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ABSTRACT

The Impact of Local Demographic Change in the Contemporary United States
by
Christopher Maggio

Advisor: Richard Alba
Growing racial/ethnic diversity has undoubtedly made a major social and political
impact in many localities across the United States in recent times. Various studies have
addressed local reactions to this demographic change, most commonly highlighting
backlash among the White population. This dissertation takes an in-depth look at the impact
of these demographic changes on several key outcomes: the 2016 presidential election,
White attitudes toward immigration policy, and perceptions of racism among racial/ethnic
minorities that may emerge as a result of White backlash. These studies are careful to
examine particular subsamples that may be more or less susceptible to backlash or its
knock-on effects, adding nuance to our understanding of the processes behind these
relationships. I also contribute methodologically by using analytical techniques that address
the fact that where rapid demographic change is most likely to occur is not random, thus
arriving at quasi-causal estimations of the impact of demographic change on the outcomes
described above.
I find increased Trump voting in counties that underwent a rapid increase in the
Hispanic population prior to the 2016 election, providing evidence that Trump’s antiimmigrant and anti-Latinx appeals were highly effective in these places, particularly in
iv

“new” Latinx destinations. Further analysis of the “swing” states, however, leaves
uncertainty about the actual impact of demographic change on the election results. I also
find that U.S.-born Whites in counties undergoing rapid Hispanic growth have more
negative immigration attitudes, but only among certain groups: those with lower levels of
education, political Independents, and those whose household incomes have decreased in
the past year. These results specifically highlight that backlash to demographic change
should likely be considered a group-specific phenomenon. Lastly, I find evidence that,
among Hispanics and Blacks, backlash to demographic change may lead to increased
perceptions of racism.

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor, Richard Alba, for his immeasurable insight and
guidance in writing this dissertation. Similarly, I would like to thank the rest of my
committee, Maria Abascal, Philip Kasinitz, and Mary Clare Lennon, for consistently
pushing me to make this a better dissertation. Paul Attewell and Leslie McCall were also
instrumental in the development of my second chapter in particular, as well as my
intellectual development more generally. I would like to thank my fellow students at the
Graduate Center and elsewhere for their feedback and camaraderie, especially the
Immigration Working Group. My friends and family also deserve an acknowledgment,
particularly my wife, Marisa Calleja, who has been unbelievably supportive of me
throughout this process.
It should be noted that a version of the second chapter of this dissertation has been
published in Social Science Research, and a version of the fourth chapter will be published
in the Du Bois Review.

vi

CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. viii
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW ................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION .......................................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER 3. PRIMED FOR BACKLASH: AMONG WHOM DOES DEMOGRAPHIC
CHANGE PROVOKE ANTI-IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES ........................................... 43
CHAPTER 4. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND PERCEPTIONS OF RACISM ............ 71
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS .................................................................... 100
TABLES ............................................................................................................................. 110
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 164

vii

TABLES
Page
Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics for various CCES samples .............................................. 110
Table 1.2. Logistic regressions predicting Trump voting with demographic change
variables ............................................................................................................. 111
Table 1.3. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with demographic change
variables ............................................................................................................. 115
Table 1.4. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic
percentage point growth .................................................................................... 116
Table 1.5. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic
percentage point growth (non-Hispanic Whites only) ....................................... 120
Table 1.6. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic
percentage point growth (non-Hispanic Whites only with varying levels of
education and family income) ........................................................................... 123
Table 1.7. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump/Romney voting with demographic
change variables (county-level) ......................................................................... 126
Table 1.8. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic
percentage point growth (counties in top quartile of citizen voting-age population
within swing states) ........................................................................................... 128
Table A1. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Romney voting with percentage point
growth in Hispanic citizen voting-age population (CVAP) vs. percentage point
growth in all other Hispanics (county-level) ..................................................... 129
Table B1. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic
percentage point growth (non-Hispanic Whites in swing states with varying
levels of education and family income) ............................................................. 130
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their current city
for at least 18 years ............................................................................................ 133
Table 2.2. Logistic regressions predicting preference to reduce legal immigration with
county-level demographic change variables ...................................................... 134
Table 2.3. AIPW and IPWRA regressions predicting preference to reduce legal
immigration with county-level demographic change variables ......................... 137
Table 2.4. AIPW and IPWRA regressions predicting preference to reduce legal
immigration with top quartile of Hispanic growth (reported decreased household
income in the past year) ..................................................................................... 140
Table 2.5. AIPW and IPWRA regressions predicting alternative outcomes with top quartile
of Hispanic growth and controls for key subsamples ........................................ 141
Table 2.6. Mean percentage point growth, treatment vs. control groups (inverse-probabilityweighted) ........................................................................................................... 143
Table A2. Racial resentment questions .............................................................................. 144
Table B2. Correlations between key characteristics .......................................................... 144
Table 3.1. Agreement that racial problems are rare and/or isolated by race/ethnicity,
nativity, and immigrant generation .................................................................... 145
Table 3.2. OLS regressions predicting agreement that racial problems are rare/isolated with
county-level demographic change and various other county-level and individuallevel variables .................................................................................................... 147
viii

Table 3.3. Multinomial logistic regressions predicting agreement that racial problems are
rare/isolated with county-level demographic change ........................................ 152
Table 3.4. OLS regressions predicting various racism-related outcomes with county-level
demographic change .......................................................................................... 154
Table 3.5. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting agreement that racial problems are
rare/isolated........................................................................................................ 155
Table 3.6. Average percentage point growth, treatment vs. control counties (inverseprobability-weighted) ........................................................................................ 156
Table 3.7. Average estimated descriptive statistics for "high-growth" counties (inverseprobability-weighted) ........................................................................................ 157
Table 3.8. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting agreement that racial problems are
rare/isolated for various subsamples .................................................................. 159
Table 3.9. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting various “racism-related”
variables ............................................................................................................. 159
Table A3. Agreement on various racism-related questions by race/ethnicity.................... 160
Table B3. Correlations between various racism-related outcomes .................................... 161
Table C3. Mean likelihood of selection into "high growth" for respondents in treatment and
control counties with and without inverse probability weights applied ............ 162
Table D3. Correlations between contextual and individual characteristics for Black and
Hispanic respondents ......................................................................................... 163

ix

CHAPTER ONE
Overview

Introduction
In the post-1965 era, patterns of migration and Hispanic/Asian population growth have
led to increased diversity in many areas of the United States (Portes and Rumbaut 2014). The
Black population is also growing in various places, many of which had previously lost Black
residents in the Great Migration (Frey 2004; Wilkerson 2010). Questions about the impact of the
ethno-racial environment on social and political outcomes have long interested social scientists,
and new scholarship has studied the impact of these demographic trends and their potential to
generate backlash among local populations, particularly local White populations, in various
ways. Drawing on some of the original research on racial group threat related to both minority
group size (Key 1949; Blalock 1967) and growth (Allport 1954; Blalock 1956; Williams Jr.
1947), researchers have identified relationships between rapid demographic change and various
outcomes, including immigration attitudes, voting patterns, and policy preferences (Enos 2017;
Hopkins 2009, 2010; Johnston, Newman, and Velez 2015; Newman 2013), primarily from a
backlash framework (but see Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2018). This dissertation will add to this
research through the approaches described in more detail below.
Broadly speaking, various scholars in recent years have written about concerns of “status
threat” among the White majority in the United States vis-à-vis immigrants and racial/ethnic
minorities. Mutz (2018:2) describes status threat related to demographic change in the following
way: “The declining white share of the national population is unlikely to change white

1

Americans’ status as the most economically well-off racial group, but symbolically, it threatens
some whites’ sense of dominance over social and political priorities.” Additionally, Mutz (2018)
finds evidence that concerns over immigration were particularly important in understanding the
election of Donald Trump in 2016, particularly related to the divergence in how voters perceived
the distance between Trump and Hillary Clinton on the issue of immigration. Sides, Tesler, and
Vavreck (2018) make similar arguments in their assessment of the 2016 election. Prior to this,
Parker and Barreto (2013:3) demonstrated how status threat generated by the election of the first
African American president, Barack Obama, was important in support for the Tea Party, a rightwing movement that sprung up in the wake of the 2008 election, with many of its members
demonstrating “the anxiety they feel as they perceive the America they know…slipping away,
threatened by the rapidly changing face of what they believe is the ‘real’ America: a
heterosexual, Christian, middle-class, (mostly) male, white country.” Also studying Tea Party
supporters, Hochschild (2016) describes White perceptions of immigrants and racial minorities
“cutting them in line” for the rewards they believed they deserved. Conveying a similar
perception, many of Gest’s (2016) working-class White respondents in Youngstown, Ohio
suggested that “welfare recipients,” often thought to be disproportionately African Americans,
have usurped them in the American status hierarchy.
Experimental research has displayed similar notions of White status threat by exposing
Whites to information about racial/ethnic demographic change and studying how this impacts
their political and social attitudes, usually with a conservatizing effect (see Craig, Rucker, and
Richeson [2018] for a review of the literature). For instance, Craig and Richeson (2014) link
exposure to information about demographic change to more conservative political ideology
among Whites, while Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich (2018) link it to White support for
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Trump. Evidence of status threat in these experimental studies has been identified for racial
minorities as well (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). It should be noted, however, that
the “majority-minority” projection employed in much of this literature has been questioned on
sociological grounds related to the position of the mixed-race population in American society
(Alba 2018), and alternative framings of demographic change may produce more positive
reactions among the White population (Myers and Levy 2018). Regardless, it is clear that
demographic concerns are important in generating status threat for Whites.
With this is mind, what is the role of actual local demographic conditions for status
threat? Research on how the local ethno-racial environment impacts attitudes toward race
alongside key social and political variables has been a major part of research on race in America
for many years. The most important early work comes from Key (1949), Southern Politics in
State and Nation. Key found that Whites in the Jim Crow South were more likely to take various
political actions in defense of White supremacy in places with larger African American
populations, ostensibly a reaction to this group’s presence as a threat to White supremacy.
Blalock (1967) further developed the concept of group threat in his work, Toward a Theory of
Minority-Group Relations, positing that majority groups will often react to a large minority
group in a way that supposes they are a threat to their resources, whether economic, social, or
political. Blalock also posits that there are diminishing returns to this relationship, meaning that
at a certain point larger numbers in the out-group will no longer generate additional threat.
Allport's (1954) earlier work, The Nature of Prejudice, was important to this conversation
through his introduction of intergroup contact theory. This theory posits that increased contact
between groups will break down stereotypical beliefs and improve relations, under specific
conditions such as equal status among groups and a set of common goals. In their meta-analysis,
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Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) actually find that such conditions are not necessary to produce
positive intergroup contact, but instead can enhance the positive effects of contact. The
intergroup contact theory is often framed as being in contradiction to the group threat theory, but
there is evidence that both can operate simultaneously (Knowles and Tropp 2018).
While the predictions of both theories have materialized in the research, many studies
have found the group threat effect to dominate when examining the impact of Black population
size and the perceived threat among Whites (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Frisbie and Neidert 1977;
Giles and Buckner 1993; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998; Wright 1977). However, the
position of African Americans in the United States is unique in many ways, and the history of
racism—from slavery to Jim Crow to mass incarceration—has likely generated a White-Black
dynamic that is uniquely problematic in American life (Kendi 2017). This is not to say that racial
issues do not strongly impact the lives of Hispanics and Asians, but it is clear that the group
threat research does not necessarily replicate as consistently for these groups (Dixon and
Rosenbaum 2004; Fox 2004; Taylor 1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003), even in the era of mass
immigration where their numbers have been steadily growing. Moreover, there are complications
underlying all research on minority group size and demographic threat/intergroup contact, most
notably the selection effect, whereby places with diverse populations are more likely to attract
White people with a preference or tolerance for diversity (Gould 2000).
Given this reality, many researchers have turned to demographic change rather than
group size as the appropriate metric for analyzing reactions to incoming immigrant-origin
groups. The idea here is that while individuals may select in and out of diverse places based on
preferences about the ethno-racial environment, thus confounding the effects of said environment
on various outcomes, demographic change over a relatively short period of time may disrupt
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one’s expectations about their local environment and thus trigger a reaction that can be measured
in various ways.1 Additionally, while a baseline level of local diversity may be viewed as
acceptable, rapid changes in local diversity may upset the status quo and lead individuals to reevaluate their orientation toward the community (Hopkins 2009). Moreover, people often notice
change more than the absolute state, which they may have become accustomed to and use as a
point of reference (Helson 1964; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Various studies have found that
conservative voting patterns, attitudes, or policy outcomes have emerged in places with rapidly
changing demographics (Arzheimer 2009; Becker and Fetzer 2017; Enos 2017; Hopkins 2009,
2010; Johnston et al. 2015; Newman 2013; Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 2018; Swank and
Betz 2003). The details of these studies will be discussed below in the relevant empirical
chapters.
Data
The primary data set for this dissertation is the Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(CCES). The CCES is a voting and political attitudes survey of adults in the United States. For
the first empirical chapter, this survey offers information on voting (and non-voting) in the 2016
election, allowing me to determine if Trump’s appeals to anti-immigrant sentiment were
particularly effective in places undergoing rapid demographic change. For the second empirical
chapter, I use several questions about documented and undocumented immigration policy
preferences to determine among which subgroups of U.S.-born non-Hispanic Whites backlash
against demographic change in terms of immigration attitudes is most likely. For the third
empirical chapter, I examine racial minorities’ perceptions of racism in places undergoing rapid
demographic change, primarily through their assessment of whether racial problems are
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Selection in and out of these places may still be an issue, and I will address this issue in various
ways that are outlined in this dissertation.
5

rare/isolated, but also through their perceptions of White privilege, their anger about the
existence of racism, and their fear of other races. The CCES also offers various socioeconomic,
demographic, and attitudinal variables, which I use both as controls and as ways to identify
particular subgroups described above and in more detail below. Crucially, the CCES provides
information on respondent county of residence, allowing me to link this survey to various data
sets to provide contextual characteristics of the county, most importantly racial/ethnic
demographic change and immigrant growth since 2000. For these variables, I use data from the
Census and American Community Surveys, as prepared by Social Explorer, and for county-level
voting results I use David Leip’s Election Atlas. More specificity is provided where relevant for
each individual empirical chapter.
Methodology
Each of these studies links demographic change to the different outcomes of interest
described above. Generally speaking, the key independent or treatment variables of demographic
change are defined as the percentage point growth in foreign-born, Hispanic, Asian, and/or Black
population at the county level since 2000. These variables are defined as both continuous
variables and categorical variables representing higher or lower growth. The goal for the
continuous variables is to determine if a percentage point increase in growth of the groups
described above is associated with changes in Trump voting, immigration attitudes, and
perception of racism. The goal for the categorical variables is to determine if the relationship
between demographic change and these outcomes may be concentrated at higher levels of
demographic change, mostly the top quartile, but I also employ robustness checks with other
cutoff points. These modeling strategies are employed in OLS regressions, logistic regressions,
ordered logistic regressions, and multinomial logistic regressions, depending on the outcome in
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question and the goal of each particular analysis. This will be described in more detail for each
empirical chapter.
The categorical treatment variable is also required by the quasi-causal selection models
that I employ in this study. Specifically, I use inverse-probability-weighted regression
adjustment (IPWRA) and augmented inverse-probability-weighting (AIPW) (Huber and Drukker
2015). These methods weight cases according to their likelihood of being selected into treatment
(treatment in this case meaning rapid demographic change), providing a larger weight for those
that make it into the treatment category but are highly unlikely to (based on a model predicting
the treatment variable), and vice versa. This is done in an effort to make the treatment and
control groups more similar in terms of the characteristics predicting selection into treatment
after applying the weights, and, in theory, isolating the effect of the treatment variable on the
outcome. These characteristics include preexisting racial/ethnic demographics, preexisting
political environment, and economic conditions such as the level and change in median
household income. By weighting according to this selection into treatment, these methods
account for the fact that places experiencing rapid demographic change may differ systematically
from those that do not, and that these differences may be related to the outcomes analyzed in this
dissertation. These methods provide a “quasi-causal” approach to my analysis. While not
allowing me to make causal claims to the same extent as an experimental study, for instance,
they still approach causality in a more rigorous way than a traditional OLS or logistic
regressions. It should also be noted that these methods require the omission of cases that violate
the “overlap assumption,” cases where the likelihood of selection into treatment is extremely
high or extremely low, in order to avoid unstable estimates (StataCorp 2013). More detail about
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modeling selection into treatment as well as control variables and other important aspects of the
modeling approach will be described in the relevant empirical chapters below.
The choice to primarily operationalize demographic change in percentage point terms at
the county level is driven by several considerations. Firstly, this formulation has been shown to
be important in recognizing demographic change among a local population. Specifically,
Newman and Velez (2014) find that percentage point growth in the Hispanic population at the
county level is associated with increased perceptions of “new immigration” into the local
community. In other words, people notice percentage point racial/ethnic demographic change at
the country level, and establishing evidence of this awareness gives me confidence that this
formulation will be useful as a predictor of various reactions to this demographic change, for
instance in terms of Trump voting and immigration policy attitudes. Arguments have been made
for examining the ethno-racial environment at the state level (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015),
namely because selection out of a state is less common than at lower levels of geography and
that media accounts will alert people to immigration to their state even if they do not observe it
locally. However, the direct evidence of recognition of immigration at the county level provided
by Newman and Velez (2014) establishes the validity of this methodological approach.
Additionally, selection should be less of a concern when examining demographic change over a
relatively short period of time, and I attempt to account for selection in other ways described in
more detail below.
Secondly, while it is important to note that there are limitations to both percentage point
and percentage change formulations for demographic growth, I am able to overcome the
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shortcomings of the former through analytical strategies described below.2 In the simplest terms,
percentage growth will generally be negatively correlated with the preexisting population of the
particular group. This is because places with lower starting points of Hispanics, for instance, will
have an overstated growth in percentage terms when in percentage point terms this growth is
more modest. For instance, if a county moves from 1% Hispanic to 2% Hispanic, this is only a 1
percentage point growth in the Hispanic population, but 100% percent growth in the Hispanic
population. It is clear from this example how the level of percentage growth could be overstated
in many cases. Alternatively, percentage point growth tends to be positively correlated with the
preexisting population of the particular group, as would be predicted by cumulative causation
theory (Massey 1999),3 with the barriers to movement to a particular place being lowered by coethnic networks that provide improved access to jobs, housing, and/or cultural and social life.
The limitation here is that, while an increase of 5% to 10% Hispanic, for instance, might be
somewhat impactful in terms of local reactions to demographic change, an increase from 50% to
55% may be less noticeable and/or impactful, particularly given evidence that the backlash to
demographic change may, in many instances, subside in places where there is already an
established population of the group that is increasing its numbers (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong
1998; Newman 2013). This may be due to the long-term positive effects of contact or selection
out of these places by those less tolerant of immigrants or racial/ethnic minorities, but either way
it places a limit on the usefulness of percentage point growth as a measure of demographic
change. To address this limitation, in all three empirical chapters I examine percentage point
demographic change in counties with different preexisting racial/ethnic demographics at the

2

All analyses in this paragraph have been performed by the author using the Census and
American Community Survey.
3
Population growth through births will also play a role here.
9

county level. This way, I am able to get the “best of both worlds” by specifically analyzing
counties that had both a high growth in percentage point terms and a relatively low percentage of
racial/ethnic minorities, often referred to as “new destinations” in the relevant literature (Massey
2008). Past research has suggested that these counties will be especially likely to display
backlash to demographic change (Grattet 2009; Green et al. 1998; Lyons 2008; Newman 2013;
Stacey, Carbone-López, and Rosenfeld 2011), and there is indeed evidence of this in this
dissertation, though with various caveats that will be explored more fully below. Additionally, I
do secondarily test percentage growth as a variable that is potentially associated with the
outcomes in this dissertation and address these results as appropriate.
Lastly, there are practical reasons to primarily focus on percentage point change at the
county level in this dissertation. County of residence is available in the public data of the CCES,
something that is not true of many national surveys. Exploiting this information by linking the
CCES to the Census, American Community Survey, and data from Election Atlas is a uniquely
beneficial approach for this particular data set. Additionally, previous relevant studies have also
used percentage point growth at the county level (Hopkins 2010; Johnston et al. 2015; Newman
2013; Newman and Velez 2014), so this allows for a greater level of comparability with the
current dissertation.
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CHAPTER TWO
Demographic Change and the 2016 Presidential Election

Abstract
The election of Donald Trump raised many questions about the impact of immigration on
American politics. This chapter asks whether backlash to demographic change in counties
undergoing rapid growth in foreign-born, Hispanic, and/or Asian populations may have played a
role in his election. I use the techniques accounting for selection into treatment to examine the
relationship between demographic changes at the county level and voting patterns in the 2016
presidential election. Analyzing individual-level survey data and controlling for voting patterns
in 2012, I find that people living in counties with a rapid percentage point increase in the
Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote for Trump in the general and primary
elections. For non-Hispanic Whites in the general election, Hispanic growth is predictive of
Trump voting among those with both lower levels of education and higher family incomes, as
well as those living in counties with smaller Hispanic populations in 2000 (“new destinations”).
There is also evidence of backlash to Hispanic growth among Asian voters. When analyzing
county-level election results, I again find an uptick in Trump voting in high-Hispanic-growth
counties for the general election, but these results do not replicate for swing states, or for the
primaries. This provides reason to be cautious about claims that backlash against local
demographic trends “won” Trump the election, though data limitations prevent me from
analyzing all key locations individually. Regardless, this chapter provides clear evidence of an
impact of local demographic change on contemporary U.S. politics.
Introduction
11

During the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump ran a campaign
highly focused on immigration, usually with a negative framing (Lamont, Park, and AyalaHurtado 2017). In contemporary political history, restrictionist attitudes toward immigration,
particularly with regard to undocumented immigration, have been an important position of many,
though not all, in the Republican Party (Wroe 2008). However, as this unconventional candidate
was wont to do, Trump amplified the rhetoric around immigrants—as well as racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities—in ways that discomforted some Republicans (Diamond 2015; Ye Hee Lee
2015). Some predicted that these sorts of comments, among other types of controversial
statements, would contribute to derailing the Trump campaign (Kruse and Gee 2016). Given
Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016 election, it worth investigating the role that immigration
played in this outcome.
This chapter addresses trends in immigration and Hispanic/Asian population growth since
2000 and quantifies what impacts these trends may have had on the 2016 presidential election.
There is ample evidence that concerns about immigration and racial/ethnic demographic change
are important to understanding support for Trump (Major et al. 2018; Mutz 2018; Sides 2017;
Sides et al. 2018). However, analysts have often pointed out that localities with higher foreignborn populations were actually less likely to vote for Trump (Flowers 2016). Various factors
likely account for this relationship, including the impact of immigrants and their children, many
of whom are racial minorities, on the electorate (Holbrook and Park 2018; Krogstad and Lopez
2016; Pew Research Center 2012; Sides 2017). Immigrants also tend to live in larger
metropolitan areas, places that were unlikely to vote for Trump (Florida 2015; Scala and Johnson
2017). For non-Hispanic Whites specifically, the relationship between Trump support and living
in a diverse place is complex, and may depend on certain individual characteristics such as party
12

identification, as well as which out-groups Whites live near, the level of geography analyzed, the
level of segregation, local economic context, selection bias, and how these relate to the
contrasting predictions of group threat and intergroup contact (Allport 1954; Blalock 1967;
Knowles and Tropp 2018; Newman et al. 2018; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019;
Rothwell 2016; Rothwell and Diego-Rosell 2016).
However, others have focused not on the size of the local immigrant-origin population,
but instead on the rapid demographic change occurring in many places. In an op-ed entitled
“How Immigration Foiled Hillary,” Thomas Edsall addresses the impact of demographic change
in new immigrant destinations on the 2016 presidential election. Edsall draws on work from
Newman (2013) to argue that the turn towards Trump may be particularly strong in places that
are less diverse but that have recently been diversifying. Additionally, various studies from
different contexts and levels of analysis have found a positive relationship between rapid
immigration/demographic change and voting for far-right candidates (Arzheimer 2009; Becker
and Fetzer 2017; Enos 2017; Swank and Betz 2003). Enos (2017) finds a positive relationship
between Hispanic percent growth at the county level and Trump voting (for Anglo Democrats in
individual-level survey data), as well as the shift from Romney to Trump (for county-level
election results), but the analyses are very limited in their use of control variables. Reny et al.
(2019) focus on the relationship between Latinx growth at the county level and vote switching
for Trump among Whites who voted for a non-Romney candidate in 2012.4 The authors find
some evidence of a positive relationship between percent Latinx growth and switching to Trump
(for White Democrats without a 4-year degree in particular). While this relationship is
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The authors examine the impact of foreign-born growth in the appendix and find no statistically
significant results.
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statistically significant, the estimate is extremely imprecise. Hill, Hopkins, and Huber (2019)
find evidence that Hispanic and non-citizen immigrant population growth at the hyper-local
precinct level likely helped Clinton on balance, but analyze a limited number of states and do not
analyze individual-level voting patterns. Additionally, various recent studies from the U.S. have
demonstrated a link between rapid demographic change and negative immigration attitudes
(Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013) (as described above), as well as expressed support for Trump
(Newman et al. 2018), both under particular conditions.
I provide a unique contribution to the literature on immigration and electoral outcomes by
addressing demographic change and Trump voting through a quasi-causal framework.
Specifically, I employ techniques intended to account for selection effects described above that
may influence both where immigrants, Hispanics, and Asians tend to move as well as voting
patterns.5 This provides a robust test of the effect of immigration or the increase in
Hispanic/Asian population shares on local voting patterns. I also analyze various samples not
specifically addressed by the above studies of the 2016 election, including racial minority
respondents and counties with different preexisting racial/ethnic makeups. I find no evidence of
an electoral backlash caused by foreign-born or Asian population growth. However, using
individual-level survey data from the CCES, I find that people living in a county with a large
percentage point increase in the Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote for
Trump in the general and primary elections (caucuses included). The general-election increase in
Trump voting is specifically found among non-Hispanic Whites and Asians. Among nonHispanic Whites, the relationship is concentrated among those with both relatively low levels of

5

This is not to say that the studies of the impact of demographic change on the 2016 election
mentioned above make no efforts to account for selection into treatment, but none do so in as
rigorous a way as will be outlined in the current chapter.
14

education and relatively high levels of family income. I also find that non-Hispanic Whites living
in counties with lower shares of Hispanics as of 2000 were considerably more likely to vote for
Trump if that county subsequently experienced rapid Hispanic population growth. I additionally
find a positive relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting in the general election
when analyzing county-level election results from Election Atlas, but find no such relationship in
general-election swing states or in the primaries. Similar general-election results emerge from
the CCES for various swing state subsamples, though every key location cannot be examined
separately. Ultimately, although there is evidence of a positive relationship between Hispanic
growth and Trump voting, I recommend caution when evaluating any argument that suggests that
local increases in Hispanics, Asians, and/or immigrants “won” Trump the election.
Literature Review
Immigrant Threat Narrative
Politicians and political activists in the United States have long drawn on immigrant
threat narratives as a strategy to gain popular support as well as to aid in the enactment of
restrictive policies toward immigrants and immigration (Lee 2002; Ngai 1999). In its
contemporary iteration in the United States, the immigrant threat narrative has most obviously
been directed at the Latinx population. Massey and Pren (2012) trace this process back to the
termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 and its phase-out from 1965 to 1967. This guestworker program offered a legal method for Mexicans to work in the United States. When this
pathway was closed and additional immigration restrictions were implemented, undocumented
immigration rose and narratives about a border invasion took off (Chavez 2001, 2008). In their
analysis, Massey and Pren (2012:4) demonstrate that, in the post-Bracero period, there was a
large increase in “instances in which the words ‘undocumented,’ ‘illegal,’ or ‘unauthorized’ were
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paired with ‘Mexico’ or ‘Mexican immigrants’ and the words ‘crisis,’ ‘flood,’ or ‘invasion,’”
across four major newspapers. As Massey and Pren (2012) document, politicians also
participated in this narrative. For instance, Governor Pete Wilson of California framed Mexican
immigration to California as an “invasion” and Ronald Reagan connected undocumented
immigration with national-security concerns. Though both major political parties have promoted
a threat narrative regarding the border, the contemporary Republican Party has certainly taken up
this mantle more aggressively, and Trump has helped to center the most extreme version of this
narrative in the American consciousness.
The Effect of Demographic Change on Electoral Outcomes
If negative attitudes toward immigrants are triggered by demographic change under
certain conditions, as described above, voters may express such sentiments by casting their
ballots for a political party or candidate that echoes these sentiments. Indeed, various empirical
studies across different contexts and levels of analysis have found evidence that inflows of
immigration are associated with (and perhaps provoke) increases in conservative or far-right
voting (Arzheimer 2009; Becker and Fetzer 2017; Enos 2017; Swank and Betz 2003). Notably,
some of the results in this literature are conditional on various factors, such as how urban the
location is (Dustmann, Vasilieva, and Piil 2019) and the socioeconomic status of the immigrant
group (Edo et al. 2019; Mayda et al. 2018).6 An additional caveat is that the coefficients in these
studies vary in size, and some find little evidence that immigration flows were, ultimately,
particularly impactful (Becker and Fetzer 2017). Despite this, and despite the fact that not all
studies show a positive impact on conservative voting (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Mayda et al.
2018), there is a substantial body of evidence confirming the hypothesis that conservative voting

6

Edo et al. (2019) also find nationality to be important.
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is tied to immigration threat, and the magnitudes in these studies are often quite substantial
(Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018).
The question of whether immigration causes conservative or far-right voting is another
matter. Most innovatively, various authors have used natural experiment, difference in
difference, instrumental variable, propensity score matching, and/or synthetic control group
approaches to answer this question (Becker and Fetzer 2017; Dustmann et al. 2019; Edo et al.
2019; Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Thompson 2021). The difficulty that these authors are
attempting to overcome is that the places where immigrants and immigrant-origin groups choose
to live may vary systematically in ways that are related to voting patterns. I attempt to solve this
problem by using the techniques described above, which account for selection into particular
geographical areas by inverse-weighting observations according to the likelihood of the county
having been a high-migration or Hispanic/Asian-growth setting in the 2000 to 2010–2014 period.
One additional study is worth noting in particular. Newman et al. (2018) use
inflammatory comments by Donald Trump relatively early in his campaign to test the effect of
activation of anti-Latinx sentiments and to determine whether this activation might be more
effective in counties with rapidly growing Latinx populations. The authors find that living in
such a county was positively predictive of support for Trump among Republicans and
Republican-leaners after, but not before, said comments. This fits well with other research on
demographic change and political activation. For instance, Hopkins (2010) finds that restrictive
sentiment is more highly correlated with immigrant growth during times when immigration is
more nationally salient due to its level of coverage in the media. In other words, politicians and
the media can help make salient the link between immigration growth and anti-immigrant
sentiment and/or right-wing voting.
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Such a framing effect is exemplified not only by the focus of Trump in his campaign on
the issue of undocumented immigration (Lamont et al. 2017), for instance, but also by the
evidence that immigration became important for Trump voting in a way that it was not in the
most recent presidential election prior. For instance, according to Sides (2017:4), “attitudes about
immigration, feelings toward black people, and feelings toward Muslims7 became more strongly
related to voter decision making [for Whites] in 2016 compared to 2012….The greater salience
of attitudes related to race, ethnicity, and religion arguably derives from a campaign far more
focused on immigration and the threat of terrorism than the 2012 campaign was.”8 In the case of
the current chapter, I hypothesize that Trump’s public framing may have primed a backlash
effect, and that such an effect may be reflected in his likelihood of capturing votes in places that
have undergone rapid demographic change. Lastly, it should be noted that, although the focus of
the Trump campaign was clearly on Hispanic migration, it is worth analyzing Asian migration as
well given Trump’s anti-China rhetoric that could be viewed through an anti-Asian framework
(Mirilovic and Kim 2017; Stracqualursi 2017), and more generally because of the importance of
comparing the reception of Hispanic and Asian immigration in the contemporary United States
(Ha 2010; Pew Research Center 2015).
Data
To answer the questions posed in this chapter, I use multiple data sources. First, I analyze
individual-level survey data from the 2016 CCES (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). The
CCES was fielded in two waves, one just before the 2016 general presidential election and one

7

Feelings toward Muslims are not, however, a statistically significant predictor in the 2016
model.
8
Mutz (2018) reaches a somewhat different conclusion on this matter in terms of immigration
attitudes, but certainly does not deny the importance of immigration attitudes in the 2016
election.
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just after. It provides a large sample of U.S. citizen adults for whom there is voting (or nonvoting) information and post-election survey weights for the 2016 general presidential election
(N = 51,690). Crucially, it also asks about voting behavior from the 2012 presidential election
and provides county-level residential information. Next, I analyze county-level election results
for the 2016 and 2012 presidential elections from David Leip’s Election Atlas (Leip 2013, 2017).
These data sets have voting information from over 3,000 counties and county-equivalent
geographies. For the current chapter, the sample size of both of these data sets is reduced due to
the exclusion of Alaska, whose voting results from Election Atlas are not reported by its closest
county equivalent (boroughs). The sample sizes are reduced further due to a small amount of
missing data on certain variables. I merge the above data sets with the 2000 Census and the
2006–2010 and 2010–2014 American Community Surveys, which provide the treatment
variables reflecting demographic change across counties, as well as other control variables, either
directly from these sources or constructed from them. As described in the first chapter, Newman
and Velez (2014) provide evidence that demographic change at the county level is highly
noticeable to residents, justifying the use of this geographic unit when analyzing the relationship
between demographic changes and the outcomes for this chapter and the rest of the dissertation. I
choose the 2000 to 2010–2014 period of demographic change for the main analysis to allow for a
substantial period for demographic change to generate and to maximize comparability with key
studies in this area (Enos 2017; Newman et al. 2018; Reny et al. 2019).
Research Questions
The research questions for this chapter are as follows:
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1. Were individuals living in counties undergoing rapid demographic change since 2000 more
likely to vote for Trump in the 2016 presidential general election, controlling for their voting
(or non-voting) in 2012? This analysis uses the CCES.
2. Are there differential impacts of demographic change depending on the group of voters or
potential voters? This includes the impact of demographic change on subsamples of
respondents based on voting patterns in 2012, race/ethnicity, levels of education and family
income, and the preexisting racial/ethnic demographic makeup of their county in 2000. This
analysis uses the CCES.
3. Did demographic change have an impact on voting patterns in the 2016 Republican
primaries?9 I compare Trump’s success to all other candidates using the CCES.
4. Do impacts of demographic change appear in actual county-level election results for 2016,
controlling for results from 2012? In addition to the full set of counties, I also examine the
“traditional” swing states, as designated by Silver (2016).10 Alternatively, might there be an
effect of demographic change on electoral outcomes that predated Trump? To answer this
question, I analyze the relationship between demographic change and results in the 2012
election, controlling for results in the 2000 election. These analyses use Election Atlas.
5. I return to the CCES to assess the impact of demographic change on several additional
samples that might be especially important in evaluating the impact of demographic change

9

For all analyses of the Republican primaries, I include states that hold caucuses but not states
whose primaries/caucuses were ultimately meaningless, which is to say those that held them after
Trump had effectively won the nomination (California, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia). By controlling for state of
residence, I account for any specific features of state primaries or caucuses that may be
important.
10
This includes Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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on the 2016 election: the swing states that Trump won, counties within swing states and the
swing states that Trump won that also have a high citizen voting-age population, and
individual swing states where possible (Florida and Pennsylvania).11
Methodology
As stated, to analyze the key questions of this chapter, I examine the relationship between
a county having high growth in foreign-born, Hispanic, or Asian share of the population from
2000 to 2010–2014 and voting for Trump, using both individual-level survey data and countylevel election results. I use two techniques to account for selection into treatment: augmented
inverse-probability-weighting (AIPW) and inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment
(IPWRA) (Huber and Drukker 2015). Again, the goal here is to inverse-weight counties
according to their probability of having experienced a high rate of growth in the share of the
population that is foreign-born/Hispanic/Asian since 2000. The treatment group has actually
experienced this large demographic change and the control group has experienced much more
modest growth in their foreign-born/Hispanic/Asian population share, or even no growth or
negative growth in some cases. This is done in an effort to make the treatment and control groups
more similar in terms of characteristics predicting selection into treatment and, in theory,
isolating the effect of the treatment variable. The AIPW and IPWRA methods accomplish these
goals in somewhat different ways (see StataCorp [2013] and Huber and Drukker [2015] for
detailed explanations), and using both methods in this dissertation will provide robustness checks
on the results.

11

I analyze only Florida and Pennsylvania as individual states primarily due to concerns about
sample size overall and/or for certain categories of certain variables.
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Key Variables
For the analysis of individual-level survey data, I employ binary outcomes indicating
whether someone voted for Trump or not. In the primary analysis on the full sample, the group
that did not vote for Trump includes those who voted for another candidate or did not vote at all.
I include non-voters as a group that may have been influenced in their decision to not vote by
similar factors as those who chose to vote for a particular candidate, including demographic
change. I use this expansive definition as a way to identify initial relationships in the general
sample, and then perform robustness checks to ensure that the results replicate to other
definitions of Trump voting. These include voting for Trump vs. voting for another candidate
and voting for Trump vs. voting for Hillary Clinton, Trump’s only competitive challenger. For
the analyses of the county-level election results, the outcomes include the percentage of a
particular county that voted for Trump, as well as the percentage point difference between
Trump and Clinton. I also analyze vote percentage for Mitt Romney in 2012 at the county level.
The primary treatment variables are binary variables representing counties with high rates
of growth in their foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian population shares. I use a binary treatment
variable in all models to match the binary treatment in the analyses accounting for selection into
treatment. I generally (though not always)12 define “high-growth” counties as counties in the top
quartile of percentage point growth from 2000 to 2010–2014 for Trump voting, and from 2000 to
2006–2010 for Romney voting.

12

I use different formulations of this variable where necessary for the purposes of maintaining a
reasonable sample size for relevant categories and achieving convergence. I note in all tables
which formulation is being used.
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Controls
For every model, I employ controls that may be correlated with the treatment and
outcome. For the analysis of individual-level survey data, I control for education, family income,
employment status, race/ethnicity, Hispanic identification, immigrant generation, gender, birth
year, current/former union membership, parental/guardian status (children under 18), marital
status, state of residence, and length of current residence to account for selection in and out of
places of residence that may be correlated with key variables in this chapter. As additional
contextual variables, I control for the population density and labor force participation (age 16+)
in a respondent’s county, as well percent foreign-born, Hispanic, or Asian in 2000, depending on
the treatment variable. I also control for population movements in and out of these counties that
might be important: U.S.-born, non-Hispanic, or non-Asian population change from 2000 to
2010–2014, respectively, depending on the treatment variable. Lastly, I control for who the
respondent voted for in 2012, as well as the percentage of their county that voted for Romney in
2012. The former includes an “other” category for those who did not vote in 2012, were too
young to vote in 2012, voted for someone besides Romney or Obama, or it is uncertain who they
voted for.13
For the analysis of county-level election results, I control for the percent foreign-born,
Hispanic, and Asian for different years depending on the model. If I am examining the impact of
high Hispanic growth, for instance, I control for percent foreign-born and Asian in 2010–2014
(or 2006–2010 in the 2012 election models) and control for percent Hispanic in 2000. The idea
here is that the percent Hispanic in 2000 captures that population at the beginning of the growth

13

A small number of respondents who were too young to vote in 2012 claim to have voted for
Obama or Romney. I code them as having voted for these candidates as a way to capture their
preference, even if they could not actually vote.
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period, which may be related to subsequent growth, and the treatment variable captures the
increase over time. I also control for percent non-Hispanic Black, the percent with at least a
bachelor’s degree (age 25+), the population density, median household income, median
household income growth since 2000, percent in the labor force (age 16+), percent never married
(age 15+), percent age 65 or older, percent female, and state of residence. Again, I control for the
population growth/decline of U.S.-born, non-Hispanic, and non-Asian populations to account for
selection in and out of particular counties, as appropriate. For the models predicting the percent
voting for Trump, I control for the percent of the population that voted for Romney in 2012 as a
gauge of voting preferences in the recent past, and for the models predicting the difference
between Trump and Clinton voting, I control for the difference between Romney and Obama
voting in 2012. For the analysis of the 2012 election, all relevant controls are from 2006–2010
instead of 2010–2014, and prior voting patterns are captured by the percent that voted for George
Bush in 2000. The purpose here is to control for voting preferences at the beginning of the period
of demographic change to determine if Republicans may have captured electoral gains from
backlash against demographic change prior to Trump.
Predicting Selection into Treatment
To predict selection into treatment for the AIPW and IPWRA analyses, I use variables
likely to be correlated with growth in the share of the population that is foreign-born, Hispanic,
and/or Asian since 2000. First, I include the percent foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian in 2000,
as appropriate depending on the treatment. I include population density and population in 2000
as predictors. Immigrant groups are often attracted to large metropolitan areas (Portes and
Rumbaut 2014), but new destinations have grown as well (Massey 2008). Immigrants tend to
move to places with more economic opportunities (Borjas 2014), but also may end up in
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relatively low-income counties, perhaps for cost-of-living purposes (Marrow 2011), and growth
of a relatively low-income group may lead to relatively lower median household income growth.
Therefore, I include median household income in 2000 and median household income growth
since 2000 as predictors of the treatment variables. As much of the foreign-born, Hispanic, and
Asian growth is concentrated in particular states, I include state of residence as a predictor of
selection into treatment as well.
Subsample Analyses
One important goal of this chapter is to examine how the impact of demographic change
on Trump voting may vary by respondents’ personal and contextual characteristics. One obvious
distinction is party affiliation/past voting patterns. One might expect Republicans, who tend to
have more negative attitudes toward immigration (B. Jones 2019), to react more negatively to
demographic change. Indeed, Myers and Levy (2018) find this to be the case in terms of
exposure to information about Whites becoming a minority.14 In the case of the current chapter, I
examine subsamples depending on voting in 2012. While we may expect Romney voters to be
more negatively impacted by demographic change, we also know that these voters were already
highly likely to vote for Trump, and it may be non-Romney voters who see the biggest impact.
Enos (2017) finds results that support such a hypothesis, namely that Anglo Democrats, though
not Anglo Republicans or Independents, were more likely to vote for Trump in counties
undergoing higher growth in the Hispanic population.
Much of the research on backlash to demographic change in the U.S. is focused on the
reactions of non-Hispanic Whites (Craig and Richeson 2014; Enos 2017; Myers and Levy 2018;
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The authors also find that the framing of information about projected demographic change is
critically important in predicting how respondents will react and how this varies by party
affiliation.
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Newman 2013; Reny et al. 2019). The current chapter will of course examine this group, but a
growing body of work has also assessed the potential impact of demographic change on nonWhite minority groups (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). Relative group position may
be important when theorizing the relationship between demographic change and conservative
turns in voting. Blacks may view Hispanics as economic competitors given their generally
similar class status (Kochhar and Cilluffo 2018), but also may recognize similarities between
their own experiences of discrimination and those of Hispanics (J. Jones 2011). Asians may find
commonality with Hispanics in terms of immigrant or second-generation experiences, but
divergent class statuses can also generate conflict through employer-employee relationships, for
instance (Min 2007).
Like political affiliation, education also tends to be an important predictor of attitudes
toward immigration in the U.S., with those at higher levels of education expressing more positive
attitudes (Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). If wage
competition with relatively “low-skilled” immigrant-origin groups is part of the reason why, we
may expect relatively low-income individuals to express similar attitudes and perhaps be more
likely to vote for Trump in response to demographic change in their communities. However, it is
not entirely clear that this is the case (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and
Margalit 2015), and instead the relationship between education and immigration attitudes may be
driven more by cultural and racial-status concerns (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).
Additionally, although there are mixed results in the literature (Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller
and Hiscox 2010; Tingley 2013), there is at least some evidence that concerns about fiscal
burden may drive immigration concerns in certain circumstances (Facchini and Mayda 2009;
Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). In the case of the current chapter, this raises the
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possibility that relatively well-off Americans, those most likely to fear an increased tax burden,
may have been driven to Trump as a result of demographic change (Nunns et al. 2015).
Additionally, prior evidence has demonstrated that preexisting racial/ethnic
demographics at the local level may be an important factor in predicting the impact of
demographic change. As touched on above, Newman (2013) finds that anti-immigrant backlash,
in terms of cultural threat perception, is strong in counties that saw both a large percentage point
increase in the Hispanic population and had fewer Hispanics to begin with. Drawing on the
defended-neighborhood hypothesis (Green et al. 1998) and the literature on acculturative stress
(Berry 1997),15 Newman hypothesizes that demographic change is particularly disruptive,
“culturally threatening,” and likely to cause backlash in places with little preexisting non-White
immigrant population. The author describes this as the “acculturating-contexts hypothesis.” I
apply the same logic to my analyses, separately analyzing counties with different racial/ethnic
makeups in 2000.
Lastly, I also perform additional analyses restricting the sample to swing states and the
swing states that Trump won, due to the particular importance of these subsamples on the
election results. I discuss in more detail below how these states may differ from the full sample
of states in important ways.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.116 displays the descriptive statistics for the full sample of counties in the CCES
that are analyzed in this chapter, as well as subsamples of counties in the top quartile of foreign-
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Berry (1997) focuses on acculturative stress for immigrants, while Newman (2013) uses the
concept in theorizing the experience of native Whites in relatively homogeneous places that are
rapidly diversifying.
16
The main tables in this dissertation are labeled by empirical chapter. The tables for the first
empirical chapter (Chapter 2) are labeled 1.1, 1.2, etc. The tables for the second empirical
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born, Hispanic, and Asian percentage point growth. This table uses variables merged into the
CCES from the 2000 Census and the 2010–2014 American Community Survey. As stated above,
the number of respondents for the full sample is smaller than what was given in the data section
due to the exclusion of Alaska and small amounts of missing data for some of the variables.
The key takeaway here is that counties in the top growth quartiles have substantial
growth in their respective groups. On average, this is 4.4 percentage points for foreign-born
growth, 7.6 percentage points for Hispanic growth, and 3.4 percentage points for Asian growth.
In all cases, there is at least twice the growth in these counties compared to the full set of
observations, indicating that they clearly stand out in terms of demographic change. Though not
displayed, it is also worth noting that many counties in the high-growth categories have quite a
bit higher growth than the average in their respective groups, further evidencing the unique value
of these counties in answering the questions in this chapter. Further examining the counties in the
top quartile of percentage point growth, these counties already had relatively large populations of
their respective groups in 2000. The counties with high percentage point growth in the Asian
population are particularly dense, well-off financially, and more highly educated. Counties with
high percentage point growth in the foreign-born population are doing relatively well in terms of
median household income and education as well.
Results
Logistic Regressions
Beginning with an analysis of the individual-level survey data from the CCES, Table 1.2
shows logistic regressions demonstrating the relationship between the likelihood of voting for

chapter (Chapter 3) are labeled 2.1, 2.2, etc. The tables for the third empirical chapter (Chapter
4) are labeled 3.1, 3.2, etc.
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Trump (vs. all other options including non-voting) and living in a high foreign-born, Hispanic, or
Asian share growth county, as well as Trump voting and the various controls. This table will
demonstrate whether there is a statistically significant relationship between these variables prior
to accounting for selection into treatment using the AIPW and IPWRA models. The treatments
are considered in separate models due to a high level of multicollinearity. All CCES analyses
presented are run using post-election weights provided by the CCES, as recommended in the
survey guide. I report robust standard errors as well as statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and
.1% levels for all analyses in this dissertation.
Examining the control variables, I find various relationships that are statistically
significant across all six models.17 As expected, those who voted for Romney in 2012 (or at least
claim to have) were more likely to vote for Trump than those who voted for Obama, but those
with an “other” voting history were as well. Even accounting for these relationships, those living
in a county with a higher percent of Romney voting in 2012 were also more likely to vote for
Trump. Those with a high school degree, some college, or a two-year degree were more likely to
vote for Trump than those with less than a high school degree, while those with a 4-year degree
were about as likely and those with a graduate degree were less likely, all else held constant.
There appears to be less variation by family income, though those in the $50,000 to $59,000
bracket were more likely to vote for Trump compared to those in the lowest income bracket. All
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When interpreting these relationships, it is important to remember that I control for voting
patterns in 2012. For instance, these results do not necessarily suggest that union membership did
not matter for Trump voting, only that it did not matter when I account for who respondents
voted for in 2012. In fact, when this 2012 voting variable is excluded, current union membership
negatively predicts Trump voting in relation to never having been a union member. Similarly,
when interpreting the negative relationship between Trump voting and retirement, it is important
to remember that I am already controlling for birth year. When I remove birth year and
individual 2012 voting from the model, retirement is positively correlated with Trump voting.
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else held constant, the unemployed, retirees, and homemakers were less likely to vote for Trump
compared to those with full-time jobs. Blacks, Asians, Middle Easterners, and those reporting
mixed race were less likely to vote for Trump compared to Whites. The CCES allows Hispanic
identification as part of the racial/ethnic question and as a separate question specifically about
Hispanic identification. I include both measures here and find that Hispanics were less likely to
vote for Trump. Interestingly, controlling for all other factors, foreign-born citizens were no
more or less likely to vote for Trump than second- or third-generation individuals, and were
more likely to vote for Trump than those in the fourth generation or higher. Women and younger
people were less likely to vote for Trump, as were those without children and those who were
divorced, single, or in a domestic partnership, as compared to those who were married at the
time. Current or former union members appear no more or less likely to vote for Trump as
compared to those who have never been in a union. After controlling for all other factors, the
population density of one’s county appears to have no relevance for Trump voting, while living
in a place with a higher labor force participation predicts a lower likelihood of voting for Trump.
Lastly, in general, residents with a longer tenure in their current address were more likely to vote
for Trump.
In relation to the key questions of this chapter, I find no statistically significant evidence
from logistic regressions that people living in counties with rapid percentage point growth in
immigrant, Hispanic, or Asian populations were more likely to vote for Trump. I do find that
people living in counties with rapid foreign-born growth were actually less likely to vote for
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Trump, but the analysis via techniques accounting for selection will address this more
rigorously.18
Techniques Accounting for Selection into Treatment
The next analyses account for selection into treatment using the inverse-probabilityweighted models when examining the relationship between the treatment (rapid demographic
change) and the outcome (Trump voting in the 2016 general election). I use linear probability
models (LPM) to model the outcome here because of the difficulty of convergence of logit or
probit models. Though this can be a controversial approach for various reasons, Wooldridge
(2010:563) points out that “if the main purpose of estimating a binary response model is to
estimate the partial effects of the explanatory variables, averaged across the distribution of x,
then the LPM often does a very good job….The fact that some predicted probabilities are outside
the unit interval need not be a serious concern.” Additionally, the use of robust standard errors
addresses the potential for heteroskedasticity. I perform robustness checks not presented in this
chapter with models excluding the survey weights as well as predicting treatment using only
percent foreign-born/Hispanic/Asian in 2000 (as appropriate), median household income growth,
and state of residence. “Simplified” models including one or both of these features sometimes
achieve a better balance between the treatment and control groups in terms of their likelihood of
treatment.19 The results for these models do not drastically alter any of the conclusions of this
chapter. I will describe any notable discrepancies as necessary.

18

In an analysis not presented, I also examine percentage growth, rather than percentage point
growth, of the key demographic groups, and find no statistically significant results.
19
In the main analysis for Hispanics, for instance, these weights improve the balance between
the treatment and control group substantially. In the models without the inverse probability
weights, there is a 26.8–28.8 percentage point difference in likelihood of selection into treatment
between the treatment and control groups, while this difference is only 4–7.6 percentage points
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Table 1.3 presents the results for these analyses. I exclude cases that are close to violating
the overlap assumption—those that have extremely high or extremely low probabilities of
selection into treatment—in order to avoid unstable estimates (StataCorp 2013).20 Table 1.3
demonstrates that people living in counties in the top quartile of Hispanic growth between 2000
and 2010–2014 were more likely to vote for Trump, as compared to all other options including
non-voting, in the 2016 general election.21 Voters are estimated to be 3.1 or 4.8 percentage points
more likely to vote for Trump, depending on whether AIPW or IPWRA is used. Percentage point
growth in the foreign-born and Asian populations seems to have no relationship to Trump
voting.22 These results echo recent research showing that the reception of Hispanic immigration
in the United States tends to be relatively negative compared to the reception of Asian
immigration (Pew Research Center 2015).23 More will be said about this in the second and third
empirical chapters as well as the concluding chapter.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 dig further into these results, looking at the relationship between high
Hispanic growth and Trump voting for various subsamples in the general election, as well as
separately for all respondents who voted in Republican primaries or caucuses. For the general
election these analyses use the three different definitions of Trump voting mentioned above:
Trump voting (1) vs. all other options including non-voting (0), Trump voting (1) vs. voting for

after applying the weights. This is slightly better than the primary inverse-probability-weighted
models, though the results show little difference.
20
The foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian growth models lose 13.5%, 17.5%, and 21.8% of
observations, respectively, through this process.
21
Similar results hold if I adjust the threshold to the top 20%.
22
Models using percentage growth instead of percentage point growth (not displayed) show no
statistically significant results for any group. Analyses with certain “simplified” models actually
demonstrate a negative relationship between foreign-born percent growth and Trump voting.
23
It should be noted that, as displayed in Table 1.1, Hispanic growth in the treatment counties is
more rapid than foreign-born or Asian growth, which may play a role in the differential results
for these groups.
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all other candidates (0), and Trump voting (1) vs. Clinton voting (0). For the primary election, I
examine Trump voting (1) vs. all other Republican primary-candidate voting (0).
It is worth noting that the results are fairly consistent regardless of which outcome
operationalization I use. Table 1.4 shows that, for the general election across all models, the
relationship between high Hispanic percentage point growth and Trump voting is consistently
observed among those who voted for Romney in the 2012 election. It is perhaps surprising that
Hispanic growth would influence Romney voters in this way—voters who are already highly
likely to vote for Trump—but there is also some evidence of a relationship between Hispanic
growth and Trump voting among Obama voters in the IPWRA models. Though this does not
replicate to the AIPW models, the “simplified” models show consistent statistically significant
and positive results for Obama voters, with magnitudes ranging from 2.7 to 5.5. There is no
evidence of an effect of Hispanic growth among those in the “other” voting category for 2012. I
find that the relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting is consistently present
among non-Hispanic Whites and Asians, though not among non-Hispanic Blacks. Non-Hispanic
Blacks in high-Hispanic-growth counties were less likely to vote for Trump according to one
model (IPWRA, Clinton vs. Trump), but this is not consistent across models. The result for
Asians is perhaps the most intriguing because of the large magnitude of the coefficients: 8.9 to
15.8 percentage points depending on the outcome and model, adding to recent research on nonHispanic minority reactions to Hispanic population growth, or at least exposure to information
about said growth (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). It is notable, however, that the
“simplified” models have somewhat more modest magnitudes (between 4.3 and 11.4), with the
Trump vs. Clinton analyses producing non-statistically significant p-values in the models
excluding survey weights. It should be noted that the sample size of Asians in the CCES is
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comparatively small and that this makes it difficult to divide the sample any further to probe
these results more deeply. Lastly, I find that people living in high Hispanic percentage point
growth counties were more likely to vote for Trump in the Republican primaries, providing
evidence that this advantage held for Trump throughout his campaign.
Table 1.5 further divides the sample of non-Hispanic Whites for the general election. The
models divided by education are limited to those born in 1991 or earlier so that respondents are
approximately age 25 or older, giving them a reasonable amount of time to have obtained a
degree. Across all models, I find that non-Hispanic Whites without at least a 4-year degree were
more likely to vote for Trump in high-Hispanic-growth counties, as were those in a relatively
high family-income bracket ($80,000 or greater). Alternatively, high Hispanic growth does not
appear to have an influence on the more highly educated or a consistent influence on the lower
family-income group (less than $50,000) to vote for Trump. These results may seem
counterintuitive, but fit some of the research described above that suggests that the relationship
between education and immigration attitudes may be more culturally than economically driven,
and that those at the higher end of the income spectrum may fear fiscal impacts from the rapid
growth of a relatively working-class population such as Hispanics. Lastly, echoing work from
Newman (2013), I find that the relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting is
particularly strong in places with lower Hispanic populations to start with, namely those in the
bottom half of percent Hispanic in the CCES sample as of 2000 (less than or equal to 5.6 percent
Hispanic). Within these counties, non-Hispanic Whites were estimated to be 12.3 to 15
percentage points more likely to vote for Trump if the county experienced high Hispanic growth
since 2000, depending on the model in question. Conversely, non-Hispanic Whites living in
counties in the top half of percent Hispanic as of 2000 were not impacted at a statistically
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significant level by Hispanic growth in terms of voting patterns.24 This provides strong evidence
that Trump’s appeals were particularly effective in places undergoing rapid Hispanic population
growth for perhaps the first time.
Given the intriguing results around education and family income, I further interrogate this
issue by examining additional subsamples of non-Hispanic Whites:
•

Lower education, lower family income

•

Lower education, higher family income

•

Higher education, lower family income

•

Higher education, higher family income

Lower and higher education/family income are again defined as above. All of these samples are
limited to those born in 1991 or earlier. These results are presented in Table 1.6. As
demonstrated in Table 1.6, only one group fairly consistently demonstrates a statistically
significant relationship between high Hispanic population growth in their county and Trump
voting across all models: non-Hispanic Whites with relatively low levels of education and
relatively high family incomes.25 There is only one model for which this result is not statistically
significant at the 5% level (AIPW, Trump vs. all other candidates), but the p-value in this model
is very close to statistical significance (p-value = 0.054). The magnitude of this relationship is
estimated to be between 3.9 and 4.7 percentage points depending on the model. No other group
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Percent Hispanic at the county level in 2000 is not correlated with having at least a 4-year
degree or having at least $80,000 in family income among non-Hispanic White citizens to the
extent that it would be a concern that this subsample is capturing greatly overlapping populations
with the socioeconomic subsamples (0.0824, 0.0880).
25
I find evidence of similar results when limiting the sample to Whites who have lived in their
current city for 16 years or longer, in other words those Whites most likely to have “received the
treatment” of Hispanic growth since 2000. The results are at or close to statistical significance at
the 10% level or better (5% level) in a majority of cases for the primary and simplified models.
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demonstrates such a consistent relationship, and those with a higher level of education and lower
family income even demonstrate some evidence of lower levels of Trump voting in counties with
high Hispanic growth.
I now turn to the county-level election results compiled by Election Atlas to examine the
potential impact of rapid demographic change on actual election outcomes, the percent voting for
Trump and Romney, respectively. A robustness check for the 2016 general election examines the
gap between Trump and Clinton. Table 1.7 shows results for AIPW and IPWRA analyses for the
2016 general and primary elections, as well as the 2012 general election. Additionally, I
specifically analyze swing states for both the 2012 and 2016 general elections.
For the AIPW and IPWRA analyses of the full set of counties, high-Hispanic-growth
counties were .548 and .417 percentage points more likely to vote for Trump in the 2016 general
election. Additionally, the models predicting the difference between Trump voting and Clinton
voting show a similar result, with a 1.15 or .809 percentage point magnitude depending on the
model. This provides evidence of an impact of rapid Hispanic growth on the election results.
However, analyzing the counties in swing states, I find no statistically significant impact of
Hispanic growth on Trump vote percentage or the difference between Trump and Clinton
percentage. This provides evidence that rapid Hispanic growth did not necessarily have a
decisive impact on the 2016 general election. I also find no statistically significant results for the
primaries, which contrasts with the results from the CCES.
In addition, controlling for the results in the 2000 election, there is no effect of rapid
Hispanic percentage point growth on the 2012 election in the full set of counties, and the
relationship in swing states appears to be negative. In other words, counties in swing states that
saw rapid Hispanic growth from 2000 to 2006–2010 were less likely to vote for Romney in
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2012, reminding us that one effect of Hispanic population growth may simply be to add
Democratic voters to the local population. Evidence in support of this is provided in Table A1.26
Examining Romney voting again, I employ two new treatment variables: a binary variable where
“1” represents counties in the top quartile of Hispanic citizen voting-age population (CVAP)
growth from 2000 to 2006–2010, and another binary variable where “1” represents counties in
the top quartile of all other Hispanic growth.27 The idea here is to compare the impact of the
growth of eligible Hispanic voters to all other Hispanics. Again, there are no statistically
significant results for the full set of counties, but high growth in the Hispanic CVAP predicts
lower Romney voting at a statistically significant level in swing states, while growth in the
Hispanic population not eligible to vote does not. Returning to Table 1.7, there are no
statistically significant results for rapid foreign-born or Asian growth in the 2016 general or
primary elections, or the 2012 election.
For Hispanic growth, is it possible that there is an effect in swing states that is
concentrated in the higher-population counties, in other words those that are ultimately more
impactful on the election outcome? For a larger sample size, I turn back to the CCES in Table
1.8. I limit the sample to respondents in counties that are in the top quartile of CVAP for 2012–
2016 within swing states. I find no statistically significant results in Table 1.8, leading to further
uncertainty that Hispanic growth had a tangible effect on the 2016 election. Similar results (not
displayed) are found when analyzing the swing states that Trump won, counties in the top
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The appendix tables in this dissertation are labeled by empirical chapter. The tables for the
first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) are labeled A1, A2, etc. The tables for the second empirical
chapter (Chapter 3) are labeled B1, B2, etc. The tables for the third empirical chapter (Chapter 4)
are labeled C1, C2, etc.
27
When the top quartile of Hispanic CVAP growth is the treatment, the model controls for
whether the county was in the top quartile of Hispanic non-CVAP growth, and vice versa, all for
2000 to 2006–2010.
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quartile of CVAP within the swing states Trump won, and two swing states that Trump won and
that have ample sample sizes for analysis (Florida and Pennsylvania). Again, this leaves a level
of uncertainty about the true impact of Hispanic growth on the 2016 election, but it should be
noted that my inability to test all key locations separately is a major limitation in drawing any
firm conclusions here.
What might account for the lack of statistically significant results in swing states? After
examining several possibilities, including differences in racial demographics both in 2000 and at
the time of voting, I find the most compelling evidence for differences in education and family
income for non-Hispanic Whites in swing vs. non-swing states. Specifically, non-Hispanic
Whites with lower education and higher family income are notably less common in the highHispanic-growth counties of swing states, the swing states Trump won, the high CVAP counties
for these subsamples, as well as in Florida and Pennsylvania. There is at least a 5 percentage
point difference in all cases (among non-Hispanic White U.S. citizens born in 1991 or earlier).28
This is the group that showed the highest likelihood of increased Trump voting in high-Hispanicgrowth counties in Table 1.6, which is essentially replicated within swing states in Table B1 at
quite high magnitudes.29 The fact that there are fewer lower-education and higher-income nonHispanic Whites provides one plausible explanation for why the relationship between Hispanic
growth and Trump voting is not statistically significant in swing states.30 This is, of course, not
necessarily the only factor involved.
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A similar pattern is found when examining the 2010–2014 ACS Microdata.
One of the models for this group is not statistically significant, but it is close (p-value = 0.61).
30
It should be noted that the sample size for certain models in this analysis is not particularly
large.
29
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Conclusion
In testing the hypotheses of this chapter, I find no evidence of a backlash effect for rapid
growth of foreign-born or Asian populations. However, in analyzing survey data from the 2016
election, I find robust evidence that those living in counties with a large percentage point growth
in the Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote for Trump in 2016, both in the
general election and primaries. This is especially notable given that I control for voting patterns in
the 2012 election. This provides evidence that Hispanic growth pushed voters toward Trump. I
also find evidence that the general-election backlash effect appears among non-Hispanic Whites
and Asians. For non-Hispanic Whites, the relationship is particularly concentrated among those
with both lower education and higher family income. Lastly, I find evidence of a large effect for
non-Hispanic Whites who live in places that might be viewed as “new destinations” for Hispanics,
namely counties in the bottom half of percent Hispanic in 2000 for the CCES sample.
However, in rigorously testing the above hypotheses on county-level election results, I find
less evidence that rapid demographic change has had a decisive benefit for Republicans in recent
presidential elections. I first test this hypothesis on the full set of counties for the 2016 general
election, and indeed find evidence of a positive effect for high Hispanic growth on Trump voting
and the difference between Trump and Clinton voting. However, looking at swing states, I find no
statistically significant effect of Hispanic population growth. This result holds when analyzing
subsamples of the CCES that examine the swing states that Trump won, the top quartile of CVAP
in swing states and the swing states that Trump won, as well as two individual swing states that
Trump won (Florida and Pennsylvania). Therefore, it is not clear that Hispanic growth actually
had an impact on the final result of the 2016 election, including the primaries, where I also find no
statistically significant results in the county-level data. That said, it is possible that an effect may
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be present in key states that I was unable to examine specifically, so it is important to be cautious
in drawing conclusions, particularly given the evidence of a benefit for Trump from Hispanic
growth more generally. I also examine the 2012 election while controlling for results in the 2000
election to determine if the Republicans may have captured backlash effects prior to the rise of
Trump. I find that this is not the case in the full set of counties and that, if anything, swing-state
counties with high Hispanic growth from 2000 to 2006–2010 were less likely to vote for Romney.
A growing Hispanic population translating into more Democratic voters may be at play in these
analyses.
This analysis provides several theoretical implications. Firstly, it demonstrates further
evidence of the potential for a conservatizing impact of rapid demographic change that disrupts
locals’ understanding of the ethno-racial environment and generates threat (Helson 1964;
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Hopkins 2009). In the context of this chapter, this is specifically
true of Hispanic growth, though not foreign-born or Asian growth, further highlighting the
stigmatization of Latinx immigration in particular (Chavez 2001, 2008; Pew Research Center
2015), which may have both racial and class components (Newman and Malhotra 2019). This
chapter also provides evidence of the particular benefit of certain types of demographic change to
a politician with a far-right immigration agenda as opposed to more moderate conservatives (Pierce
2019), which has implications for understanding the global far right and populist movements more
generally (Arzheimer 2009; Becker and Fetzer 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Swank and Betz
2003). While this reaction, as expected, is displayed among non-Hispanic Whites, there is also
evidence of increased Trump voting among Asians, a group that may not always see commonality
with Hispanics due to divergent class status and reception in the United States (Krogstad and
Radford 2018; Pew Research Center 2015). I also find strong evidence supporting the
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acculturating-contexts hypothesis, which argues that backlash to demographic change will be most
likely to occur in places with little preexisting population of the incoming group (Newman 2013).
Lastly, this chapter provides evidence that socioeconomic status and the various concerns it
generates are likely important factors in understanding backlash to demographic change, with
support for the idea that both cultural and financial considerations may be important as they relate
to education and family income (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014;
Hanson et al. 2007).
Ultimately, the results do provide evidence for the impact of Hispanic growth on Trump
voting. However, that this ultimately had an impact on the 2016 election is uncertain. This should
provide caution for those claiming that backlash against local demographic change “won” Trump
the election, but I also cannot rule it out. That said, as demographic changes continue to occur
across the country, it will be worthwhile to consider the effects of these changes on politics at both
the local and national levels. My results for counties with low Hispanic populations in 2000 are
particularly instructive. The relationship between high Hispanic growth and Trump voting was
especially large in these “new destinations.” As the number of new destinations across the country
increases (Massey 2008), social scientists would do well to pay attention to these places, and how
voting patterns, policy preferences, and party alignments might change as a result of demographic
change. Moreover, places with larger Hispanic populations in 2000 did not reveal a relationship
between Hispanic growth and Trump voting, mirroring past research showing that the dynamics
of politics and demographic change are perhaps different in such places. Whether this is due to
long-term selection patterns in and out of these places by Whites or the positive long-term effects
of contact (or both) is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth keeping in mind the potential
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for temporal variation in the effects of demographic change on political outcomes. Overall, this
chapter can help to inform such research going forward.
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CHAPTER THREE
Primed for Backlash: Among Whom Does Demographic Change Provoke
Anti-Immigration Attitudes?

Abstract
A large body of research has explored which factors are important in understanding
contemporary attitudes toward immigration, often through contrasting explanations related to
cultural and economic concerns, the latter assessing the importance of both personal economic
circumstances and broader, nonpersonal (sociotropic) worries about the impact of immigration
on the economy. Simultaneously, a burgeoning literature on the impact of local demographic
changes on immigration attitudes has developed, in part to identify under which conditions
demographic change will lead to immigration backlash. I attempt to combine these literatures by
systematically examining which characteristics and/or contexts for U.S.-born Whites predict
backlash to local demographic change in terms of Hispanic and Asian population growth. I find
no evidence of backlash to Asian growth for any group of U.S.-born Whites. Alternatively, I find
evidence that county-level Hispanic growth may lead to a preference for reduction in
immigration among three groups in particular: those with less than a 4-year degree, those
identifying as political Independents, and those who report their annual household income
having decreased in the prior year. Among the final group, it is those with lower levels of
education and those with lower family incomes that are most likely to demonstrate antiimmigration backlash. This provides evidence that cultural and economic factors may both be
important in understanding backlash to demographic change, and that contrary to some prior
research, personal economic circumstances appear to play a key role. Additionally, the role of
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political Independents as a “swing” constituency is clearly exhibited in these results, with
Hispanic growth potentially swinging them to the right on immigration. Overall, these results
provide a framework for understanding how immigration policy attitudes may evolve in the
context of demographic change, and how this is mediated by the characteristics of the White
population.
Introduction
There is a longstanding debate in the immigration attitudes literature regarding whether
cultural or economic factors are more important in predicting orientations toward immigrants and
immigration, and whether personal or sociotropic economic concerns are more predictive. On the
economic side, individuals may view immigrants as labor market competitors who drive down
wages or drive up unemployment (Bean, Telles, and Lowell 1987). Higher-income individuals in
particular may fear the fiscal burden of working-class immigrants (Facchini and Mayda 2009),
while others may have negative perceptions of the impact of immigration on the economy more
generally (Citrin et al. 1997). Alternatively, various scholars have argued that cultural factors are
more important in predicting immigration attitudes, with racism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and
a preference for cultural homogeneity motivating restrictionists (Hainmueller and Hopkins
2014).
Other research has looked at patterns of local demographic change to determine how this
may impact immigration attitudes, usually from a backlash framework (Kaufmann and Goodwin
2018). Within this literature, scholars have not only addressed the relationship between local
demographic change and immigration attitudes, but also how this relationship may change based
on other important factors. This includes the preexisting racial/ethnic makeup of one’s locality
(Newman 2013), the salience of immigration in the media (Hopkins 2010), orientation toward
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uncertainty (Johnston et al. 2015), and political party/ideology (Gravelle 2016; Karreth, Singh,
and Stojek 2015). Each of these studies has made important contributions to the literature on
immigration attitudes.
However, what is still lacking is a systematic approach to understanding the conditions
under which demographic change may or may not trigger backlash in terms of immigration
attitudes. This chapter attempts to fill this gap by examining whether respondents are more or
less likely to advocate for a reduction of immigration under conditions of demographic change
depending on various personal and contextual characteristics. Additionally, I examine how this
impact may vary depending on the immigrant-origin group in question, analyzing the growth of
the two major immigrant-origin groups in the contemporary United States: Hispanics and Asians.
Importantly, I also use inverse-probability-weighting techniques to approximate quasi-causal
relationships, an approach not applied in the above research.
I find no evidence of backlash to Asian growth in terms of preferences for reducing
immigration. However, respondents without at least a 4-year degree, political Independents, and
those reporting a decline in their household income over the past year all show evidence of a
negative reaction to Hispanic growth in terms of immigration attitudes. Exploring this final result
more fully, among those expressing household income decline, it is those with lower levels of
education and those with lower family incomes that are most likely to conservatize their attitudes
in high-Hispanic-growth counties. The implications of these results are discussed more fully
below. Overall, these findings show that cultural and economic factors may be at play in the
reaction to demographic change, that some groups may be more malleable on this issue than
others, and that the reactions to Asian and Hispanic growth are likely not equal.
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Literature Review
Predictors of Immigration Attitudes
As stated above, much of the scholarly debate on attitudes toward immigration concerns
whether anti-immigrant attitudes are driven primarily by cultural or economic factors. Cultural
factors refer to those in which immigrants are perceived by the native population to be
irreconcilably different in language, religion, and other markers, many of which are perceived to
be closely related to race/ethnicity (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Economic factors can take
numerous forms, depending on where one falls in the class hierarchy. As described above, this
can include labor market competition, fiscal burden, or the impact on the economy as a whole.
This is not to say that these concerns are realistic in all instances (see National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine [2017] for an overview), but simply that they may exist
among various populations.
In their review of the literature from the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe over 20
years, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014:225) argue that the evidence largely supports the idea that
“immigration attitudes are shaped by sociotropic concerns about its cultural impacts—and to a
lesser extent its economic impacts—on the nation as a whole.” For example, a host of studies
have found that racial/ethnic bias, perception of cultural threat, and placing a premium on
cultural homogeneity are correlated with more anti-immigrant attitudes, while personal economic
circumstances are less important, if important at all (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997;
Hout and Maggio 2021; Miller 2018; Sides and Citrin 2007). This is not to say that there is no
evidence that personal economic circumstances matter (Citrin and Sides 2008; Melcher 2020;
Palmer 1996), but simply that, according to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), the evidence is
relatively weak in the overall literature. Generally, higher education is predictive of more liberal
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immigration attitudes, and could be used as a proxy for “skill.” Using cross-national data, Mayda
(2006) finds support for the idea that labor-market-competition concerns drive immigration
attitudes with this idea in mind. The author shows that “skilled individuals are more likely to be
pro-immigration in countries where the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants is
high” (Mayda 2006:510). However, asking about preferences for different types of immigration
may tell a different story. For instance, results from European data show that years of schooling
and having a relatively “high” occupational skill level positively predict more liberal
immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). These results hold regardless of whether
the country of immigrant origin given is high- or low-income, or inside or outside of Europe. In
the U.S. context, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find that both “high-” and “low-skilled” natives
prefer “high-skilled” immigrants, and the strength of this preference does not vary by native skill
level at a statistically significant level.31 Additionally, Hainmueller et al. (2015) find that the
positive relationship between education and support for “high-” and “low-skilled” immigration
shows little meaningful variation by the skill intensity or reliance on foreign-born labor for a
given industry (see also Helbling and Kriesi 2014). Ultimately, there is a lack of clear evidence
in these studies that natives are more concerned about immigrants that may be more likely to
compete with them on the job market. Additionally, there is evidence that the skill preference is
not “race-neutral” (Newman and Malhotra 2019). This has led to speculation that skill
preferences may capture some other concerns and that the positive relationship between
education and liberal immigration attitudes may be more culturally than economically based.
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Hainmueller et al. (2015) find evidence that more highly educated natives actually place a
higher premium on “high-skill” immigration.
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Concern about the fiscal burden of immigrants finds mixed support in the literature
(Citrin et al. 1997; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hanson et al. 2007;
Helbling and Kriesi 2014; Tingley 2013), but broader economic concerns do seem to be
correlated with attitudes toward immigration. For example, Citrin et al. (1997) find that negative
evaluations of the national economy in the past year predict less support for immigration.
Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris (2008) find that poor national economic conditions correlate with
restrictionist attitudes. Poor local economic conditions and relative population loss for Whites
may be important as well, generating a sense of decline and displacement that may be blamed on
immigration (Gest 2016), particularly if there is conflict over a perceived scarcity of resources
(Dancygier 2010). Specifically for the purposes of this chapter, it also is important to note that a
clear political divide on immigration has emerged in recent years, with Democrats, and to a
lesser extent Independents, moving towards more liberal immigration attitudes, and Republicans
remaining more conservative (Hout and Maggio 2021). More generally, it is useful to remember
that the importance of various factors may depend on the country and time period that is studied
and how the questions are phrased.
Demographic Change and Immigration Attitudes
In addition to the research described above, an area of the literature that has grown in
recent years examines the relationship between immigration attitudes and local changes in the
composition of the population, whether growth in immigrants or largely-immigrant-origin groups
such as Hispanics or Asians. This work draws on much of the classic literature described in
Chapter 1 (Allport 1954; Blalock 1956, 1967; Key 1949; Williams Jr. 1947). Various studies
have found evidence of the importance of demographic change in promoting backlash in terms of
immigration attitudes (see Kaufmann and Goodwin [2018] for a meta-analysis). As described
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above, while residential selection or adaptation to the local environment over the long term may
lead to more positive attitudes for those living near immigrant-origin groups, the sudden
disruption of the demographic status quo may generate resentment and subsequent backlash
(Hopkins 2009). In terms of immigration attitudes, various studies have found this to be the case
under specific circumstances. To reiterate findings described above, Hopkins (2010) finds that
restrictionist immigration attitudes are more common in places undergoing growth in the foreignborn population, but only during times when immigration is particularly salient in the media,
such as after the 9/11 attacks. Johnston et al. (2015) examine variation by personality orientation,
finding that those with greater aversion to uncertainty32 show a strong positive relationship
between county-level Hispanic growth and cultural threat from immigration. Relatedly, other
research has suggested that backlash to demographic change may be more common on the
political right (Gravelle 2016; Karreth et al. 2015). Newman (2013) draws on the defendedneighborhood hypothesis (Green et al. 1998; Rieder 1985; Suttles 1972) and acculturative-stress
literature (Berry 1998) to generate the “acculturating-contexts hypothesis,” arguing that
demographic change will most likely to lead to backlash, specifically cultural backlash,33 in
places with little previous history of non-White immigration. In more racially homogenous
places, the stakes of demographic change may appear greater for Whites than in places with
higher levels of initial diversity.
Contribution
While all of the above research is clearly important to the understanding of immigration
attitudes, one gap in the literature is a systematic exploration of how demographic change
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This is operationalized through measures of authoritarianism.
The survey question in this study is “America’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by
people coming to live here from other countries.”
33
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interacts with personal and contextual characteristics to shape immigration attitudes. One
important consideration for this is whether the characteristics that appear important in predicting
conservative immigration attitudes more generally will be the important ones in predicting
whether demographic change will lead to more conservative attitudes. For instance, based on the
literature review presented above, we might predict that Republicans, those with lower
education, the most racially resentful, those with more negative assessments of the economy, and
those living in areas with high unemployment and declining White population will be more
likely to react negatively to demographic change because these groups are more likely to possess
negative immigration attitudes. Alternatively, these groups may have already made up their mind
about immigration, and demographic change may not be impactful for them at all. For instance,
we may expect Whites without college degrees to react more negatively to demographic change
than Whites with college degrees, given their more negative outlook on immigration described
above. However, it is also possible that, because immigration conservatism is already more
common among Whites without college degrees, Whites with college degrees will actually be
more likely to change their views in a conservative direction as a result of demographic change.
Preexisting racial/ethnic context and political identification are likely different than the other
variables described above because there is already specific evidence that people living in places
with lower Hispanic populations will react more negatively to demographic change (Newman
2013), as will those on the political right (Gravelle 2016; Karreth et al. 2015). Regardless, this
article primarily asks whether predictors of immigration attitudes are also important moderators
of the relationship between demographic change and immigration attitudes.
Another contribution of this chapter is that it examines two forms of demographic change
that may have different implications for theories of their impact on immigration attitudes.
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Specifically, I compare the impacts of Hispanic and Asian growth, the growth of the two
populations most highly represented among recent immigrant-origin groups. As mentioned
briefly above, various studies have demonstrated that the reception of these groups is likely not
the same, with a preference for Asian immigration generally emerging in the literature,
particularly among Whites (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ha 2010; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Pew
Research Center 2015). Some of this preference may be accounted for by a more general
preference for “high-skilled” immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller et al.
2015), but this would not explain the findings by Newman and Malhotra (2019), who
demonstrate in various ways that the preference for “high-skilled” migration is likely not raceneutral. For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth keeping in mind that characteristics of the
White population may be influential in their reaction to Hispanic and Asian growth, respectively.
As alluded to above, it may be the case that low-income Whites react negatively to Hispanic
growth because they view the group as economic competitors, while higher-income Whites may
react negatively to Asian growth for the same reason. Alternatively, as described above,
Hainmueller et al. (2015) demonstrate that the preference for “high-skill” immigration does not
vary at a statistically significant level depending on the skill level of the respondent. In this case,
other factors may be at play. For instance, the broad demonization of Latinx immigrants in
politics and media (Chavez 2001, 2008) may frame this group as an economic or cultural threat,
potentially leading to their scapegoating in times of high unemployment, for instance, or making
them particularly vulnerable to targeting from racially resentful Whites. These potentialities will
be explored in more detail below.
This chapter also makes a methodological contribution to the literature on local
demographic change with the selection models described above. Again, where rapid
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demographic change of certain groups occurs is not random and may be correlated in important
ways with the outcomes of this chapter. In theory, if the treatment and control groups are more
similar on the characteristics predicting selection into treatment due to inverse-probabilityweighting, this can isolate the effect of demographic change, providing for a quasi-causal
interpretation.
Lastly, it is pertinent for scholars and policymakers to understand where and among
whom backlash to demographic change is most likely to occur. For policymakers, targeting
efforts at amelioration of backlash among relevant populations could be useful in making these
efforts more effective. While this particular chapter applies to the United States, there are many
commonalities in the factors predicting immigration attitudes across countries (Hainmueller and
Hopkins 2014), so these analyses potentially have broader implications as well.
Data
The primary data set for this chapter is the 2018 CCES. I choose 2018 for this study
because this particular year of the survey has a question about legal immigration, while 2016
only has questions related to undocumented migration. As described in more detail below, I
focus on the legal-immigration question for the primary portion of the chapter, but also analyze
questions related to undocumented immigration as well as scale constructed from these questions
to gain a complete picture of the relationship between demographic change and immigration
policy attitudes for the key subsamples of this chapter. I provide additional detail about the
implications of the study of each of these outcomes below. For the purposes of measuring
demographic change as well as other contextual variables, I merge the CCES with the 2000
Census, the 2013–2017 American Community Survey (ACS), and voting data from Election
Atlas.
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Methodology
The primary outcome for this chapter is a question about preferences for levels of legal
immigration. Specifically, the question asks:
What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?
• Reduce legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based
migration
o Support
o Oppose
I choose this as the primary outcome because it is most similar to commonly used
questions in the immigration attitudes literature that ask about preferences for immigration levels
to be higher or lower (or remain the same) that have been asked repeatedly in different forms in
data sets such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Study
(ANES), as well as polls by Gallup and Pew (Gallup 2020; Pew Research Center 2018). The
primary differences are that the CCES question refers specifically to the visa lottery and familybased migration, and only asks about reduction of immigration, not increasing or keeping
immigration levels the same. The reference to types of migration flows are of particular concern
because it may affect the answers of respondents from particular demographic groups, and may
relate to particular migration flows. For instance, family migration is common for many groups
(Zong, Batalova, and Burrows 2020), but Asians (particularly Indians) may be more associated
with labor migration due to their overrepresentation in the H-2B program, though of course
many Hispanics enter with work visas as well (Teke and Navarro 2018). Family migration may
also not be viewed as an economic threat in the same way as labor migration, but has been
framed negatively as “chain migration” by various politicians (Qiu 2018). Additionally, certain
Latin American and Asian countries are not even eligible for the diversity visa lottery due to
their large numbers through other streams (U.S. Department of State 2020).
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Fortunately, the CCES also offers a variety of other immigration policy questions,
broadly related to undocumented immigration, that touch on some of the most important issues
in the contemporary immigration debate:
What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?
• Increase spending on border security by $25 billion, including building a wall
between the U.S. and Mexico
• Provide legal status to children of immigrants who are already in the United
States and were brought to the United States by their parents. Provide these
children the option of citizenship in 10 years if they meet citizenship requirements
and commit no crimes (DACA)
• Withhold federal funds from any local police department that does not report to
the federal government anyone they identify as an illegal immigrant
• Send to prison any person who has been deported from the United States and
reenters the United States
These questions also offer two possible responses: “support” or “oppose.” After
analyzing the primary outcome of this chapter, I will check to see if key groups also respond to
demographic change in terms of these secondary outcomes as a way to gain a more complete
picture of the relationship between demographic change and immigration policy attitudes.
Additionally, because what may be impacted by demographic change is not necessarily
particular issues but instead a more general attitude towards immigration, I also create a scale
based on all of the above questions that will provide a general measure of conservative vs. liberal
immigration attitudes.34
The main treatment variables for this chapter are binary variables that are “1” for counties
in the top quartile of Hispanic or Asian percentage point growth at the county level from 2000 to
2013–2017, and “0” for all other counties. I again choose percentage point growth since 2000 to
match with comparable studies (Gravelle 2016; Hopkins 2010; Johnston et al. 2015; Newman
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The scale has a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.83 and its first factor accounts for 88% of the total
variation.
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2013) and choose county-level as the unit of analysis, given that Newman and Velez (2014) find
that respondents do indeed notice rapid demographic change at this level. I employ an alternate
cut point (top 20%) as a robustness check on the key results below.
The primary analysis sample for this chapter is U.S.-born non-Hispanic Whites who have
lived in their current city for at least 18 years.35 The idea here is to examine those who are most
likely to have “received the treatment” in terms of demographic change, namely those who have
lived in their current city since around 2000. The models presented in this chapter control for
various factors that are likely to be correlated with both the outcomes and the treatment
variables. At the individual level, this includes education, family income, employment status,
immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former union status, number of children under
18, marital status, and length of time living in their current city. At the county level, this includes
the percentage that voted for Bush in 2000 as a way to gain a sense of the political environment
at the beginning of the demographic growth period, the percent non-Hispanic White in 2000 as a
way to gauge the racial environment, as well as population density in 2013–2017 to determine
how urban their current county is. Additionally, I control for the percent Hispanic or Asian in
2000 at the county level, depending on the model, and the growth of the non-Hispanic or Asian
population from 2000 to 2013–2017 to account for other population changes that may be
occurring. Lastly, I control for state of residence in most cases, but control for region of
residence in cases where the analysis sample is below 1,000 for the purpose of ease of model
convergence for the AIPW and IPWRA models.36 These are the only controls for the primary
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Long-term residents of their current city also served as a robustness check for results in
Chapter 2.
36
The statistically significant results of this chapter remain statistically significant regardless of
whether state or region of residence is employed.
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models, but I add several controls in a robustness check: the county-level unemployment rate,
political party identification, racial resentment, and national and household economic
assessments. These are controls that may, in theory, be mediators between demographic change
and immigration attitudes.
For this chapter, I use several variables to predict selection into treatment for the AIPW
and IPWRA models. These include the percent voting for Bush in 2000, median income in 2000,
median income growth from 2000 to 2013–2017, and population size in 2000, all at the county
level. Again, these are employed because the political, economic, and demographic environment
will be important in predicting where Hispanics and Asians move (Borjas 2014; Leach and Bean
2008; Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013). I also predict selection into treatment using state of
residence, again substituting region of residence in cases where the sample size is below 1,000.
Lastly, I again predict demographic growth using percent Hispanic and Asian in 2000,
respectively, under the assumption that for many, social, familial, cultural, and linguistic
networks37 and cumulative causation will be important factors in determining where to move
and/or settle and have a family (Bachmeier 2013).
Subsamples
I examine various subsamples in this chapter to determine among whom and/or where
backlash against demographic change in the form of immigration policy attitudes is likely to
occur.38 These factors are as follows:
•

Education (4-year degree+ vs. no 4-year degree)

37

This of course does not take into account the cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of the
Hispanic and Asian populations, something beyond the scope of this chapter.
38
Ideally I would utilize interaction terms, but the AIPW and IPWRA techniques demonstrate
convergence difficulties when interaction terms are applied.
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•

Family income ($80,000 or greater vs. less than $80,000)39

•

Employment (full-time vs. part-time vs. unemployed)

•

County-level racial/ethnic makeup in 2000 (top vs. bottom half of percent Hispanic or
Asian)40

•

County-level unemployment rate in 2013–2017 (top vs. bottom half)

•

County-level non-Hispanic White population change 2000 to 2013–2017 (positive vs.
negative)

•

Political party identification (Democrat vs. Republican vs. Independent)

•

Racial resentment scale (top vs. bottom half)41

•

Assessment of national economy in the past year (gotten better vs. gotten worse vs.
stayed the same)

•

Assessment of household income in the past year (increased vs. decreased vs. stayed the
same)
As described above, these factors have, to varying degrees, been shown to be relevant

predictors in the immigration attitudes literature. Fewer of them have been analyzed in terms of
how they condition reactions to demographic change and its impact on immigration attitudes (but
see Gravelle 2016; Newman 2013). The analyses in this chapter will help to determine if
relatively anti-immigrant groups, such as those with low levels of education, react more
negatively to demographic change in terms of their immigration attitudes, or whether these
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I also analyze a threshold of $60,000, which is closer to the median household income in 2018
($63,179) (Rothbaum and Edwards 2019). This does not alter the conclusions of the chapter.
40
The thresholds here are actually slightly above the median percent Hispanic/Asian in order to
achieve model convergence.
41
The racial resentment scale is constructed from the items displayed in Table A2. The scale has
a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.91 and its first factor accounts for 90% of the total variation.
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groups have already formed strong attitudes on this issue, and the highly educated, for instance,
are instead more likely to be swayed by demographic change. These variables also allow for a
comparison of economic and cultural factors, as well as individual and contextual factors. Lastly,
their relevance in relation to Hispanic vs. Asian growth will be examined as well.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics. I describe the characteristics and context for the
primary analysis sample in this chapter, U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their current city for
at least 18 years. Firstly, there are large numbers of respondents who support reducing legal
immigration (8,589, 54.3%) and there are large numbers who oppose this (8,426, 45.7%).
Unsurprisingly, the large majority of respondents are on the lower end of education and family
income (less than a 4-year degree and less than $80,000 in family income). The large majority
are also full-time employed, with less than 10% part-time employed and only 5% unemployed.42
Over a quarter of respondents are Democrats and Independents, while closer to 40% are
Republicans.43 Given the long-term economic growth occurring prior to the interview date in
2018 (The World Bank 2020), it is unsurprising that nearly 60% thought the national economy
had improved over the prior year, while only 15% said it was worse. Yet, many fewer
respondents said that their household income had increased relative to the prior year (33.6%),
and most said it had stayed the same (51.5%). 55.5% of respondents lived in a county that lost
non-Hispanic White population since 2000, and 44.5% lived in a county that gained nonHispanic White population.
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The rest are temporarily laid off, retired, permanently disabled, homemakers, students, or some
“other” status.
43
The rest report an “other” identification or are “not sure” of their identification.
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The median respondent lived in a county that was 3.7% Hispanic in 2000, but the range
of values here is remarkable, with some respondents living in a county with almost no Hispanics,
and others living in counties where the vast majority of residents are Hispanic. It should be
noted, however, that 99% of respondents lived in a county that was under 50% Hispanic. The
median Asian population was lower (1.4%), and the range is narrower as well. Lastly, the
median county-level unemployment rate was around 6% at this time, though some counties had
practically no unemployment and others had substantially higher unemployment. Overall, 99%
of respondents lived in counties with less than 12% unemployment.
Results
Table 2.2 displays standard logistic regressions predicting support for a reduction in legal
immigration through the means mentioned above. The main predictors are a continuous version
of Hispanic and Asian growth at the county-level from 2000 to 2013–2017, as well as the binary
version comparing the top quartile of Hispanic and Asian growth to the bottom three quartiles. I
also include all the controls mentioned above and cluster standard errors at the county level. For
the primary results, there is no evidence from Table 2.2 that Hispanic and Asian growth,
variously operationalized, are related to support for a reduction in legal immigration at a
statistically significant level. However, Hispanic percentage point growth is close to statistical
significance, predicting more support for reducing legal immigration with a p-value of 0.066.
Regardless, part of the purpose of this chapter is to construct hypothetical scenarios in which
high- and low-growth Hispanic counties and high- and low-growth Asian counties are more
similar on various characteristics through the AIPW and IPWRA models, and use these scenarios
to determine if growth then has a quasi-causal relationship to immigration attitudes. This is done
first in the full sample, then for the various subsamples described above. I choose linear
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probability models here for ease of model convergence.44 These results for the full sample show
no statistically significant relationship between Hispanic or Asian growth and support for
reduction in legal immigration, after accounting for selection into treatment. However, these null
results may mask heterogeneity in terms of what demographic groups and contexts are most
likely to react to demographic change in the form of changes in immigration policy attitudes.
Table 2.3 provides no evidence of any backlash to Asian growth, regardless of the
subsample in question. In fact, among U.S.-born Whites whose household income has increased
in the past year, Asian growth predicts more liberal attitudes in terms of opposing a reduction in
legal immigration, though this only holds in the AIPW model. Alternatively, several subsamples
show evidence of backlash to Hispanic growth. At first glance, this provides evidence that
Hispanic growth may provoke a negative reaction in some places, while Asian growth does not,
again potentially highlighting differential receptions for these groups. More will be said about
this below.
For now, I focus on the groups that demonstrate backlash to Hispanic growth. Perhaps as
expected, those with less than a 4-year degree have more restrictive views on legal immigration
in counties in the top quartile of Hispanic growth compared to the bottom three quartiles.
Specifically, top-quartile Hispanic growth is associated with approximately a 4 percentage point
increase in support for reduction of legal immigration. There is no such relationship for those
with at least a 4-year degree. As described above, lower education is generally associated with
more restrictive immigration attitudes, and appears to be important in predicting reactions to
Hispanic growth though not Asian growth. It is possible that this equates to a reaction among
“lower-skilled” Americans to “lower-skilled” immigrant-origin groups as an economic
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See Wooldridge (2010:563) described in Chapter 2 for a justification of this approach.
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competitor, but it is important to note that I find no statistically significant results for those with
lower (or higher) family incomes. Additionally, in an analysis not presented, Whites without a 4year degree appear to react negatively to demographic change regardless of whether they have a
higher or lower family income. Lastly, again as described above, there is evidence in the
literature more broadly that suggests that the relationship between education and immigration
attitudes may be accounted for more by cultural factors than personal economic factors
(Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller et al. 2015).
However, the assessment of one’s household economic circumstances does seem
important in determining reactions to demographic change. Specifically, those who say that their
household income has decreased in the past year either “somewhat” or “a lot” show a positive
relationship between Hispanic growth and preference for reduction in legal immigration, while
those whose household income has increased or stayed the same do not. Those reporting a
decrease in household income are around 8 to 9 percentage points more likely to support a
reduction in legal immigration in counties in the top quartile of Hispanic growth since 2000
compared to all other counties. While other economic circumstances seem to be less important,
assessments of changes in economic circumstances for oneself and/or one’s family may provoke
backlash against local demographic change. However, it is again important to note that this is
specifically the case for Hispanic migration. Why might this be?
Analyses presented in Table 2.4 may shed more light on this. Specifically, I subdivide
those who reported a decrease in household income into those with higher and lower education
and family income45 and examine the relationship between Hispanic growth and support for
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I adjust the definition of higher family income here in order to achieve a reasonable sample
size for each analysis.
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reduction in immigration. This analysis finds that, among those reporting a decrease in
household income, two groups demonstrate a backlash to Hispanic growth: those with lower
levels of education and those with lower levels of family income. This suggests that those in the
most disadvantaged positions in the labor market, and thus those most likely to perceive
competition with Hispanics, are the ones who, under circumstances of relative economic distress,
are the most likely to react negatively to demographic change in terms of immigration attitudes.
Again, this is not necessarily to say that Hispanic migration is a labor market threat for this
group, but these perceptions may go a long way. Cultural aversion to immigration among those
with lower education may also play a role in terms of the likelihood of immigration
scapegoating, but the results around family income also suggest that personal economic
circumstances are indeed important in understanding reactions to demographic change.
Finally, returning to Table 2.3, I find that Hispanic growth predicts support for a
reduction in legal immigration for Independents, and not for Democrats and Republicans. This
result suggests that, as the research on polarization would imply (Hout and Maggio 2021),
Democrats and Republicans are firmly placed in ideological camps on immigration, and are
perhaps less likely to be swayed by local demographic changes. On the other hand, Independents
may be more persuadable, and thus more likely to be swayed by local demographic change, in
this case to the tune of a 6 or 7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of supporting a
reduction in legal immigration. However, again, this is only the case for Hispanic growth, and
there is no strong reason to believe that Independents would perceive a personal economic threat
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from Hispanics but not from Asians, indicating that other issues related to the stigmatization of
Hispanic migration may be at play.46
It is important to note that I find similar results for Hispanic growth among the key
subsamples presented in Table 2.3 when I adjust the definition of “high growth” to the top 20%.
I also find similar results for the “lower-education” subsample when I restrict the sample to those
born in 1993 or earlier, approximately age 25 or older at the time of the interview, in order to
provide a reasonable amount of time to earn a 4-year degree. Lastly, the models in Table 2.3 do
not control for factors that have a reasonable possibility of being impacted by Hispanic growth
and subsequently indirectly impacting immigration policy attitudes: the county-level
unemployment rate, political party identification, racial resentment, and national and household
economic assessments. However, when controlling for these factors as appropriate,47 I find
similar results for the key subsamples described in Table 2.3, though at slightly smaller
magnitudes.
Another important question to answer is whether there is a high correlation between any
of the characteristics for these subsamples, and whether or not this may be at play in explaining
the results described above. Therefore, Table B2 in the appendix examines the correlation
between having a 4-year degree, being a political Independent, and reporting decreased
household income in the past year. The results demonstrate that the correlations are not strong
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It should be noted that these subsamples for lower education, decreased household income,
and political Independents lose a substantial number of observations due to violation of the
overlap assumption: 43.7%, 48.5%, and 45.2%, respectively. However, these inverseprobability-weighted models achieve excellent balance in terms of the likelihood of selection
into treatment for the treatment group compared to the control group. Specifically, the difference
in these models is 0.4, 0.2, and 1.1 percentage points, respectively, compared to 29.9, 32.7, and
29.1 percentage points without the weights.
47
Specifically, party identification is not included in the subsample of Independents because they
all obviously have the same party identification.
63

(-0.0055, -0.0351, 0.016). This allays concerns that the results for one key subgroup can be
explained by the fact that this characteristic is highly correlated with that of another key
subgroup.
Next, I examine several other outcomes, as well as a scale created from all the outcomes,
for the key samples of this chapter. Table 2.5 displays these results.There are various pieces of
evidence that the impact of Hispanic growth for these key subgroups is not limited to the
question about legal immigration. Those with lower levels of education are also more likely to
report increased support for investment in border security in high-Hispanic-growth counties. For
the other subsamples, there is evidence of increased conservatism on various questions. This
includes decreased support for DACA and increased support for spending on border security,
withholding federal funds from police departments not reporting undocumented immigrants, and
jailing those who are deported from the U.S. and reenter. However, it is perhaps most important
to focus on increased conservatism on the immigration attitudes scale, which applies to all these
key subgroups. Therefore, there is substantial evidence that, for these subgroups, there is a
general rightward lean of immigration attitudes in counties where there is a rapidly increasing
Hispanic population.
It is also worth noting several subsamples that did not reveal statistically significant
results in Table 2.3. Firstly, in contrast to Newman (2013), I do not find statistically significant
evidence that backlash to Hispanic growth occurs in places with lower Hispanic populations to
begin with. It should be noted, however, that Newman (2013) examines cultural backlash rather
than immigration policy backlash. I also find no evidence that broader economic circumstances,
as measured by the county-level unemployment rate or assessments of the national economy, are
influential in reactions to demographic change, despite evidence that these may be important
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factors influencing immigration attitudes more generally (Citrin et al. 1997; Wilkes et al. 2008).
Perhaps these broader circumstances are less relevant in tying immigration attitudes to local
demographic change, which is observed on a personal level. Despite racial resentment being a
strong predictor of immigration attitudes (Miller 2018), there is no evidence that higher (or
lower) racial resentment is tied to reactions to demographic change. This may be a result of the
fact that racial ideology is an already established set of beliefs that may not adjust in response to
demographic change. Lastly, I find no statistically significant results for Republicans. This is in
contrast with Gravelle (2016), which suggests that backlash to Hispanic growth is more likely to
occur among Republicans than Democrats or Independents. In theory, this could be because
Gravelle (2016) focuses on outcomes specifically related to undocumented immigration.
However, as shown in Table 2.5, Independents also show more restrictive attitudes on various
questions related to undocumented immigration in high-Hispanic-growth counties, while a
separate analysis of Republicans (not displayed) does not reach a similar conclusion. Therefore,
other differences in data and/or methodology, such as the selection techniques described above,
may be important here.
Lastly, to further interrogate the issue of the impact of Hispanic vs. Asian migration, I
test whether the rate of growth for these groups may be important in interpreting the results in
this chapter. Might the faster rate of growth for Hispanics help explain a more negative reaction
from Whites? Table 2.6 clearly shows that, for all the key subsamples of this chapter, the rate of
growth for Hispanics in the top quartile of counties is higher than that of Asians. Across
subsamples, the Hispanic rate of growth ranges from 7.85 to 8.13 percentage points, while Asian
growth ranges from 2.86 to 3.19 percentage points. The difference between the treatment and
control counties is also larger for Hispanics, ranging from 4.2 to 4.52 percentage points,
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compared to 1.5 to 1.85 percentage points for Asians. It is therefore not unreasonable to wonder
whether especially high rates of Hispanic growth may trigger backlash in a way that the more
modest growth of Asians may not. At the same time, the clear preference among Americans for
Asian over Latin American migration likely plays a role as well (Pew Research Center 2015).
Conclusion
Local change in ethno-racial composition is clearly an important trend in the
contemporary United States, and how White people react to this trend may well determine much
about social and political life in this era of mass migration. However, as demonstrated in the
current chapter, there is little reason to believe that different subsets of White people will react
uniformly to demographic change, and the characteristics of the White population are an
important and understudied factor in the immigration backlash literature.
This chapter shows that there are particular groups for whom Hispanic population growth
predicts increased support for reductions in legal immigration. I find that those with less than a
4-year degree, political Independents, and those reporting decreased household income in the
past year are more likely to express a preference for reduced legal immigration in counties where
the Hispanic population has grown rapidly since 2000. These results hold for various model
specifications. Those with lower education also appear to prefer an increased investment in
border security in these high-Hispanic-growth contexts, while there appears to be a more general
impact on immigration attitudes for the other two key subsamples.
Those with lower levels of education are generally found to have more conservative
immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller et al. 2015), so it is perhaps
not surprising that they are also more likely to react negatively to demographic change. There is
a lively debate in the literature over whether the relationship between education and immigration
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attitudes is driven by personal economic concerns or some relationship between education and
cultural attitudes that are strong predictors of immigration attitudes, such as cosmopolitanism
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The results here could indicate either, particularly given the
working-class character of the Hispanic population on average (Zong and Batalova 2019).
However, Whites without college degrees appear to react negatively to Hispanic growth
regardless of the level of their family income, indicating that non-economic factors may be
important here.
On the other hand, the result for those reporting a decrease in household income is
concentrated among those likely at the lower end of the labor market: those with lower family
incomes and those with lower levels of education. One interpretation of this result is that those
suffering a disruptive economic change may blame migration for their circumstances, but only if
they are among the most vulnerable workers. There still may be a cultural aspect at play,
whereby anti-immigrant scapegoating is more likely among those with lower levels of education,
but the situation of deteriorating household economic circumstances and lower family incomes in
fostering this reaction does suggest that demographic change may be linked to economic
vulnerability in the minds of these respondents. This highlights the importance of personal
economic circumstances in predicting reactions to demographic change, even if these
circumstances are not as important in the overall immigration attitudes literature (Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014). Moreover, it seems plausible that changes to economic circumstances may
be tied to rapid demographic change in the minds of respondents in ways that overall economic
circumstances are not, which perhaps makes sense given the potentially disruptive nature of both
rapid demographic change and decreases in household income. In other words, White
respondents may link these two simultaneous changes in their mind in a way that they might not
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link demographic change to their more general and longer-term economic circumstances, whose
basic origins may predate these local demographic changes.
As described above, Democrats and Republicans have taken clearly divergent trajectories
on immigration attitudes in recent times, with Democrats landing on much more liberal positions
(B. Jones 2019). Independents have also liberalized their attitudes, but to a lesser extent than
Democrats, landing somewhere between the two poles (Hout and Maggio 2021). This
intermediate position is perhaps most ripe for influence by demographic change, as captured in
the results described above, while Republicans and Democrats remain more strongly in
ideological camps, unswayed by local demographic changes.48 Again, this is in contrast to
previous findings by Gravelle (2016), which may be explained by data/methodological
differences.
As mentioned throughout this chapter, there is a clear distinction between Hispanic and
Asian growth in the results, with no evidence of backlash to Asian growth, and strong evidence
of backlash to Hispanic growth for certain subgroups. Perceptions of economic competition
could be at play for those with lower levels of education, but past research challenges this
interpretation (Hainmueller et al. 2015; Helbling and Kriesi 2014). Those reporting decreased
household incomes as well as lower educational and/or family income status may have the
strongest claim to an economic competition argument against Hispanics, whether perceived or
real. There is no obvious reason, however, to believe that Independents would be more likely to
perceive economic competition with Hispanics rather than Asians, and yet they appear to adjust
their immigration preference in contexts of growth of the former and not the latter. The relative
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It is still worth noting that many Independents actually lean toward one party or another. I
attempted to capture this in a separate analysis, but the regressions with these subsamples were
too sensitive to small changes in model specifications to be useful for the purposes of this article.
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rapidity of Hispanic growth may be at play, but it is difficult to ignore the growing evidence that
there is a relative preference for Asian migration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ha 2010; Masuoka
and Junn 2013; Pew Research Center 2015), and that economic competition may not be the only
reason why. At the same time, given that the “forever foreigner” stereotype is most often applied
to Asians (Tuan 1998), we might expect culturally-driven backlash to apply more to this group.
This leaves open the possibility that belonging to a global middle class (Koo 2016), for instance,
may be a more important signifier of cultural congruence in this case. Future research should
address these questions more fully.
What are the policy implications of the results for the current chapter? There is some
hope among immigration progressives that, if the level of education among Americans continues
to increase (U.S. Census Bureau 2019), anti-immigration attitudes will continue to fall by the
wayside. This argument assumes that the relationship between education and immigration
attitudes is causal (Cavaille and Marshall 2019), which it may not be (Lancee and Sarrasin
2015), but the results in this chapter add to the evidence that education may provide a protective
effect against immigrant scapegoating, perhaps highlighting the relevance of education policy in
this area. Additionally, while absolute economic circumstances do not provide a clear platform
for backlash, relative economic circumstances may, specifically current economic circumstances
relative to recent past economic circumstances. Therefore, policymakers will do well to
understand that fighting economic instability (Hardy 2017), for instance, could have implications
beyond the economic circumstances themselves. Additionally, over a quarter of White
respondents in the CCES identify as Independents. According to Pew Research Center (2020),
34% of registered voters in the U.S. identify as Independents. This group has, of course, long
been perceived as politically persuadable and thus politically important, even though most
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actually lean toward one of the major political parties (Pew Research Center 2020). Regardless,
the specific role that local demographic change might play in this process has been less
acknowledged, though perhaps should receive more attention from those invested in the political
preferences of this population. Lastly, it is also important to remember that there is obviously not
a perfect correlation between immigration policy preferences and immigration policy (Gilligan
2015). The long-term liberalization of immigration attitudes followed by the election of a highly
restrictive candidate in Donald Trump speaks very clearly to this. Regardless, insofar as attitudes
do inform policy, it would be wise to keep in mind the role of local demographic change in
shaping said attitudes, and the uneven distribution of this effect across socioeconomic and
political groupings.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Demographic Change and Perceptions of Racism

Abstract
As described above, various studies have demonstrated that rapid racial demographic
change may aid in triggering various forms of backlash under certain conditions. This has led
scholars to speak of Whites “defending” their local environment in the face of eroding racial
dominance. However, little research has addressed how perceptions of racism among minorities
may be triggered under conditions of demographic change. This chapter attempts to fill this gap
in the literature by examining the relationship between racial demographic change for Blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians and perceptions of racial problems among these groups. Using standard
OLS regressions, ordered logistic regressions, multinomial logistic regressions, and techniques
accounting for selection into treatment, I find that Blacks and Hispanics living in counties
undergoing rapid growth of Black and Hispanic populations, respectively, have higher
perceptions of racial problems. I find no such relationship for Asians. For Blacks, this
relationship is concentrated among those without at least a 4-year degree and residents of
counties with lower initial White populations (and higher initial Black populations). For
Hispanics, it is similarly concentrated among those without at least a 4-year degree, but also is
likely stronger among residents of counties with higher initial White populations (and lower
initial Hispanic populations), highlighting unique racial dynamics that will be explored more
fully below. This research adds to a growing body of work showing the importance of examining
demographic change at the local level in order to understand some of today’s most pressing
political and social issues.
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Introduction
I draw again on the growing body of research that has demonstrated that increases in the
local minority population under certain conditions can lead to backlash of many varieties,
including perceptions of cultural threat (Newman 2013) and voting patterns (Enos 2017).
However, whether this backlash, usually concentrated among Whites (but see Marrow 2011;
Stuesse 2009), translates into a perception of racial backlash among the minority group
undergoing rapid growth has received less attention. This is important to consider given that
local anti-immigrant attitudes, for instance, do not always translate into actual perceptions of
discrimination (Hopkins et al. 2016), for various reasons discussed below. However, research has
indeed found a relationship between local demographic change and hate crimes (Grattet 2009;
Green et al. 1998; Lyons 2008; Stacey et al. 2011), particularly in areas with little preexisting
minority populations, indicating that increases in racial/ethnic minorities may generate backlash
that has serious consequences.
Might similar findings emerge for the relationship between demographic change and
feelings of racism that are a regular part of minority life in the U.S. (Feagin 1991; Chou and
Feagin 2008; Deitch et al. 2003; Pérez, Fortuna, and Alegria 2008; Swim et al. 2003)? Several
studies have suggested that this may be the case (Blalock 1956; Jiménez 2010; Tuan 1998).
Notably, Stewart et al. (2009) find that perceptions of police discrimination among a sample of
Black youths are higher in neighborhoods that are predominantly White but undergoing an
increase in the Black population. But contemporary research that systematically examines the
relationship between Black, Hispanic, and Asian growth and overall perceptions of racism is
lacking. More generally, research has found the impact of other contextual factors to be mixed in
terms of perceptions of discrimination (Almeida et al. 2016; Camacho, Allen, and Quinn 2019;
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Dailey et al. 2010; Ebert and Ovink 2014; English et al. 2014; Gay 2004; Hopkins et al. 2016;
Hunt et al. 2007; McDermott 2011; Stewart et al. 2009; Welch et al. 2001).49 This chapter
examines various individual and contextual predictors of perceptions of “racial problems” for
Black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents, with a specific focus on how these perceptions change
in places where the numbers for each of these groups are increasing rapidly. I examine this with
standard OLS, ordered logistic, and multinomial logistic regressions, as well as regressions that
account for selection into treatment, again keeping in mind that where certain groups grow is not
random and may be related to perceptions of racism. I dig deeper into these results by looking at
variation by preexisting racial/ethnic demographics, education, and nativity.
I find that growth in the Black and Hispanic populations at the county level predicts a
decrease in the likelihood that Black and Hispanic respondents, respectively, believe that racial
problems are rare and/or isolated. I interpret this as an increase in perceptions of racism and/or
racial conflict in these rapidly changing counties. This holds in OLS models, ordered logistic
models, multinomial logistic models, and models accounting for selection into treatment. The
same cannot be said for Asians, a group that again may receive a relatively more positive
reception from Whites (Pew Research Center 2015), or may be growing in places more amenable
to increasing diversity, as will be demonstrated in the current chapter. Additionally, I find this
relationship to be concentrated among Blacks and Hispanics without at least 4-year degrees. Due
to sample size limitations, I am only able to examine subsamples by nativity for Hispanics. I find
that both U.S-born and foreign-born Hispanics perceive more racial problems in rapidly
changing counties. Though the coefficient magnitudes are larger for foreign-born Hispanics,
there is substantial overlap between point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the two
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subsamples, leaving some ambiguity about this result. I also find that the relationship between
Hispanic growth and perceptions of racial problems appears to be more pronounced in “new
destination” counties, in other words those that were more predominantly White (and less
Hispanic) to begin with. Alternatively, counties with higher initial White populations (and lower
initial Black populations) show no statistically significant relationship between Black growth and
perceptions of racial problems for Blacks, highlighting distinct dynamics for each racial/ethnic
group. Overall, it is clear that local demographic change is an important and under-examined
predictor of racism-related outcomes for minorities in the U.S.
Shifting the Focus
Much of the research described above and presented in this dissertation focuses on the
impact of racial/ethnic demographic change on the attitudes and behaviors of Whites. It may
seem intuitive that backlash among Whites would result in some negative outcomes for
racial/ethnic minorities themselves, but there are reasons to be cautious about this assumption.
Hopkins et al. (2016:16), for instance, find a lack of geographic variation in perceptions of
discrimination among immigrants, positing that although “local demographics shape residents’
social and political attitudes, they might not meaningfully influence how they interact with their
neighbors.” Potential explanations include the possibility that “immigrants might not perceive
discrimination if the actions of the native-born are either individually or collectively ambiguous,
subject to multiple interpretations, or invisible to the native-born themselves” (Hopkins et al.
2016:16; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Marrow 2011; Sears 1983). Regardless, various studies
have demonstrated a relationship between demographic change and experiences of hate crimes,
indicating that backlash to demographic change has genuine and serious impacts for racial
minorities. Green et al. (1998) and Lyons (2008) find that local growth in the African American
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population predicts increased hate crimes against this group in predominantly White areas. This
might be intuitive for any scholar of Black history, given the violent reaction of Whites to Black
population growth in various cities during the Great Migration (Wilkerson 2010),50 but the
growth of Hispanic and Asian populations in the post-1965 period has been relevant in hate
crime research as well (Green et al. 1998; Stacey et al. 2011).
Perhaps the most compelling framework from these studies is the “defendedneighborhood hypothesis,” whereby the likelihood of hate crimes is determined by “the
interaction…between white homogeneity and the rate at which that homogeneity is being
eroded” (Green et al. 1998:376). It should be noted that non-Whites may also attempt to defend
against the erosion of their numerical advantage as new groups enter (Marrow 2011). The
erosion aspect is the focus of this chapter, though I also examine how the effect of this erosion
differs depending on the preexisting racial/ethnic context. According to Green et al. (1998:376),
“The literature on defended neighborhoods may be interpreted as a rapprochement between
symbolic and realistic perspectives: while emphasizing the importance of nonmaterial values
(such as preserving a way of life), ethnographers trace conflict over neighborhood territory to the
onset of racial integration” (Rieder 1985; Suttles 1972). The status in and “ownership” over a
community for Whites may appear threatened as minority numbers increase, thus resulting in a
backlash that can lead to a violent “defense” of said community.
Outside of hate crimes, Stewart et al. (2009) address demographic change and
perceptions of racial discrimination by police, with results in line with a “defendedneighborhood” interpretation. On the qualitative side, Jiménez (2010) interviews later-generation
Mexican-Americans in places that have had recent Mexican immigration and finds some
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evidence of heightened feelings of racism tied to backlash against these new influxes, with the
U.S.-born respondents being “mistaken for” or “lumped in with” immigrants playing a role. Tuan
(1998) identifies comparable feelings for Asians in California in places with increasing Asian
migration. This chapter aims to determine if similar findings can be applied broadly to
perceptions of racial problems using a national survey.
Black, Hispanic, and Asian Growth
There are various reasons to expect differential outcomes depending on the racial/ethnic
group in question, some of which has been alluded to above.51 African Americans are by most
accounts the racial group most discriminated against in the United States, both historically and at
present (Kendi 2017). This is evidenced, for instance, by research on socioeconomic statistics
and incarceration rates that indicate high levels of Black disadvantage (K. McIntosh et al. 2020;
Western and Pettit 2010), as well as high segregation rates (Iceland 2009) that indicate great
social distance from Whites. More directly related to this chapter, and mentioned above, large
Black populations in a particular locality have consistently shown evidence of generating
backlash among Whites (Enos 2016; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Taylor 1998), while
this has been less clear for large Hispanic and Asian populations (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004;
Fox 2004; Taylor 1998). Among the two major recent immigrant-origin groups, Hispanics and
Asians, various studies described above have demonstrated or implied a preference for Asian
migration, particularly among Whites (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ha 2010; Masuoka and Junn
2013; Pew Research Center 2015). Again, this may be related to the skill-based preference
afforded to migrants with higher levels of education, on average (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010;
Hainmueller et al. 2015), though this likely ignores class heterogeneity among the Asian
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population (Zong and Batalova 2016), as well as the lack of a skill-based preference afforded to
African and Middle Eastern immigrants (Pew Research Center 2015). Regardless, all of the
above assessments have caveats. Latinx demographic growth has been stigmatized in a way that
may trigger a stronger backlash than African American growth (Chavez 2008). Perceptions of
discrimination among Asians varies widely by ethnic group and how discrimination is defined
(Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). Anti-Blackness may already be so great that local demographic
patterns make little difference. The analyses in the current chapter will address these questions
directly.
Pre-Existing Racial/Ethnic Context, Education, and Nativity
In line with the defended-neighborhoods hypothesis, places with less of a minority
population to begin with may be particularly susceptible to backlash, as they have more invested
in the racial status quo (Newman 2013). Whether this backlash might translate to increased
perceptions of discrimination or racism is less clear (Ebert and Ovink 2014), but seems plausible.
Alternatively, demographic change may follow a “tipping point” model, whereby demographic
change will not generate backlash, and possibly discrimination, against a particular group until
they reach a certain percentage of the population (or the White proportion decreases to a certain
level), at which point they may begin to be viewed as a numerical threat (Schelling 1972).52
Education is another variable that may be important. Those with college educations may
not only have more contact with Whites, but also a greater amount to lose in terms of access to
mainstream economic and social life. This may lead to greater perceptions of racism during
times of rapid demographic change. However, minorities with lower levels of education may be
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viewed as threats—economically, fiscally, or culturally—in a way that middle-class minorities
may not (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller et al. 2015; Rieder 1985), thus increasing
backlash and discrimination against these groups in rapidly changing settings.
I also examine nativity, though only for Hispanics due to sample size constraints. On the
one hand, foreign-born Hispanics may be targeted for discrimination and racism due to their
accents, Spanish-language usage, and/or lack of legal documentation (Pew Research Center
2007). Alternatively, because U.S.-born Hispanics may feel more connected to the U.S
“mainstream” and have strong American identities (Telles and Sue 2019), they may be more
jarred by discrimination driven by changes in ethnic makeup (Schildkraut 2005), thus
heightening their perceptions of racism. Furthermore, as fluent English speakers with higher
levels of cultural awareness, they may be more attuned to an uptick in racism. A recent survey
found the highest perceptions of discrimination for second-generation Hispanics, followed by the
foreign-born, and then the third generation (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Krogstad 2018). But
perceptions of racial problems—as opposed to perceptions of discrimination—may tell a
different story.
Data
I incorporate several datasets for the purposes of this chapter. The outcome and most of
the covariates come from the 2016 CCES, which has sizeable samples of each minority group
and several questions related to perceptions of racism. From there, I merge in data from the 2000
Census and the 2010–2014 American Community Survey (ACS) in order to calculate the
percentage point growth in Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations from 2000 to 2010–2014, just
prior to the 2016 CCES survey. I choose percentage point growth for my main treatment variable
in accordance with previous literature in this area (Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013), but examine
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the percentage growth rate as well. I also use several other variables from the 2000 Census and
2010–2014 ACS described below. Lastly, I merge in 2016 presidential-election data to provide a
sense of the political climate at the county level around the time of the 2016 CCES survey.
Outcomes
As stated above, the primary outcome for this chapter is related to perceptions of racial
problems (DeSante and Smith 2017):
Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations:
1. Strongly disagree
2. Somewhat disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat agree
5. Strongly agree
If the score on this variable decreases as a result of demographic change and respondents
show less agreement that racial problems are rare and/or isolated, I primarily interpret this as an
increase in perceived racism, though it could indicate a more generalized perception of racial
conflict. It should be noted that this variable may capture individual-level perceptions of racial
problems or perceptions of racial problems for the group as whole. Thus, this outcome does not
rely on respondents directly experiencing racism themselves. It may not even rely on observing it
for others, but may also capture the “feeling” of racism that is often reported by racial minorities
(Chou and Feagin 2008), or a general understanding that racism is pervasive.
I also examine additional outcomes in the CCES, all racism-related, to determine if
demographic change impacts other aspects of racial experiences for minority groups. These
outcomes, listed below, also use a five-point agreement/disagreement scale:
•

“White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.”

•

“I am angry that racism exists.”

•

“I often find myself fearful of people of other races.”
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On the one hand, we may expect all of these outcomes to be similarly impacted by
demographic change and any subsequent backlash. On the other hand, it is also possible that
perceptions of racism may increase in response to these social processes without any subsequent
increase in recognition of White privilege, anger about racism, or fear of other races. Because
these questions capture different aspects of racism/racial issues, their relationship to
demographic change may be different. For example, P. McIntosh (1989) describes White
privilege as the “invisible knapsack,” something that is crucial for understanding a racialized
society but may not be especially visible to Whites or something that they want to acknowledge.
Given this, it seems plausible that White privilege may not be “ramped up” in a situation of acute
racial backlash, but instead continues to function as part of the racial landscape. Additionally, the
idea that racism makes respondents angry is fairly ubiquitous among Blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians, with very few respondents disagreeing with this statement53 (see Table A3 in the
appendix). It is possible that demographic change and racial backlash could increase awareness
of racism without having much impact on anger about racism, since racism already generates
substantial anger among racial/ethnic minorities. Fear of other races may be the most likely of
these three outcomes to be impacted by demographic change given that demographic change,
under certain circumstances, may lead to an increase in the likelihood of hate crimes occurring
(Grattet 2009; Green et al. 1998; Lyons 2008; Stacey et al. 2011). However, unless an individual
or someone they know is the victim of a hate crime or such an incident receives a great amount
of attention in the community, media, or political sphere, it may not result in increased fear of
other races. Given the evidence of underreporting of hate crimes (Pezzella, Fetzer, and Keller
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2019), it is a distinct possibility that many hate crimes may go relatively unnoticed.
Alternatively, hate crimes can receive a great amount of attention and fear may follow (Perry
2014). However, more generally, it is not necessarily the case that increased perceptions of
racism tied to demographic change will result in an increase in fear of other races. While all four
of the outcomes above show some correlation, they are not so highly correlated among Blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians that they could be considered to capture precisely the same concept (see
Table B3 in the appendix).
Methodology
I first examine these outcomes using OLS regressions. The main predictor is the growth
of the non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic Asian populations for subsamples of
these respondent groups, operationalized both as continuous variables for percentage point
growth and binary variables where “1” is respondents in counties in the top quartile of
percentage point growth, and “0” is everyone else. Although this is the primary predictor, I also
look at the relevance of other contextual and individual-level variables for predicting perceptions
of racial problems. Overall, the county-level contextual variables account for the fact that racist
and/or xenophobic attitudes may vary by the characteristics of the local population. These
include percent of the given racial/ethnic minority group, percent non-Hispanic White,
population density, median household income, and percent age 25+ with a BA+, all in 2010–
2014. I also look at median household income change and percent age 25+ with a BA+ change
from 2000 to 2010–2014. I analyze Trump voting in 2016 as well. I include a predictor for
region of residence, given that the sample sizes for some states are too small to use state of
residence. At the individual level, I use variables that may lead someone to perceive greater or
fewer racial problems. This is not necessarily to say that these characteristics lead to
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experiencing greater or fewer racial problems, though they may, but that they may impact one’s
knowledge and understanding of racial problems. These include education, family income,
employment status, assessments of the national economy, nativity/immigrant generation, gender,
birth year, union membership, having children under 18, marital status, length of residence in
one’s current home, and length of residence in one’s current city. The research around these
variables and their relationship to perceptions of racism/discrimination will be discussed below.
Lastly, given that other population trends will be correlated with the demographic change
variables mentioned above, I control for all other population growth at the county level from
2000 to 2010–2014. In other words, the analysis of Black respondents controls for non-Black
population growth, the analysis of Hispanic respondents controls for non-Hispanic population
growth, and the analysis of Asian respondents controls for non-Asian population growth.
After analyzing these variables in OLS models and doing a robustness check with
ordered logistic models, I analyze multinomial logistic models to address the results from the
OLS models in more detail. For instance, does demographic change lead minority respondents to
strong disagreement that racism is rare, or does it lead them to more neutrality on the topic, for
instance? This process will be described in more detail below. I will then move to the models
accounting for selection into treatment, “treatment” being the top quartile of growth for these
minority groups. Again, where Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians increase their population is not
random, and is likely related to perceptions of racial problems. For instance, if minorities select
into areas that are known to be progressive in terms of racial attitudes, perhaps more Democratic
areas, the effect of demographic change on perceptions of racism could be underestimated by
OLS regressions. If they select into areas where consciousness of racism is quite high, perhaps
areas with a higher minority population, the effect could be overestimated by OLS regressions.
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This technique is also applied to the additional subsamples mentioned above. The models
predicting selection into treatment use county-level variables including the percent of the
respondent group, percent voting for Bush, median household income, population size, and
population density, all in 2000. They also include median household income growth from 2000
to 2010–2014 and region of residence for the respondent. I use the variables from the OLS
regressions as controls, except that I control for percent of the respondent group in 2000 instead
of 2010–2014 as the best predictor of demographic change, given that the year 2000 is the
beginning of the growth period.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the responses to the main question in this chapter:
agreement or disagreement that racial problems are rare and/or isolated, by racial/ethnic group,
with CCES survey weights applied. One advantage of the CCES is that, unlike many other
surveys, there is information not only about nativity but also immigrant generation. Therefore, I
also examine the breakdown of responses by nativity and immigrant generation. Among the
U.S.-born, the “second generation” are those with at least one foreign-born parent, and the
“third-plus generation” are those without any foreign-born parents.
Firstly, it is very clear that Black respondents are much less likely to think racial
problems are rare and/or isolated. Over 50% of Blacks strongly disagree with this statement,
compared to 34.2% of Hispanics and 29.8% of Asians. This accords with prior research showing
that Blacks are, generally speaking, the most conscious of racism in the United States (Horowitz,
Brown, and Cox 2019). Still, all of these groups are unlikely to strongly agree that racial
problems are rare and/or isolated. Hispanics are a bit more likely than Asians to strongly disagree
that racial problems are rare/isolated, except in the third generation and higher. For all
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racial/ethnic groups, the foreign-born demonstrate lower perceptions of racial problems than the
full sample. This could partially be explained by the tendency of some immigrants to attribute
discrimination to xenophobia instead of racism (Marrow 2011), the distinct understanding of
racism among those born in the U.S. compared to those coming from places where issues of
racism may be considered differently (Roth 2008), and/or the optimism of immigrant parents that
their children can achieve success through hard work, despite racism (Louie 2012; Waters 2009).
Black respondents in the third-plus generation are the most likely to strongly disagree that racial
problems are rare/isolated of any group, once again highlighting the unique position of African
Americans whose ancestry dates back to slavery, in regard to the racial system of the United
States. Blacks are also the most likely to strongly disagree that racial problems are rare/isolated
within all generational groupings, likely demonstrating that anti-Blackness has a strong impact
regardless of generational status (Sall 2019). Interestingly, however, compared to Hispanics and
Asians, a higher percentage of Blacks strongly agree that racial problems are rare/isolated among
the foreign-born and second generation, though this perception is fairly rare overall, especially
among the U.S.-born. More about these relationships will be revealed in the OLS regressions.
Results
Table 3.2 displays OLS regressions predicting perceptions that racial problems are
rare/isolated for each racial/ethnic group. A higher coefficient indicates stronger agreement that
racial problems are rare/isolated (lower perception of racial problems), but I will often simply
refer to lower/higher perceptions of racial problems for simplicity. Firstly, there is evidence that
demographic change at the county level is impactful for perceptions of racial problems among
Blacks and Hispanics, though not among Asians. For Blacks, percentage point growth in the
Black population from 2000 to 2010–2014 predicts a decrease in agreement that racial problems
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as rare/isolated. For Hispanics, living in a county in the top quartile of Hispanic percentage point
growth from 2000 to 2010–2014 predicts the same pattern. This provides initial evidence that
perceptions of racial problems among Blacks and Hispanics, though not Asians, are in fact
stronger in places that are undergoing rapid demographic change. The selection models,
discussed below, will go further to interrogate this issue, as well as explore the magnitudes in
more detail. It should be noted that these relationships are similar when using ordered logistic
regressions (not displayed). I also analyze an alternative specification where growth of the
various groups is defined as percentage, not percentage point growth, and find no statistically
significant results (not displayed).
It should also be noted that the result for Hispanic growth replicates for the top 40% and
30% of growth, but becomes non-significant when examining the top 20% of growth. This is
perhaps because places with very high levels of Hispanic percentage point growth have higher
Hispanic populations to start with, and these places may be less susceptible to demographic
backlash. Indeed, in an interaction analysis not presented, being in a county in the top 20% of
Hispanic growth is associated with increased perceptions of racism in counties with lower
Hispanic populations in 2000, but not in those with higher Hispanic populations in 2000
(interaction p-value = 0.145). Regardless, as described briefly below, the continuous version of
Hispanic percentage point growth is predictive of increased perceptions of racism in the
multinomial logistic regression model (p-value = 0.084).
In terms of the other contextual variables, there is no evidence that minorities living in
places with higher (or lower) population percentages of their group in 2010–2014 more (or less)
strongly perceive racial problems. This confirms the hypothesis that demographic change rather
than group size is the key variable in understanding racial backlash and the ensuing rise in
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perceptions of racial problems. Additionally, most of the other county-level contextual variables
do not demonstrate any statistically significant relationship to perceived racial problems for any
of the groups. The exception is county-level education, where a higher percent and higher growth
in the percent of the population with a bachelor’s degree (age 25+) predicts decreased
perceptions of racial problems among Hispanics, perhaps due to the perception that collegeeducated populations have more progressive racial attitudes (Wodtke 2012). In an analysis not
presented, I break down the county-level income and education variables by race/ethnicity
(White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian), and mostly do not find statistically significant results.54 The
exception is that Asian income growth predicts decreased perceptions of racial problems for
Asians, perhaps suggesting that Asian income growth is less likely to be viewed as a threat, and
instead may be positively received (Kurotani 2005). There are also few differences based on
region of residence, though there is some evidence that Hispanics and Asians in the Midwest
have higher perceptions of racial problems compared to the Northeast, as do Asians in the Pacific
region in one of the models. As stated above, past research has found that context has a mixed
record in its impact on perceived discrimination (Almeida et al. 2016; Camacho et al. 2019;
Dailey et al. 2010; Ebert and Ovink 2014; English et al. 2014; Gay 2004; Hopkins et al. 2016;
Hunt et al. 2007; McDermott 2011; Stewart et al. 2009; Welch et al. 2001).
There are various statistically significant relationships for the individual-level variables.
Confirming the descriptive analysis above, the U.S.-born have higher perceptions of racial
problems, though the difference between foreign-born and second-generation Blacks is not
statistically significant. Highly educated Black respondents have higher perceptions of racial
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problems, though these results are not quite statistically significant at the 5% level.55 This is in
line with other research demonstrating that Blacks who have been exposed to more information
about racial injustice and/or have been exposed to more Whites in a higher-education setting or
certain workplaces may be more aware of racial discrimination (Dailey et al. 2010; Welch et al.
2001). In terms of family income, Black respondents in families earning $60,000 to $99,999
show higher perceptions of racial problems compared to the lowest earners. There are no other
statistically significant relationships for this variable, though those in the top bracket of Asian
income also show higher perceptions of racism at p-values close to statistical significance (pvalues = 0.073, 0.078). Black and Asian part-time workers show lower perceptions of racism
compared to full-time workers, as do unemployed Asians and retired Hispanics, perhaps
indicating increased exposure to racism with regular time spent in the workplace (Wingfield
2007, but see Ebert and Ovink 2014, Pew Research Center 2007). For assessments of the
national economy, there are some statistically significant results for Blacks and Hispanics, but
there is no clear pattern to determine if negative or positive assessments are more linked to
higher or lower perceptions of racism. Although minority men are often more likely to perceive
discrimination (Benner and Graham 2011; Ebert and Ovink 2014; English et al. 2014; Pérez et
al. 2008; Stewart et al. 2009; Welch et al. 2001, but see Pachter et al. 2010), it appears that
minority women actually show higher perceptions of racial problems in this case, which may
reflect the uniquely marginalized position of minority women in the United States (Crenshaw
1990). Black respondents born more recently show lower perceptions of racial problems, which
may be a function of their distance from the pre–Civil Rights era, or simply that younger people
have had less opportunity to experience and identify racism (English et al. 2014; Welch et al.
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2001). Hispanic and Asian labor union members have lower perceptions of racial problems,
perhaps due to the increasing contemporary efforts of unions to organize across racial lines and
address racial issues (Frymer and Grumbach 2020). Blacks show similar results to Asians that do
not quite reach statistical significance (p-values = 0.066, 0.063). Asians with children under 18
have lower perceptions of racial problems, as do Hispanics at close to statistically significant
levels (p-values = 0.074, 0.070). Blacks and Hispanics who are separated or divorced, Hispanics
who are single, and Asians who are widowed or in domestic partnerships56 show evidence of
higher perceptions of racial problems.57 These results perhaps support the notion that those with
less normative family forms may perceive more racism, which accords with Whites’ framing of
these family forms among minorities as “deviant” (Bryant and Coleman 1988). The relationship
between length of residence in one’s home and perceived racial problems is ambiguous for
Hispanics and not statistically significant for others, but Asians who are longer-term residents in
their city have higher perceptions of racial problems.
Focusing further on the primary statistically significant results in Table 3.2, those related
to Black and Hispanic demographic change, I reanalyze using multinomial logistic regressions in
Table 3.3. I analyze the relationship between Black percentage point growth and perceptions of
racial problems, as well as the top quartile of Hispanic percentage point growth and perceptions
of racial problems, again controlling for all factors from Table 3.2 (though these controls are not
displayed for simplicity). As described above, the purpose is to determine which categories of
the primary outcome are most likely to be impacted by demographic change, alternating what
serves as the baseline category.
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The important point in Table 3.3 is illustrated most clearly in the furthest right column,
where the base category is “strongly agree.” Black respondents living in counties with relatively
higher Black growth are more likely to “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree” that racial
problems are rare/isolated. Hispanic respondents in counties in the top quartile of Hispanic
growth are more likely to “strongly disagree” that racial problems are rare/isolated. As
mentioned above, a comparable result emerges when using a continuous measure of Hispanic
percentage point growth (not displayed). Using the “margins” command in Stata, I find that
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of Black growth is associated with an estimated 4.5%
increase in the number of Black respondents strongly disagreeing that racism is rare, while this
number is 6.6% for Hispanic growth and Hispanic respondents. These results provide evidence
that rapid demographic growth is associated with increased disagreement that racial problems are
rare, not simply more neutral perceptions or weaker agreement that racial problems are rare,
though these are also true in the case of Black respondents. This suggests a heightened sense of
racial problems in these rapidly changing counties.
I now return to OLS regressions to determine if demographic change is predictive of any
of the other racism-related outcomes described above. Table 3.4 displays these results, again
controlling for the same factors as in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, though not displaying these controls. I
find no statistically significant results to demonstrate that demographic growth of Blacks,
Hispanics, or Asians is predictive of perceptions of White advantages, fear of other racial groups,
or anger about racism for these groups. This provides initial evidence that the relationship
between Black and Hispanic demographic change and perceptions of racial problems are unique
to this outcome. This will be explored and discussed more with the selection models.
Inverse-Probability-Weighted Models
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I now move on to the selection models in an effort to determine if the demographic
change variables still show a statistically significant relationship to perceptions of racial
problems when the “high-growth” and “low-growth” counties are more similar in terms of
characteristics predicting selection into “high growth.” Table C3 in the appendix shows the
likelihood of selection into treatment for treatment and control counties before and after applying
the inverse probability weights. This demonstrates that there is a great improvement in balance
after applying the weights, thus allowing for greater isolation of the impact of the demographic
change variables. It should be noted that a simplified model predicting high Hispanic growth
with only percent Hispanic in 2000, median household income in 2000, and region of residence
achieves a better balance between the treatment and control groups (less than a percentage point
difference in the likelihood of treatment), and results in similar findings to those presented in the
main analysis in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 presents the primary results for the AIPW and IPWRA models.58 For the sake
of interpretability, I present the coefficients as percentage increases or decreases from the control
group mean of the dependent variable. The AIPW and IPWRA results accord with what was
revealed in the OLS models in Table 3.2. After accounting for selection into treatment, high
growth of Black and Hispanic populations at the county level predicts higher perceptions of
racial problems. Specifically, Black growth in the top quartile predicts a decrease for Blacks on
the 5-point scale of agreement with seeing racial problems as rare/isolated by 5.4% for the AIPW
model and 6.7% for the IPWRA model. Hispanic growth in the top quartile predicts a decrease
for Hispanics by 5.4% in the AIPW model and 6.1% in the IPWRA model. Again, there are no
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statistically significant results for Asian growth, suggesting that Black and Hispanic growth have
a unique relationship to perceptions of racial problems. Ultimately, this provides further evidence
that local Black and Hispanic growth may result in an increase in perceptions of racism for these
groups. Additionally, from analyses not presented, there is no evidence of a “secondary transfer
effect” (Pettigrew 2009) of demographic change on perceptions of racism.59 In other words, local
Hispanic growth does not increase Black perceptions of racism, and local Black growth does not
increase Hispanic perceptions of racism. This suggests that, if there is a backlash to demographic
change, it falls most directly on the group that is rapidly growing in its local population share.
In terms of the different results described above, might some of them be accounted for by
the growth rates of the different groups, or where they are growing? In other words, a group may
be the most likely to inspire backlash if they are growing very rapidly in places that might be
primed for backlash, such as places with high White populations (Grattet 2009; Green et al.
1998; Lyons 2008; Newman 2013; Stewart et al. 2009).60 Table 3.6 compares growth rates of the
various groups highlighted above for the treatment and control counties, and Table 3.7 compares
various contextual and individual-level characteristics for the sample of counties in which these
groups are growing rapidly. Each of these analyses are weighted with the inverse probability
weights described above in order to best replicate the conditions from the analysis in Table 3.5.
There are, indeed, growth rate differences between the groups. On average, the treatment
group counties show 7.68 percentage points of growth for Hispanics, 4.05 for Blacks, and 3.64
for Asians. Perhaps more importantly, there are differences in the gap between the treatment and
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The secondary transfer effect normally refers to positive contact, but in this case I am referring
to the negative impact of demographic change on Whites in terms of threat and any subsequent
increase in perceptions of racism by minority groups.
60
Though, again, the “tipping point” model provides an alternative prediction.
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control counties in terms of mean growth rates. This gap is 4.26 percentage points for Blacks,
4.27 for Hispanics, and 2.58 for Asians. Could the fact that Hispanics and Blacks appear at the
top of both of these lists, rather than a uniquely negative reception, account for the results in
Table 3.5? Perhaps, but it is important to note that Blacks also perceive more racial problems in
higher-growth counties when growth is operationalized as a continuous variable, as is shown in
Table 3.2, including when I restrict the sample to make the range of growth rates for Blacks and
Asians more similar (not displayed).
What about the context of reception? It is fairly clear from Table 3.7 that Asian
population growth is occurring in counties that may be less susceptible to backlash than the
counties where the other groups are growing. These counties are less conservative in terms of
Bush voting in 2000, are denser, and are much more highly educated. Also notably, Blacks are
entering more predominantly White counties than either Hispanics or Asians. Regardless, the
fact that Asians may be entering relatively hospitable environments overall is an underexplored
aspect of their relatively positive reception in the United States, and should be explored more
deeply by future research.
I now look at various subsamples for Blacks and Hispanics, though not Asians due to
sample size constraints, with results displayed in Table 3.8. Specifically, I look at places with
higher and lower White populations in 2000 by excluding the bottom and top quartile of percent
White, respectively, at the county level.61 I also compare those with and without a 4-year degree
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Ideally, I would simply examine the top and bottom half of percent White. However, these
models do not achieve convergence. Instead, therefore, I examine the top and bottom three
quartiles. These samples, of course, overlap, but this is necessary for model convergence. The
important distinction is that one sample has a higher average percent White in 2000 and the other
has a lower average percent White in 2000.
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or higher. Lastly, I compare U.S.-born and foreign-born populations, but can only do so for
Hispanic respondents due to sample size limitations for Blacks.
Firstly, I show that Hispanic population growth likely demonstrates an especially strong
relationship to perceptions of racial problems in places that were more predominantly White in
2000. Specifically, top-quartile Hispanic growth in these counties predicts a 11.4% or 15.1%
decrease in the scale for perceiving racial problems as rare/isolated, depending on the model,
compared to 6.4% in the counties that were less predominantly White in 2000. The coefficient
estimates for the respective subsamples do not overlap with the 95% confidence intervals of the
other subsample except in one out of four cases, providing decent evidence that the relationship
is indeed different when comparing these subsamples. This suggests, as other studies have
(Green et al. 1998; Newman 2013), that Hispanic growth may be most likely to generate
backlash in places with little previous racial/ethnic diversity. By comparison, I find no
statistically significant results for Black growth in places with higher White populations in 2000
(and in fact the signs are positive), but do in places with lower White populations in 2000. This
contradicts the defended-neighborhood hypothesis, but is in line with some research showing
that Whites may embrace or tolerate diversity in the form of a sizeable Black population to a
point, but as this “tipping point” is being passed by Black growth, this tolerance may decrease
(Schelling 1972). Another possibility is that the recognition of racism as a function of backlash is
heightened in counties with a higher Black population, and thus a stronger co-racial community
to raise awareness of racism, particularly for a racial group with a high consciousness of racism
(Horowitz et al. 2019). Alternative models (not displayed) examining low Hispanic/Black
counties in 2000 as opposed to high White counties and high Hispanic/Black counties in 2000 as
opposed to low White counties show similar patterns. In other words, increased perceptions of
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racism appear particularly likely to occur for Blacks in counties with relatively high Black
populations as of 2000, and for Hispanics in counties with relatively low Hispanic populations in
2000.
For the comparison by education level, we see that Blacks and Hispanics with at least a
4-year degree perceive no greater or fewer racial problems in places undergoing rapid
demographic change. Alternatively, those without a 4-year degree show higher perceptions of
racial problems in rapidly changing counties. Similar results hold when the samples are limited
to those born in 1991 or earlier so that respondents are at least age 25 or so, allowing time for
them to have obtained a degree. This is evidence that those with lower education, who may also
be more economically vulnerable, are likely to bear the brunt of racism and/or racial conflict
related to demographic change.
Lastly, Hispanic growth predicts a statistically significant increase in the perception of
racial problems for U.S.-born and foreign-born Hispanics. However, the magnitudes (decrease
on the scale) for the foreign-born population are larger, 12.0% or 10.1% depending on the model,
compared to 6.2% or 8.1% for the U.S.-born. This falls in line with research showing
discriminatory targeting of foreign-born Hispanics in particular (Hosoda, Nguyen, and StoneRomero 2012). This is in contrast, though, with the higher perceptions of racial problems for
U.S.-born Hispanics described above, and also in contrast to the theory that U.S.-born Hispanics
may be more impacted by discrimination as a threat to their proximity to the U.S. “mainstream”
(Schildkraut 2005). However, there is overlap between these subsamples in terms of the
coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals in three out of four cases, so the
conclusion of these findings is somewhat ambiguous.
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There is some concern that the correlation of these various subsamples may play a role in
these results. However, as shown in Table D3 of the appendix, the correlations between these
variables are not particularly strong. This table is divided into the Black and Hispanic
subsamples and show correlations for all ages as well as only those approximately age 25-plus.
This provides evidence that the individual results presented in Table 3.8 are likely each worth
interpreting on their own.
I now test whether the results from Table 3.5 hold when including controls for the other
racism-related variables of this chapter. I also again analyze these racism-related variables as
outcomes, controlling for the other three racism-related variables. These results are displayed in
Table 3.9.
Firstly, Black and Hispanic growth continue to predict less agreement that racism is
rare/isolated after controlling for the other racism-related variables. However, for Black
respondents, there is no evidence of increased perceptions of White advantages, anger about
racism, or fear of other races in high Black growth counties. In fact, there is evidence of the
reverse for the first two of these outcomes, but the magnitudes of these results are likely not large
enough to be especially meaningful (1–2%). This provides evidence that perceptions of the
frequency of racial problems are uniquely impacted by Black growth. It is possible that the
backlash Black respondents observe simply alerts them to the frequency of racism but does not
impact their understanding of White privilege, which is perhaps a subtler phenomenon that
permeates American society rather than something that is “triggered” in certain situations (Flagg
1993). Still, there is some evidence of increased acknowledgement of White advantages for
Hispanics as a result of high Hispanic growth. Hispanic growth does not, however, appear to
impact anger about racism or fear of other races. Anger about racism is already highly reported
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by respondents, with very few disagreeing with the statement described above even compared to
the other outcomes,62 implying that perhaps respondents do not need to observe any demographic
backlash in order to be angry about racism. It is perhaps most surprising that being fearful of
other races is not impacted by demographic change, given the evidence around demographic
change and hate crimes described above. However, as noted above, hate crimes are
underreported (Pezzella et al. 2019), and even under conditions of demographic change they may
not always receive the attention necessary to generate genuine fear of other races in a substantial
segment of the Black and Hispanic populations. More generally, heightened perceptions of
racism do not necessarily translate into heightened fear of other races. Overall, the relationship
between demographic change and increased perceptions of racial problems may not apply to
increased perceptions of White privilege (at least for Blacks), increased anger about racism, or
increased fear of other races, as highlighted by the results in Table 3.4 and Table 3.9.
Conclusion
The evidence presented above provides a strong argument for continuing to bring context
into the conversation around perceptions of racism. Despite mixed evidence of the importance of
context in the related literature, and a lack of evidence that most contextual factors are predictive
of perceptions of racial problems in this chapter, rapid demographic change predicts increased
perceptions of racial problems for both Black and Hispanic respondents in the CCES.
Specifically, as Black and Hispanic populations grow at the county level, Black and Hispanic
respondents, respectively, agree less with the idea that racial problems are rare and/or isolated.
This is in contrast to high Asian growth, which predicts no such change in perceptions. This
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Again, disagreeing that Whites have advantages is also rare, though not quite as rare, among
Black respondents.
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could indicate a lack of negative reaction to Asian growth specifically, or could have to do with
the context of places where Asians are rapidly increasing their numbers, among other
possibilities. Further research should reckon with these potential interpretations. Regardless, the
results for Black and Hispanic growth fit within a framework whereby rapid demographic
change upsets the status quo and may result in backlash of many varieties, including antiimmigrant sentiments, conservative political turns, or even hate crimes. Whether this backlash
results in increased perceptions of racism has been unclear, but this chapter provides evidence in
support of this idea. As described in the current chapter, however, this is not necessarily the case
for all racism-related outcomes in this chapter. Precisely why this might be is unclear, but some
possible explanations were addressed above.
For Hispanics, perceptions of racial problems are likely heightened in places where the
White population proportion has been greater (and the Hispanic proportion has been lower),
providing support for the defended-neighborhood hypothesis and justifying particular concern
about backlash in so-called “new destinations” in the United States (B. Jones 2019).
Interestingly, however, I find the opposite results for high Black growth, which particularly
predicts increased perceptions of racial problems in places where the White population was
relatively low and the Black population was relatively high in 2000. This perhaps highlights the
distinct experience of these two groups: one made up of a large percentage of immigrants and
currently entering regions of the country with little history of immigration (Massey 2008), the
other a group largely with deep ancestral roots in the United States and having undergone its own
mass migration earlier in the 20th century (Wilkerson 2010). Alternatively, a relatively high
concentration of Black respondents may aid in the perceptions of racial backlash, particularly
given the high consciousness of racism for the group as a whole (Horowitz et al. 2019).
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Regardless, I also find some commonality of experience in the sense that both Blacks and
Hispanics without 4-year degrees are more likely to report increases in perceived racial problems
in places undergoing rapid demographic change, while the more educated of these groups may
have shielded themselves through their higher socioeconomic status, despite the fact that they
may be more likely to encounter Whites. For Hispanics, both the U.S.-born and foreign-born
show evidence of increased perceptions of racial problems as a result of rapid demographic
change. The magnitude is greater for the foreign-born, though there is less certainty that this
difference is statistically meaningful.
The results described above should not overshadow the fact that White racial attitudes in
the United States more generally did not necessarily become more conservative over the period
studied in this analysis, and by some measures have undergone a liberalization in recent times
(McElwee 2018; Pew Research Center 2017), known colloquially as the “Great Awokening”
(Yglesias 2019, but see Baldassarri and Park 2020; Bobo et al. 2012). This chapter does not
necessarily suggest that demographic change will substantially disrupt this trend, but simply that
as rapid demographic change occurs in various places around the country, increased perceptions
of racism may follow. One line of thinking around the Trump election, for instance, is that while
racism has not clearly increased in the United States, there is evidence that it was mobilized in
the service of Trump’s campaign (Sides 2017). Similarly, while certain racial attitudes may be
liberalizing, the activation of racism in rapidly changing places may be relevant to the experience
of racial/ethnic minorities. Researchers and policymakers would do well to consider this when
studying not only new immigrant destinations, but also “old destinations” for African Americans,
namely the American South (Frey 2004). In other words, there is no one story of racism in the

98

United States, but rather a complex racial system that will be impacted by various factors,
including local disruptions to the racial status quo.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Concluding Thoughts

This study has grappled with one of the most important issues facing various countries
around the globe today: migration and the racial/ethnic demographic change that follows in
many local communities (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2013). It also deals with Black population
growth in the U.S., which is a combination of growth of African Americans and Black
immigrants (Hamilton 2019). As described in detail throughout this dissertation, the reaction of
local populations to these changes, often though not always among Whites, has been important in
shaping various political and social outcomes, including immigration attitudes, policy
preferences, and voting patterns. I take new approaches to the questions of voting in the 2016
election and immigration attitudes, and make a more wholly novel contribution by examining the
knock-on effects of backlash to demographic change on the perceptions of racism for racial
minorities. More generally, I apply a quasi-causal approach that has not been used in this area of
the literature, thus adding increased relevance to the findings.
Overall, I add to the research demonstrating evidence of backlash to local demographic
change, moving away from the focus on minority levels as the key variable in predicting
backlash. I find that Whites as well as Asians were more likely to vote for Donald Trump in
2016 in counties where the Hispanic population grew rapidly. I show that this is likely, at least to
some extent, a Trump-specific phenomenon, by controlling for voting patterns in 2012. Thus, we
see the ways in which the importance of immigration issues may be tied to politicians who
mobilize these issues in particular, and may not necessarily benefit conservatives more generally
(Newman et al. 2018; Mayda et al. 2018). However, like many issues in American politics, the
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idiosyncrasies of the Electoral College complicate matters and leave some ambiguity as to the
ultimate effect of demographic change on the 2016 election. As studies on the 2020 election
begin to emerge, the complications of demographic change, including but not limited to changes
in Latinx voting patterns (Ghitza and Robinson 2021), will further complicate the story of the
Trump era. Regardless of the ultimate impact, the phenomenon of Hispanic growth predicting an
uptick in voting for a far-right candidate in a quasi-causal framework should be carried forward
when considering the future of American politics.
In Chapter 3, I add to the conversation of who is most likely to react negatively to local
demographic change in terms of their attitudes toward immigration policy. Some research has
specifically addressed the question of what moderates the impact of demographic change on
immigration attitudes (Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013; Johnston et al. 2015), while a much larger
literature has looked at predictors of immigration attitudes more generally (Hainmueller and
Hopkins 2014). This dissertation makes a unique contribution by systematically examining
which factors predict backlash to demographic change and whether these factors differ from
what are generally thought to be important predictors of immigration attitudes. As described in
more detail above, I find evidence that U.S.-born Whites with lower education, a recent dip in
household income, and who identify as political Independents are more likely to have a negative
reaction to demographic change in terms of their attitudes toward various immigration policies.
The last two results are particularly striking, the former because it ties economic decline to
immigration attitudes in a way that many other studies have not, and the latter because it includes
a large portion of the population whose immigration attitudes have been considered less
frequently than those who identify with the major political parties. Hout and Maggio (2021)
show that, while this group has followed a similar path to Democrats in terms of liberalization on
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immigration preferences in recent decades, they have not moved as far left on average, and now
fall somewhere between Democrats and Republicans. As this dissertation shows, demographic
change may play an important role in how immigration attitude trends play out for this group
going forward.
Lastly, I make an effort to shift the focus of studies on demographic change from
primarily Whites to minority groups who may face the consequences of backlash as their local
numbers grow. Several studies have taken up this mantle in relation to hate crimes (Grattet 2009;
Green et al. 1998; Lyons 2008; Stacey et al. 2011), but the relationship between demographic
change and more general perceptions of racism has not been studied much outside of qualitative
approaches (Jiménez 2010; Tuan 1998). I find that, indeed, Black and Hispanic respondents
display increased perceptions of racial problems in places where their numbers have grown
rapidly since 2000. The dynamic in terms of preexisting racial/ethnic context appears to be
different for these groups, with Hispanic perceptions of racism ticking up in “new destinations,”
and Black perceptions doing so in places where their numbers are a bit higher to begin with. I
explored the possible explanations for this above, but more generally these findings highlight the
complex racial dynamics playing out in various parts of the country with different historical
relationships to these groups. Research on internal migration of African Americans, often to
places in the South that have long been centers of African American life (Frey 2004), has not
been in strong dialogue with the literature on international-migration-related changes happening
in the contemporary U.S., and there has also been little effort to contextualize these changes in
reference to the Great Migration. Hopefully this study can be influential in sparking connections
between these population movements for a greater understanding of the impact of demographic
change both historically and at present.
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Apart from the individual chapters, several themes emerge from this dissertation more
generally. Across all three chapters, Hispanic growth was found to be associated with backlash in
terms of Trump voting, immigration attitudes, and perceptions of racism. As described in
Chapter 2, this group has, since at least the post-Bracero era, been the group most associated
with immigration backlash and stigmatization in the United States (Chavez 2001, 2008; Massey
and Pren 2012), and was the primary target of anti-immigrant sentiment expressed by the Trump
campaign (Imbert 2015; Ye Hee Lee 2015). In contrast, there is no evidence of backlash to
increases in county-level Asian population in this dissertation, including no increase in Asian
perceptions of racism in counties where this population has grown rapidly since 2000. A number
of possible explanations were discussed above. Firstly, from 2000 until the time periods studied
in this dissertation, the Asian population did not increase as rapidly as the Hispanic population,
at least in percentage point terms at the county level. In this sense, it is possible that a group
growing more quickly could be more likely to generate backlash, and this dynamic could change
as the Asian population continues to grow (Budiman 2020). However, as demonstrated in
Chapter 3, this is likely not the only explanation given the results around Black growth.
Another possibility, also demonstrated in Chapter 3, is that Asian growth is happening in
places around the country that are less susceptible to backlash, perhaps because the White
population is more highly educated and less politically conservative, for instance. In other words,
this is a relatively highly educated minority group moving into economically dynamic areas
where the local population may not view them as a threat (Kurotani 2005; Jiménez 2017).
However, this does not necessarily mean that these groups are not uncomfortable with the
increasing Asian population, but may express it in ways that are not captured by these surveys,
such as sending their children to private schools to avoid perceived academic competition
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(Jiménez 2017). Certainly, the ways in which the divergent locations of Black, Hispanic, and
Asian population growth may alter their reception among Whites is worth examining in future
research. However, it is also notable that, in Chapter 4, there is no evidence of backlash to Asian
growth among any of the White subsamples studied, so it is unlikely that the local context for
Asian growth is the only factor at play.
This leads, once again, into a conversation about differential reception, in particular for
the two most important immigrant-origin groups of the post-1965 era, Hispanics and Asians
(Chishti, Hipsman, and Ball 2015). The current study adds to a growing body of literature that
either implies or demonstrates in a fairly straightforward way that there is a more positive
reception for Asians than Hispanics in the United States, particularly among Whites (Abrajano
and Hajnal 2015; Ha 2010; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Pew Research Center 2015). The potential
reasons for this disparity are explored above, and the perception of Asians as a “model minority”
has of course been addressed as well (Wu 2014). There are clearly numerous issues with this
characterization, not least of which is the ongoing discrimination faced by Asians in the United
States (Chou and Feagin 2008), including the varying levels and types of discrimination faced by
different Asian groups (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). Additionally, as demonstrated by Lee (2015),
the reception of various Asian immigrant groups has been historically contingent and changed
over time depending on various geopolitical and social factors. Without making too strong of a
claim related to long-term trends, evidence of anti-Asian sentiments that have arisen during the
Covid-19 pandemic (Gover, Harper, and Langton 2020) are illustrative of the limitations of
telling a single story about the reception of Asians in the United States and assuming stasis.
Regardless, future research should more fully explore group-specific preferences for particular
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immigrant-origin groups over others, who possesses which preferences, and what may motivate
them.
For Hispanic growth in particular, there are two major pieces of evidence in this
dissertation tying backlash specifically to “new destinations,” as discussed in several places
above. Notably, the increase in support for Trump among Whites is quite large in places with
little Hispanic population in 2000, and Hispanic growth also appears to particularly impact
Hispanic perceptions of racism in these new destinations. Although I find no evidence of a
similar relationship in Chapter 3, there is prior evidence that cultural backlash against
immigrants is tied to Hispanic growth in these new destinations (Newman 2013). At this point,
much has been said about these new destinations in the literature (Brazil 2017; Brown, Jones,
and Becker 2018; Crowley, Lichter, and Turner 2015; Ebert and Ovink 2014; Johnson and
Lichter 2008; Kaushal and Shang 2013; Lichter and Johnson 2009; Marrow 2011; Massey 2008;
Okamoto and Ebert 2010), so I will not dwell on the point too much. However, it is worth noting
that this dissertation provides evidence of a process whereby the larger the preexisting
immigration-origin population is, the less likely backlash is. Some of this could be due to
selection out of rapidly changing counties on the part of less tolerant Whites and/or selection into
these counties by more tolerant Whites, all in the long term. However, Claassen and McLaren
(2021) find evidence that, at the country level across Europe, backlash to migration decreases at
higher levels of non-citizen stock. Since selection in or out of these countries (as opposed to
localities) is highly unlikely, this may represent a genuinely positive impact of contact (Pettigrew
and Tropp 2006) in terms of reactions to demographic change. However, the evidence of
backlash to Black growth in more highly Black locales in Chapter 4 leaves some hesitation.
Given evidence that Hispanics are being racialized similarly to Blacks in some of these new
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destinations provides further pause (Brown et al. 2018), and continued monitoring of this
situation will be useful.
It is also worth noting the role of education in the current dissertation. Among Whites in
particular, as access to education has grown in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2019), the
“diploma divide” has become an increasingly important factor in the current DemocratRepublican political alignment, including in the 2016 election (Kitschelt and Rehm 2019).
Moreover, various studies have found education to be an important factor in predicting
immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller et al. 2015), and perhaps a
causal factor (Cavaille and Marshall 2019, but see Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). The importance of
education in understanding reactions to demographic change also emerged in the current
dissertation. In Chapter 2, I found that Whites with less than a 4-year degree demonstrated
increased Trump voting in counties undergoing rapid Hispanic growth, while those with a 4-year
degree or more did not. In Chapter 3, I found similar results for the moderation of the
relationship between Hispanic growth and immigration policy attitudes. Whether these
relationships represent cultural or economic concerns about demographic change is less clear,
though each possibility is addressed in detail above. Regardless, if levels of education continue
to grow in the United States, it is possible that this could lead to a long-term shift in the
relationship between demographic change and various forms of backlash. As mentioned above,
this does not necessarily mean that backlash will go away, but it may shift to different forms that
are less likely to be captured by the outcomes discussed above (Jiménez 2017). Regardless, it is
clear that the high level of attention on the diploma divide is warranted and will be an important
aspect for understanding reactions to demographic change going forward.
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The role of education in shaping the experiences of racial/ethnic minorities is illuminated
in this dissertation as well. Although this dissertation is unable to speak in too much detail about
the role of education/class background in shaping the differential reception of Asians and
Hispanics, it is likely to play at least some part (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller et al.
2015). Additionally, as I show in Chapter 4, education plays a contrasting role in perceptions of
racism more generally and how perceptions of racism are influenced by demographic change. I
find evidence of increased perceptions of racism for Blacks with higher levels of education,
which finds support elsewhere in the literature (Dailey et al. 2010; Welch et al. 2001), and may
be due to increased exposure to White racism and/or the increased awareness of racism that may
come with higher education. Alternatively, Blacks and Hispanics with lower levels of education
appear to be more vulnerable to backlash to demographic change, again in terms of their
perceptions of racism. The relative “acceptability” of middle-class minorities among certain
Whites has been addressed previously (Rieder 1985), but more research into the ways in which
class influences White perception and treatment of minority groups will be useful.
Another important factor is the role that elites might play in how demographic change is
framed and understood. As described above, there is evidence outside and within this dissertation
that Trump effectively mobilized against immigration and thus set the stage for backlash against
demographic change (Newman et al. 2018; Sides 2017). Hopkins (2010) demonstrates that the
media may serve a similar role during times of heightened immigration salience. Might the
opposite be true? In other words, can progressive leaders mobilize a pro-immigration sentiment
in the context of demographic change, or at least prevent a negative reaction? Quantitative
research has done less to address this question, but qualitative research provides some promising
evidence. For instance, Hernández-León and Zúñiga (2009) study Dalton, Georgia, a carpet
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manufacturing town in the American South that might have been primed for backlash due to its
status as a “new destination.” However, a strong and obvious backlash did not emerge in Dalton
compared to many places, which the authors credit at least in part to the influence of local elites
in the political and economic sphere. If the benefits of immigration, for instance, can be
articulated in an effective way (Facchini, Margalit, and Nakata 2016), or misinformation about
immigration addressed (Haaland and Roth 2020), demographic change may be viewed as less of
a threat. Increasing political coalitions between Black and Latinx communities can be models for
this as well (Brown, Jones, and Dow 2016; B. Jones 2019), again driven in part by the efforts of
local leaders.
Lastly, without diminishing the importance of the results of this dissertation, it is also
crucial to note that there is little evidence that racial and immigration attitudes among Whites
have become more conservative in the time period studied in this dissertation, and at least for
Democrats and Independents on certain measures, there is evidence of liberalization (Hout and
Maggio 2021). Despite the clear importance of demographic change established by this
dissertation, there is very little evidence that it has disrupted these trends in any meaningful way.
That is not to say that backlash to demographic change does not have the potential to be highly
impactful, as exhibited in Chapter 2,63 but simply that, in the long term, acceptance of increasing
diversity appears to be winning out, and demographic change itself (rather than the backlash to
it) is more influential given the changes to the population and electorate,64 though this does not
always translate directly into more liberalized policy around immigration, for instance (Gilligan
2015). Still, the rise of global far-right movements does appear to benefit from demographic
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Though, again, the actual impact of backlash to Hispanic growth on the 2016 election is not
clear.
64
Chapter 2 also demonstrates this impact.
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change (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018), at least in the relative short term, and major related
political events such as Brexit appear to be influenced by these changes as well (Goodwin and
Milazzo 2017). This is not to make an argument against immigration, which can have major
benefits for migrants and “native-born” populations (Peri 2007), as well as those in the country
of origin (Clemens 2017). It is simply to say that, as racial/ethnic demographic change continues
across various countries, we should be aware of the potential reactions to this change, how it
might vary by the characteristics of the local population, and how minorities may be impacted.
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TABLES
CHAPTER 2 TABLES
Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics for various CCES samples (observations are individual-level,
statistics are given at the county level)
Top quartile foreign- Top quartile
Top quartile
born pct. point
Hispanic pct. Asian pct. point
Full
growth ‘00 to ‘10–
point growth
growth ‘00 to
Variable
sample
14
‘00 to ‘10–14
‘10–14
Foreign-born pct. point
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
2.0
4.4
[1.81]
[1.39]
Hispanic pct. point
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
3.8
7.6
[2.68]
[1.75]
Asian pct. point
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
1.3
3.4
[1.47]
[1.68]
Pct. foreign-born ‘00
10.2
12.9
15.6
19.3
[9.99]
[7.48]
[9.16]
[11.12]
Pct. Hispanic ‘00
11.2
10.8
20.2
17.1
[13.55]
[8.6]
[13.11]
[13.39]
Pct. Asian ‘00
3.3
5.0
3.7
8.0
[4.59]
[4.73]
[2.97]
[5.68]
Pct. bachelor's degree+
(age 25+) ‘10–14
29.8
35.8
29.1
38.5
[10.56]
[10.59]
[8.81]
[10.61]
Population density
(people/sq. mi.) ‘10–14
2180.7
2099.6
1591.4
5780.2
[7382.79]
[4089.57]
[3806.53]
[14011.69]
Median household
income ‘10–14
$55,918
$66,042
$57,968
$69,072
[14684.46
]
[18605.58]
[15151.04]
[16462.82]
Observations
50,989
12,518
12,341
11,832
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014
Note: The sample sizes for the top quartile of percentage point growth of each group vary due to
uneven distribution of duplicate growth rates for respondents living in the same counties.
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Table 1.2. Logistic regressions predicting Trump voting (vs. all other options including nonvoting) with demographic change variables and controls (observations are individual-level,
2016 general election)
Variables
Top quartile foreign-born pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

-0.11*

[0.054]
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14 (countylevel)

0.035
[0.054]

Top quartile Asian pct. point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14 (county-level)
Vote 2012 (ref. = Obama)
Romney
Other
Pct. Romney vote 2012 (county-level)
Education (ref. = less than high school)
High school graduate
Some college
2-year degree
4-year degree
Post-graduate degree
Family income (ref. = less than $10,000)
$10,000–$19,999
$20,000–$29,999
$30,000–$39,999
$40,000–$49,999
$50,000–$59,999
$60,000–$69,999
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-0.095
[0.073]

3.74***
[0.047]
1.15***
[0.056]
0.011***
[0.0022]

3.74***
[0.047]
1.15***
[0.056]
0.013***
[0.0023]

3.74***
[0.047]
1.15***
[0.056]
0.0090***
[0.0022]

0.37***
[0.11]
0.35**
[0.11]
0.37**
[0.12]
-0.064
[0.11]
-0.33**
[0.12]

0.37***
[0.11]
0.35**
[0.11]
0.37**
[0.12]
-0.058
[0.11]
-0.33**
[0.12]

0.38***
[0.11]
0.35**
[0.11]
0.37**
[0.12]
-0.055
[0.11]
-0.33**
[0.12]

-0.025
[0.13]
0.045
[0.13]
0.094
[0.12]
0.023
[0.13]
0.30*
[0.13]
0.15

-0.02
[0.13]
0.044
[0.13]
0.098
[0.12]
0.025
[0.13]
0.30*
[0.13]
0.15

-0.025
[0.13]
0.047
[0.13]
0.095
[0.12]
0.023
[0.13]
0.30*
[0.13]
0.16

$70,000–$79,999
$80,000–$99,999
$100,000–$119,999
$120,000–$149,999
$150,000 or greater
Prefer not to say
Employment status (ref. = full-time)
Part-time
Temporarily laid off
Unemployed
Retired
Permanently disabled
Homemaker
Student
Other
Race/ethnicity (ref. = White)
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Mixed
Other
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[0.14]
0.14
[0.14]
0.23
[0.13]
0.18
[0.14]
0.13
[0.15]
-0.016
[0.14]
0.19
[0.13]

[0.14]
0.14
[0.14]
0.23
[0.13]
0.19
[0.14]
0.14
[0.15]
-0.011
[0.14]
0.19
[0.13]

[0.14]
0.14
[0.14]
0.23
[0.13]
0.18
[0.14]
0.14
[0.15]
-0.0065
[0.14]
0.19
[0.13]

0.018
[0.074]
0.27
[0.28]
-0.21*
[0.1]
-0.15**
[0.058]
-0.023
[0.095]
-0.23**
[0.076]
-0.21
[0.13]
-0.25
[0.14]

0.017
[0.074]
0.26
[0.28]
-0.21*
[0.1]
-0.16**
[0.059]
-0.026
[0.095]
-0.23**
[0.076]
-0.21
[0.13]
-0.25
[0.14]

0.017
[0.074]
0.27
[0.28]
-0.21*
[0.1]
-0.15**
[0.058]
-0.03
[0.095]
-0.23**
[0.075]
-0.21
[0.13]
-0.25
[0.14]

-1.52***
[0.12]
-0.45**
[0.17]
-0.63***
[0.15]
0.043
[0.24]
-0.54***
[0.13]
0.2
[0.17]

-1.52***
[0.12]
-0.48**
[0.17]
-0.62***
[0.15]
0.044
[0.24]
-0.54***
[0.13]
0.2
[0.17]

-1.53***
[0.12]
-0.42*
[0.17]
-0.60***
[0.15]
0.039
[0.24]
-0.53***
[0.13]
0.2
[0.17]

Middle Eastern
Hispanic identification (ref. = Hispanic)
Non-Hispanic
Immigrant generation (ref. = foreign-born citizen)
Second generation (at least one foreign-born
parent)
Third generation (at least one foreign-born
grandparent)
Fourth-plus generation
Female
Birth year
Union membership (ref. = never)
Current
Former
Child under age 18
Marital status (ref. = married)
Separated

-0.97**
[0.33]

-0.96**
[0.32]

-0.94**
[0.32]

0.37*
[0.15]

0.40**
[0.15]

0.37*
[0.15]

-0.12

-0.13

-0.15

[0.11]
-0.12

[0.11]
-0.12

[0.11]
-0.15

[0.099]
-0.19*
[0.096]
-0.27***
[0.041]
-0.011***
[0.0021]

[0.099]
-0.19*
[0.096]
-0.27***
[0.041]
-0.011***
[0.0021]

[0.098]
-0.22*
[0.095]
-0.27***
[0.041]
-0.011***
[0.0021]

0.078
[0.082]
0.047
[0.052]
0.15**
[0.054]

0.078
[0.082]
0.048
[0.052]
0.15**
[0.055]

0.081
[0.081]
0.043
[0.052]
0.15**
[0.054]

-0.16
[0.13]
-0.16**
[0.06]
-0.057
[0.084]
-0.30***
[0.063]
-0.24*
[0.11]

-0.15
[0.13]
-0.16**
[0.06]
-0.057
[0.084]
-0.30***
[0.063]
-0.24*
[0.11]

-0.018
[0.063]
-0.095
[0.076]
-0.0046
[0.09]

-0.039
[0.063]
-0.077
[0.077]
0.05
[0.095]

-0.16
[0.13]
Divorced
-0.17**
[0.06]
Widowed
-0.06
[0.084]
Single
-0.30***
[0.063]
Domestic partnership
-0.23*
[0.11]
Population density at county-level (ref. = least dense quartile)
25–50%
-0.04
[0.063]
50–75%
-0.11
[0.076]
Most dense quartile
-0.071
[0.095]
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Pct. in labor force ‘10–14 (age 16+, county-level)
Time at current residence (ref. = less than 1 year)
1–2 years
3–4 years
5 or more years
U.S.-born population change ‘00 to '10–14

-0.014**
[0.0049]

-0.013**
[0.0048]

-0.011*
[0.0048]

0.16
[0.09]
0.22*
[0.088]
0.31***
[0.076]
0.0017
[0.0017]

0.16
[0.09]
0.22*
[0.088]
0.32***
[0.076]

0.16
[0.09]
0.22*
[0.088]
0.32***
[0.076]

Non-Hispanic population change ‘00 to '10–14

-0.000047
[0.0017]

Non-Asian population change ‘00 to ‘10–14

0.0015
[0.0017]

Pct. foreign-born ‘00

0.010**
[0.0036]

Pct. Hispanic ‘00

0.011***
[0.0025]

Pct. Asian ‘00
Constant

20.2***
[4.19]

20.1***
[4.19]

-0.011
[0.0092]
19.9***
[4.19]

Observations
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

50,989

50,989

50,989

Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000,
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014
Note: Control for state of residence not displayed.
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Table 1.3. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting (vs. all other options including
non-voting) with demographic change variables (observations are individual-level, 2016
general election)
AIPW
IPWRA
Top quartile foreign-born pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)
Coefficient
-0.026
-0.002
Robust standard error
0.084
0.007
Observations
44,112
44,112
Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)

Top quartile Asian pct. point
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14 (countylevel)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.048***
0.009
42,048

0.031***
0.008
42,048

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.114
0.075
39,623

0.013
0.013
39,623

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000,
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014
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Table 1.4. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are
individual-level, 2016 general and primary elections)
AIPW
General election (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)
Other 2012
Obama
Romney
voters (or
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic
2012 voters 2012 voters non-voters)
White
Black
Asian
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Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)
(3.5 pct. points or more
of Hispanic growth for
the non-Hispanic Black
subsample, 4 pct. points
or more of Hispanic
growth for the Asian
subsample)

Coefficient

0.019

0.027**

0.007

0.044**

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.012
18,692

0.009
13,063

0.016
9,180

0.015
30,733

-0.0036

0.112**

0.026
4,023

0.038
1,211

IPWRA
General election (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)
Other 2012
Obama
Romney
voters (or
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic
2012 voters 2012 voters non-voters)
White
Black
Asian
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient

0.048***

0.022**

-0.012

0.043***

-0.026

0.097**

(3.5 pct. points or more
of Hispanic growth for
the non-Hispanic Black
subsample, 4 pct. points
or more of Hispanic
growth for the Asian
subsample)

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.009
18,692

0.008
13,063

0.015
9,180

0.01
30,733

0.014
4,023

AIPW
General election (Trump vs. all candidates)
Other 2012
Obama
Romney
voters (or
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic
2012 voters 2012 voters non-voters)
White
Black
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Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)
(3.5 pct. points or more
of Hispanic growth for
the non-Hispanic Black
subsample, 4 pct. points
or more of Hispanic
growth for the Asian
subsample)

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.032
1,211

Asian

0.02

0.032***

-0.006

0.051**

-0.015

0.158*

0.013
17,832

0.008
12,667

0.019
5,151

0.017
27,051

0.028
3,461

0.067
959

IPWRA
General election (Trump vs. all candidates)
Other 2012
Obama
Romney
voters (or
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic
2012 voters 2012 voters non-voters)
White
Black

Asian

Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
10–14 (county-level)
(3.5 pct. points or more
of Hispanic growth for
the non-Hispanic Black
subsample, 4 pct. points
or more of Hispanic
growth for the Asian
subsample)

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.052***

0.027***

-0.02

0.048***

-0.021

0.108**

0.01
17,832

0.007
12,667

0.02
5,151

0.01
27,051

0.016
3,461

0.038
959
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AIPW
General election (Trump vs. Clinton)
Other 2012
Obama
Romney
voters (or
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic
2012 voters 2012 voters non-voters)
White
Black
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)
(3.5 pct. points or more
of Hispanic growth for
the non-Hispanic Black
subsample, 4 pct. points
or more of Hispanic
growth for the Asian
subsample)

Asian

Coefficient

0.019

0.025***

-0.007

0.043**

-0.021

0.147*

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.013
16,754

0.007
11,639

0.02
4,072

0.013
24,550

0.027
3,298

0.075
883

IPWRA
General election (Trump vs. Clinton)

Obama
Romney
2012 voters 2012 voters
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)
(3.5 pct. points or more
of Hispanic growth for
the non-Hispanic Black
subsample, 4 pct. points
or more of Hispanic
growth for the Asian
subsample)

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error
Observations

Other 2012
voters (or
non-voters)
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Coefficient
Robust
standard
error
Observations

Non-Hispanic
Black

Asian

0.052***

0.021***

-0.009

0.051***

-0.037*

0.089*

0.01
16,754

0.005
11,639

0.018
4,072

0.009
24,550

0.015
3,298

0.036
883

Republican primary
(Trump vs. all
candidates)
AIPW
IPWRA
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Non-Hispanic
White

0.033*

0.03*

0.015
9,853

0.014
9,853

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census
2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014

Table 1.5. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are
individual-level, 2016 general election, non-Hispanic Whites only)

No 4-yr.
degree
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

0.045**

-0.022

0.022

0.057***

0.123*

0.006

0.015
17,775

0.036
10,866

0.026
10,571

0.014
8,579

0.055
8,405

0.009
15,354
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No 4-yr.
degree
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

AIPW (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)
5.6%
Greater than
$80,000 or Hispanic or
5.6% pct.
Less than
greater
less ‘00
Hispanic ‘00
4-yr.
$50,000
family
(county(countydegree plus family income
income
level)
level)

IPWRA (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)
5.6%
Greater than
$80,000 or Hispanic or
5.6% pct.
Less than
greater
less ‘00
Hispanic ‘00
4-yr.
$50,000
family
(county(countydegree plus family income
income
level)
level)

0.037**

0.016

0.038**

0.011
17,775

0.013
10,866

0.014
10,571

0.055***

0.128*

0.012

0.014
8,579

0.05
8,405

0.008
15,354

AIPW (Trump vs. all candidates)

No 4-yr.
degree
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

Less than
4-yr.
$50,000
degree plus family income

$80,000 or
greater
family
income

5.6%
Hispanic or
less ’00
(countylevel)

Greater than
5.6% pct.
Hispanic ‘00
(countylevel)

0.047**

-0.018

0.029

0.054***

0.131*

-0.004

0.014
15,033

0.038
10,323

0.021
8,529

0.014
8,101

0.053
7,217

0.009
13,696

$80,000 or
greater
family
income

5.6%
Hispanic or
less ‘00
(countylevel)

Greater than
5.6% pct.
Hispanic ’00
(countylevel)

0.056***

0.142**

0.0009

0.047
7,217

0.008
13,696

$80,000 or
greater
family
income

5.6%
Hispanic or
less ‘00
(countylevel)

Greater than
5.6% pct.
Hispanic ‘00
(countylevel)

0.052***

0.135**

IPWRA (Trump vs. all candidates)
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No 4-yr.
degree
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

Less than
4-yr.
$50,000
degree plus family income

0.047***

0.014

0.036**

0.01
15,033

0.013
10,323

0.013
8,529

0.014
8,101

AIPW (Trump vs. Clinton)

No 4-yr.
degree
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient

0.025*

Less than
4-yr.
$50,000
degree plus family income
-0.013

0.01

-0.015

Robust
standard error
Observations

0.011
13,870

0.037
9,220

0.018
7,716

0.014
7,384

0.047
6,594

0.008
12,491

$80,000 or
greater
family
income

5.6%
Hispanic or
less ‘00
(countylevel)

Greater than
5.6% pct.
Hispanic ‘00
(countylevel)

0.151**

-0.008

0.047
6,594

0.008
12,491

IPWRA (Trump vs. Clinton)

No 4-yr.
degree
Top quartile Hispanic
pct. point growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

Less than
4-yr.
$50,000
degree plus family income

0.038***

0.009

0.033*

0.052***

0.01
13,870

0.012
9,220

0.013
7,716

0.014
7,384
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*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000,
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014

Table 1.6. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are
individual-level, 2016 general election, non-Hispanic Whites only with varying levels of education and family income)
AIPW (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)
Lower
education,
Lower education, Higher education, Higher education,
lower family
higher family
lower family
higher family
income
income
income
income
Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.025
0.022
8,034

0.041*
0.02
3,259

-0.11
0.084
1,997

0.025
0.025
4,970
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IPWRA (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)
Lower
education,
Lower education, Higher education, Higher education,
lower family
higher family
lower family
higher family
income
income
income
income
Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10-14
(county–level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.029
0.016
8,034

0.047*
0.019
3,259

-0.034
0.021
1,997

0.02
0.018
4,970

AIPW (Trump vs. all candidates)
Lower
education,
lower family
income

Lower education,
higher family
income

Higher education, Higher education,
lower family
higher family
income
income

Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.024
0.02
6,318

0.039
0.02
3,016

-0.088
0.048
1,828

0.016
0.026
4,773

IPWRA (Trump vs. all candidates)

Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

Lower
education,
lower family
income

Lower education,
higher family
income

0.025
0.015
6,318

0.046*
0.019
3,016

Higher education, Higher education,
lower family
higher family
income
income
-0.044*
0.02
1,828

0.02
0.018
4,773

124

AIPW (Trump vs. Clinton)

Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

Lower
education,
lower family
income

Lower education,
higher family
income

0.002
0.018
5,787

0.039*
0.019
2,824

Higher education, Higher education,
lower family
higher family
income
income
-0.072*
0.032
1,580

0.02
0.026
4,246

IPWRA (Trump vs. Clinton)
Lower
education,
lower family
income

Lower education,
higher family
income

Higher education, Higher education,
lower family
higher family
income
income

Top quartile Hispanic pct.
point growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
(county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.02
0.015
5,787

0.044*
0.018
2,824

-0.053**
0.017
1,580

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014

0.02
0.017
4,246
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Table 1.7. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump/Romney voting with demographic change variables (observations are
county-level, percentage point method, 2016 general and Republican primary elections, 2012 general election)

2016 general (pct.
Trump vote)
Swing
All
states
Top quartile
foreign-born pct.
point growth
(county-level)
126
Top quartile
Hispanic pct. point
growth (countylevel)

Top quartile Asian
pct. point growth
(county-level)

AIPW
2016 general (pct.
2016
Trump vote – pct.
Republican
Clinton vote)
primary
Swing
All
states
All

2012 general
All

Swing states

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

0.066

0.131

0.028

0.003

1.36

-0.007

-0.794

0.131
3,096

0.409
886

0.234
3,096

0.7
886

0.807
2,382

0.318
3,092

1.32
886

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

0.548*

-0.274

1.15*

-0.446

0.547

-0.178

-1.13*

0.267
2,895

0.235
705

0.541
2,895

0.465
705

0.875
2,181

0.356
2,895

0.452
705

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

-0.205

-0.319

0.039

-0.7

3.17

-0.278

-2.53

0.363
3,087

0.251
881

0.592
3,087

0.498
881

2.29
2,384

0.611
3,089

2.68
884

2016 general (pct.
Trump vote)
Swing
All
states
Top quartile
foreign-born pct.
point growth
(county-level)
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Top quartile
Hispanic pct. point
growth (countylevel)

Top quartile Asian
pct. point growth
(county-level)

IPWRA
2016 general (pct.
2016
Trump vote – pct.
Republican
Clinton vote)
primary
Swing
All
states
All

2012 general
All

Swing states

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

0.218

0.012

0.289

-0.203

0.483

-0.05

-0.531

0.123
3,096

0.2
886

0.224
3,096

0.354
886

0.358
2,382

0.211
3,092

0.3
886

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

0.417**

-0.12

0.809**

-0.187

0.8

-0.315

-0.941**

0.144
2,895

0.223
705

0.257
2,895

0.441
705

0.429
2,181

0.26
2,895

0.336
705

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

0.025

-0.359

-0.161

-0.715

0.346

-0.124

-0.243

0.116
3,087

0.199
881

0.212
3,087

0.399
881

0.347
2,384

0.242
3,089

0.371
884

*** p<0.001, **
p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 5-Year Estimates 2006–2010 and 2010–2014

Table 1.8. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are
individual-level, 2016 general election, counties in top quartile of citizen voting-age population [2012–2016] within swing states)
Counties in top quartile of CVAP within swing states
AIPW

4 pct. points or more
Coefficient
of Hispanic growth ‘00
to ‘10–14 (countylevel)
Robust standard
error
Observations
128
4 pct. points or more
Coefficient
of Hispanic growth ‘00
to ‘10–14 (countylevel)
Robust standard
error
Observations

(Trump vs. all other options
including non-voting)
-0.019

(Trump vs. all candidates)

(Trump vs. Clinton)

-0.014

-0.013

0.012

0.012

0.012

9,540

8,443

7,821

Counties in top quartile of CVAP within swing states
IPWRA
(Trump vs. all other options
(Trump vs. all candidates) (Trump vs. Clinton)
including non-voting)
-0.014
-0.007
-0.004

0.012

0.013

0.012

9,540

8,443

7,821

*** p<0.001, **
p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates 2010–2014, 2012–2016
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Table A1. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Romney voting with percentage point growth in Hispanic citizen voting-age
population (CVAP) vs. percentage point growth in all other Hispanics (observations are county-level, 2012 general election)

All
Top quartile Hispanic CVAP pct. point growth
‘00 to ‘06–10 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.183
0.349
2,878
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All
Top quartile Hispanic non-CVAP pct. point
growth ‘00 to ‘06–10 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.065
0.224
2,964

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates 2006-2010

AIPW
Swing states
-1.75***
0.397
778
AIPW
Swing states
-0.502
0.366
865

All
-0.285
0.244
2,878

All
-0.074
0.206
2,964

IPWRA
Swing states
-1.78***
0.34
778
IPWRA
Swing states
-0.535
0.345
865

Table B1. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are
individual-level, 2016 general election, non-Hispanic whites in swing states with varying levels of education and family income)

Lower education,
lower family
income
4 pct. points or more of
Hispanic growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard
error
Observations

AIPW (Trump vs. all other including non-voters)
Lower education,
Higher education,
higher family
Higher education,
higher family
income
lower family income
income

0.012

0.108*

0.039

0.053

0.037
2,086

0.044
935

0.07
645

0.036
1,542
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IPWRA (Trump vs. all other including non-voters)
Lower education,
Lower education,
Higher education,
lower family
higher family
Higher education,
higher family
income
income
lower family income
income
4 pct. points or more of
Hispanic growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.016

0.118**

0.003

0.054

0.033
2,086

0.039
935

0.037
645

0.03
1,542

Lower education,
lower family
income
4 pct. points or more of
Hispanic growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient

0.009

AIPW (Trump vs. all candidates)
Lower education,
higher family
Higher education,
income
lower family income
0.113**

0.029

Higher education,
higher family
income
0.05

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.055
1,519

Lower education,
lower family
income
4 pct. points or more of
Hispanic growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

Coefficient
Robust
standard
error
Observations
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Coefficient
Robust
standard
error
Observations

Coefficient

IPWRA (Trump vs. all candidates)
Lower education,
higher family
Higher education,
income
lower family income

0.036
1,503

Higher education,
higher family
income

0.109**

-0.012

0.05

0.034
1,519

0.036
866

0.038
585

0.03
1,503

AIPW (Trump vs. Clinton)
Lower education,
higher family
Higher education,
income
lower family income

Higher education,
higher family
income

-0.018

0.091

0.023

0.061

0.056
1,428

0.049
818

0.062
521

0.031
1,374

Lower education,
lower family
income
4 pct. points or more of
Hispanic growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

0.075
585

0.052

Lower education,
lower family
income
4 pct. points or more of
Hispanic growth ‘00 to
‘10–14 (county-level)

0.043
866

0.042

IPWRA (Trump vs. Clinton)
Lower education,
higher family
Higher education,
income
lower family income
0.085*

-0.019

Higher education,
higher family
income
0.05*

Robust
standard
error
Observations

0.037
1,428

0.036
818

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census
2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010–2014

0.036
521

0.028
1,374
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their current
city for at least 18 years in the CCES (percentages are weighted, observations are not)
Percent Observations
Min.
Max.
Reduce legal immigration
55.5%
9,061
No preference to reduce
immigration
44.5%
8,426
Higher education
30.3%
6,054
Lower education
69.7%
11,433
Higher family income
28.3%
4,666
Lower family income
71.7%
10,625
Full-time employed
68.7%
5,896
Part-time employed
9.8%
1,763
Unemployed
5.1%
777
Democrat
27.3%
5,336
Republican
38.8%
6,047
Independent
26.1%
4,757
Economy better
58.6%
9,567
Economy worse
15.1%
2,844
Economy same
23.3%
4,507
Household income increased
33.6%
5,543
Household income decreased
14.9%
2,715
Household income same
51.5%
9,204
Percent Hispanic (county-level)
8.1%
17,466
0.2% 94.3%
Percent Asian (county-level)
2.5%
17,466 0.01% 45.3%
Unemployment rate (county-level)
6.4%
17,470
0.3% 20.6%
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2018, Census 2000
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Table 2.2. Logistic regressions predicting preference to reduce legal immigration with countylevel demographic change variables and controls (U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their
current city for at least 18 years)
Variables
Percentage point change Hispanic ‘00
to ‘13–17 (county-level)

0.015
(0.010)

Top quartile percentage point change
Hispanic ‘00 to ‘13–17 (county-level)

0.074
(0.063)

Percentage point change Asian ‘00 to
‘13–17 (county-level)

0.012
(0.021)

Top quartile percentage point change
Asian ‘00 to ‘13–17 (county-level)
Percent Hispanic ‘00 (county-level)

0.063
(0.070)
0.0039
(0.0045)

0.0045
(0.0044)

Percent Asian ‘00 (county-level)
Bush vote percent ‘00 (county-level)
Percent non-Hispanic White ‘00
(county-level)
Education (ref. = less than high school)
High school graduate
Some college
2-year
4-year
Post-graduate
Family income (ref. = less than
$30,000)
$30,000–$59,999
$60,000–$99,999

0.0098**
(0.0032)

0.010**
(0.0032)

-0.018
(0.012)
0.012***
(0.0031)

0.00096
(0.0030)

0.00075
(0.0029)

-0.0029
(0.0024)

-0.0027
(0.0024)

-0.049
(0.12)
-0.23
(0.12)
-0.077
(0.12)
-0.56***
(0.12)
-0.87***
(0.13)

-0.050
(0.12)
-0.23*
(0.12)
-0.078
(0.12)
-0.56***
(0.12)
-0.87***
(0.13)

-0.053
(0.12)
-0.24*
(0.12)
-0.082
(0.12)
-0.57***
(0.12)
-0.88***
(0.13)

-0.053
(0.12)
-0.24*
(0.12)
-0.082
(0.12)
-0.57***
(0.12)
-0.88***
(0.13)

0.069
(0.063)
0.12

0.070
(0.063)
0.12

0.067
(0.063)
0.12

0.068
(0.063)
0.12
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-0.017
(0.012)
0.012***
(0.0031)

$100,000 or greater
Prefer not to say
Employment status (ref. = full-time)
Part-time
Temporarily laid off
Unemployed
Retired
Permanently disabled
Homemaker
Student
Other
Immigrant generation (ref. = Second
generation)
Third-plus generation
Female
Birth Year
Union status (ref. = never a union
member)
Currently a member of a labor union
Formerly was a member of a labor
union
Child under 18 years
Marital status (ref. = married)
Separated
Divorced

(0.072)
0.10
(0.079)
0.23**
(0.083)

(0.072)
0.10
(0.079)
0.23**
(0.082)

(0.072)
0.10
(0.078)
0.23**
(0.082)

(0.072)
0.10
(0.078)
0.23**
(0.082)

-0.17*
(0.080)
0.31
(0.31)
-0.34**
(0.12)
-0.12*
(0.061)
-0.015
(0.098)
-0.22*
(0.091)
-0.28
(0.18)
-0.043
(0.19)

-0.17*
(0.080)
0.32
(0.32)
-0.34**
(0.12)
-0.12*
(0.061)
-0.016
(0.098)
-0.22*
(0.091)
-0.29
(0.18)
-0.042
(0.19)

-0.17*
(0.081)
0.32
(0.32)
-0.35**
(0.12)
-0.12*
(0.061)
-0.013
(0.099)
-0.22*
(0.091)
-0.29
(0.18)
-0.048
(0.20)

-0.17*
(0.081)
0.32
(0.32)
-0.34**
(0.12)
-0.12*
(0.061)
-0.013
(0.099)
-0.22*
(0.091)
-0.29
(0.18)
-0.049
(0.20)

0.094
(0.093)
-0.37***
(0.046)
-0.025***
(0.0022)

0.094
(0.093)
-0.37***
(0.046)
-0.025***
(0.0022)

0.092
(0.093)
-0.37***
(0.046)
-0.025***
(0.0022)

0.092
(0.092)
-0.37***
(0.046)
-0.025***
(0.0022)

-0.24**
(0.088)

-0.24**
(0.088)

-0.23**
(0.088)

-0.23**
(0.088)

-0.100*
(0.050)
0.17*
(0.069)

-0.100*
(0.050)
0.17*
(0.069)

-0.097*
(0.050)
0.17*
(0.069)

-0.097*
(0.050)
0.17*
(0.069)

-0.22
(0.19)
-0.12

-0.22
(0.19)
-0.12

-0.22
(0.19)
-0.12

-0.23
(0.19)
-0.12
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Widowed
Never married
Domestic / civil partnership
Logged population density ‘13–17
(county-level)
Current city residence length in years
Non-Hispanic population change ‘00 to
‘10–17 (county-level)

(0.070)
-0.086
(0.084)
-0.29***
(0.068)
-0.29*
(0.12)

(0.070)
-0.086
(0.084)
-0.29***
(0.068)
-0.29*
(0.12)

(0.070)
-0.082
(0.084)
-0.29***
(0.068)
-0.29*
(0.12)

(0.070)
-0.082
(0.084)
-0.29***
(0.068)
-0.29*
(0.12)

-0.067**
(0.021)
0.0020
(0.0016)

-0.064**
(0.021)
0.0020
(0.0016)

-0.061**
(0.023)
0.0020
(0.0016)

-0.061**
(0.023)
0.0021
(0.0016)

-0.0050**
(0.0017)

-0.0051**
(0.0017)
-0.0042*
(0.0017)
49.4***
(4.44)
18,004

Non-Asian population change ‘00 to
‘10–17 (county-level)
Constant

49.3***
(4.42)

49.3***
(4.42)

-0.0041*
(0.0017)
49.5***
(4.43)

Observations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

18,004

18,004

18,004
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Table 2.3. AIPW and IPWRA regressions predicting preference to reduce legal immigration with
county-level demographic change variables and controls (U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their
current city for at least 18 years)
Top quartile Hispanic
Top quartile Asian
growth ‘00 to ‘13–17 growth ‘00 to ‘13–17
AIPW
IPWRA
AIPW
IPWRA
0.013
0.014
0.013
0.026
All
Coefficient
0.013
0.013
0.025
0.024
Robust standard error
10,083
10,083
4,492
4,492
Observations
Higher education

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.034
0.022
3,650

-0.026
0.022
3,650

0.02
0.04
1,861

0.022
0.038
1,861

Lower education

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.043**
0.016
6,368

0.042*
0.016
6,368

0.02
0.034
2,159

0.029
0.032
2,159

Higher family income

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.006
0.025
2,950

-0.006
0.024
2,950

0.068
0.042
1,566

0.056
0.043
1,566

Lower family income

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.021
0.017
5,871

0.022
0.018
5,871

-0.005
0.036
2,133

0.0004
0.035
2,133

Full-time employed

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.008
0.022
3,353

-0.008
0.022
3,353

-0.013
0.04
1,527

0.017
0.037
1,527

Part-time employed

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.074
0.045
1,233

0.081
0.044
1,233

0.039
0.054
737

0.038
0.052
737

Unemployed

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.078
0.062
442

0.07
0.058
442

-0.042
0.091
237

-0.036
0.085
237

Lower Hispanic ‘00

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.124
0.073
1,329

0.131
0.084
1,329
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-0.011
0.022
4,497

0.003
0.019
4,497

Higher Hispanic ‘00

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

Lower Asian ‘00

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.011
0.049
1,046

-0.016
0.046
1,046

Higher Asian ‘00

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.035
0.035
2,755

0.059
0.034
2,755

Higher unemployment
‘13–17

Lower unemployment
‘13–17

White population gain
‘00 to ‘13–17

White population loss
‘00 to ‘13–17

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations
Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations
Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations
Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.004

-0.002

-0.042

-0.001

0.015
6,953

0.015
6,953

0.033
2,601

0.030
2,601

0.001

0.004

0.011

0.024

0.018
6,581

0.018
6,581

0.030
3,334

0.029
3,334

0.017

0.023

0.045

0.043

0.025
3,882

0.024
3,882

0.041
1,386

0.041
1,386

-0.011

-0.004

-0.016

-0.008

0.018
5,382

0.019
5,382

0.041
2,024

0.041
2,024

Democrat

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.006
0.021
2,950

0.013
0.020
2,950

0.029
0.036
1,295

0.015
0.033
1,295

Republican

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.030
0.018
3,655

0.029
0.018
3,655

-0.014
0.039
1,284

0.007
0.039
1,284

Independent

Coefficient
Robust standard error

0.063*
0.027

0.054*
0.026

-0.025
0.044

-0.018
0.041
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Observations
Higher racial
resentment

Lower racial
resentment

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations
Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

2,571

2,571

1,209

1,209

-0.007

-0.006

0.034

0.046

0.016
5,338

0.016
5,338

0.030
2,101

0.031
2,101

-0.016

-0.015

0.014

0.023

0.019
3,893

0.019
3,893

0.033
1,800

0.032
1,800

Economy better

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

-0.007
0.017
5,507

-0.003
0.016
5,507

0.011
0.030
2,648

0.029
0.029
2,648

Economy worse

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.022
0.033
1,469

0.018
0.030
1,469

0.056
0.039
1,288

0.062
0.038
1,288

Economy same

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.003
0.026
2,508

0.011
0.027
2,508

0.020
0.041
1,229

0.018
0.039
1,229

0.003

0.007

-0.080*

-0.056

0.020
3,516

0.019
3,516

0.035
1,467

0.038
1,467

0.086**

0.093**

0.043

0.051

0.033
1,411

0.031
1,411

0.041
1,038

0.039
1,038

-0.007

-0.007

-0.033

-0.001

0.019
5,093

0.019
5,093

0.039
1,975

0.037
1,975

Household income
increased

Household income
decreased

Household income
same

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations
Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations
Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

*** p<0.001, **
p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2018, Census 2000, American Community Survey
2013–2017, Election Atlas
Note: Controls included but not displayed
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Table 2.4. AIPW and IPWRA regressions predicting preference to reduce legal immigration with top
quartile of Hispanic growth and controls (U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their current city for at
least 18 years, reported decreased household income in the past year)
AIPW
IPWRA
Household income decreased
Higher education
Coefficient
-0.02
-0.042
Robust standard error
0.058
0.054
Observations
454
454
Lower education

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.126** 0.138***
0.04
0.038
1,113
1,113

Higher family income

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.005
0.058
643

0.005
0.058
643

Lower family income

Coefficient
Robust standard error
Observations

0.123**
0.04
1,241

0.127**
0.041
1,241

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2018, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 2013–2017, Election Atlas
Note: Controls included but not displayed.
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Table 2.5. AIPW and IPWRA regressions predicting alternative outcomes with top quartile of Hispanic growth and controls for key
subsamples
DACA
Border security
Police
Prison
Scale
IPWR
IPWR
IPWR
IPWR
IPWR
AIPW
A
AIPW
A
AIPW
A
AIPW
A
AIPW
A
Lower
education
Coefficient
0.001
-0.004 0.033* 0.032* 0.00002
0.002
0.001
0.003
0.015
0.016
Robust
standard error
0.017
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.012
0.012
Observations
6,357
6,357
6,338
6,338
6,366
6,366
6,360
6,360
6,368
6,368
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Independent Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations
Household
income
decreased

Coefficient
Robust
standard error
Observations

-0.038

-0.039

0.086*
*

0.08**

0.071*

0.078*
*

0.071*
*

0.065*

0.066*
*

0.063*
*

0.027
2,575

0.026
2,575

0.027
2,594

0.027
2,594

0.027
2,566

0.027
2,566

0.026
2,565

0.027
2,565

0.02
2,570

0.019
2,570

-0.046

-0.044

0.104*
*

0.089*
*

0.002

-0.007

0.043

0.039

0.054*

0.05*

0.029
1,407

0.027
1,407

0.034
1,405

0.032
1,405

0.033
1,410

0.032
1,410

0.034
1,409

0.033
1,409

0.024
1,411

0.023
1,411

0.129*
*

0.105*
*

0.136*
*

0.103*

0.023

-0.0008

0.065

0.047

0.093*
*

0.079*
*

Household
income
decreased
Lower
education

Coefficient

Robust
standard error
Observations
Lower
family
income

0.041
1,102

Coefficient
-0.078*
Robust
standard error
0.037
Observations
1,192
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

0.039
1,102

0.044
1,102

0.041
1,102

0.042
1,114

0.039
1,114

0.042
1,114

0.041
1,114

0.031
1,113

0.028
1,113

-0.067

0.105*

0.096*

-0.003

-0.005

0.064

0.071

0.073*

0.075*

0.037
1,192

0.043
1,189

0.044
1,189

0.041
1,241

0.041
1,241

0.043
1,240

0.043
1,240

0.031
1,241

0.032
1,241
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Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2018, Census 2000,
American Community Survey 2013–2017, Election Atlas
Note: Controls included but not displayed.

Table 2.6. Mean percentage point growth, treatment vs. control groups (inverse-probability-weighted, primary analysis samples
only)
Hispanic
Asian
Hispanic
Asian
Hispanic growth,
Asian growth, HH
growth, lower
growth,
growth,
growth,
HH income
income decreased
ed.
lower ed.
Independent
Independent
decreased
Top quartile
8.05
2.86
7.84
3.14
8.05
2.85
Bottom 3
3.67
1.33
3.65
1.34
3.61
1.36
quartiles
Difference
4.38
1.53
4.19
1.8
4.44
1.49
Ratio
2.19
2.15
2.15
2.34
2.23
2.10
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2018, Census 2000, American Community Survey 2013–2017, Election Atlas
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Table A2. Racial resentment questions (options are “strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat
disagree, strongly disagree”)
“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same
without any special favors.
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of
the lower class.
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Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as
whites.”

Table B2. Correlations between key characteristics (U.S.-born Whites who have lived in their current city for at least 18
years, survey weighted)
Higher education
Independent
Independent
-0.0055
Household income decreased
-0.0351
0.016
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2018
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Table 3.1. Agreement that racial problems are rare and/or
isolated by race/ethnicity, nativity, and immigrant generation
(survey weighted)
Black Hispanic Asian
All
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Observations

51.6%
21.1%
14.1%
7.4%
5.8%
4,787

34.2%
27.0%
17.6%
14.8%
6.5%
5,334

29.8%
33.1%
19.4%
12.3%
5.3%
1,687

Foreign-born
Strongly disagree
42.8%
Somewhat disagree
15.0%
Neither agree nor disagree
13.2%
Somewhat agree
11.8%
Strongly agree
17.2%
Observations
379

27.0%
24.1%
15.3%
22.0%
11.6%
1,187

24.2%
34.6%
17.9%
15.5%
7.8%
937

Second generation
Strongly disagree
41.4%
Somewhat disagree
25.1%
Neither agree nor disagree
19.0%
Somewhat agree
7.5%
Strongly agree
6.9%
Observations
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37.8%
27.6%
17.3%
12.7%
4.6%
1,539

34.6%
31.4%
21.4%
10.0%
2.5%
546

Third-plus generation
Strongly disagree
53.2%
Somewhat disagree
21.5%
Neither agree nor disagree
13.8%
Somewhat agree
7.0%
Strongly agree
4.5%

34.6%
27.9%
18.9%
13.1%
5.5%

36.3%
32.7%
18.8%
7.8%
4.4%
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Observations

4,175

2,580
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Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016
Note: The generational totals do not add up to the overall
total because of missing information on generation for a
small number of respondents.

146

Table 3.2. OLS regressions predicting agreement that racial problems are rare/isolated with county-level demographic change and
various other county-level and individual-level variables
Variables
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Percentage point growth Black ‘00 to ‘10–14

-0.022*
(0.010)

Percentage point growth Hispanic ‘00 to ‘10–14

-0.015
(0.015)

Percentage point growth Asian ‘00 to ‘10–14

0.0021
(0.016)

Top quartile percentage point growth Black ‘00 to ‘10–14

-0.11
(0.083)

Top quartile percentage point growth Hispanic ‘00 to ‘10–14

-0.18*
(0.070)
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Top quartile percentage point growth Asian ‘00 to ‘10–14
Percent Black ‘10–14

0.099
(0.084)
0.00013
(0.0037)

Percent Hispanic ‘10–14

0.0024
(0.0032)

Percent Asian ‘10–14

-0.0086
(0.0052)

Top quartile Black ‘10–14

0.031
(0.078)

Top quartile Hispanic ‘10–14

-0.062
(0.089)

Top quartile Asian ‘10–14
Trump vote percent ‘16
Percent non-Hispanic White ‘10–14

0.0049
(0.0052)
-0.0023

0.0077
(0.0054)
-0.00021

0.0011
(0.0047)
-0.0027

0.0047
(0.0046)
-0.0021

0.0097
(0.0053)
-0.0047

0.018
(0.11)
-0.00094
(0.0044)
0.0011

Logged population density ‘10–14
Logged median household income ‘10–14
Logged median household income pct. growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
Percent BA+ (age 25+) ‘10–14
Percent BA+ pct. growth (age 25+) ‘00 to ‘10–14
Nativity/immigrant generation (ref. = foreign-born)
Second generation
Third-plus generation
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Highest level of education (ref. = less than high school degree)
High school graduate
Some college
2-year degree
4-year degree
Post-graduate degree
Family income (ref. = less than $30,000)
$30,000–$59,999
$60,000–$99,999

(0.0033)
-0.0053
(0.034)
0.084
(0.23)
-0.00029
(0.0036)
0.00066
(0.0061)
0.00057
(0.0033)
-0.14
(0.20)
-0.34*
(0.14)

(0.0044)
0.018
(0.038)
-0.40
(0.26)
-0.0056
(0.0039)
0.016*
(0.0075)
0.0091*
(0.0040)

(0.0046)
0.064
(0.049)
0.22
(0.28)
-0.0021
(0.0055)
-0.010
(0.0094)
-0.00032
(0.0073)

-0.47*** -0.35***
(0.096)
(0.095)
-0.39*** -0.44***
(0.072)
(0.11)

(0.0031)
-0.0058
(0.031)
-0.019
(0.22)
0.0019
(0.0032)
0.0025
(0.0059)
0.00083
(0.0032)
-0.14
(0.19)
-0.34*
(0.14)

(0.0035)
0.012
(0.036)
-0.41
(0.24)
-0.0061
(0.0036)
0.016*
(0.0071)
0.0079*
(0.0039)

(0.0037)
0.062
(0.047)
0.097
(0.26)
-0.0016
(0.0048)
-0.015
(0.0091)
-0.0018
(0.0067)

-0.48*** -0.35***
(0.094)
(0.095)
-0.40*** -0.46***
(0.071)
(0.10)

-0.060
(0.14)
-0.22
(0.15)
-0.15
(0.16)
-0.28
(0.15)
-0.26
(0.16)

0.073
(0.11)
-0.082
(0.12)
0.084
(0.14)
0.066
(0.13)
-0.060
(0.14)

0.21
(0.27)
0.28
(0.26)
0.12
(0.25)
0.32
(0.26)
0.049
(0.26)

-0.052
(0.14)
-0.22
(0.15)
-0.15
(0.16)
-0.28
(0.15)
-0.25
(0.16)

0.075
(0.11)
-0.081
(0.11)
0.084
(0.14)
0.064
(0.12)
-0.062
(0.14)

0.20
(0.27)
0.26
(0.26)
0.099
(0.26)
0.30
(0.26)
0.037
(0.27)

-0.042
(0.079)
-0.25**
(0.093)

0.048
(0.089)
0.081
(0.13)

-0.23
(0.15)
-0.23
(0.16)

-0.045
(0.079)
-0.26**
(0.093)

0.046
(0.089)
0.082
(0.13)

-0.22
(0.15)
-0.23
(0.16)

$100,000 or greater
Prefer not to say
Employment status (ref. = full-time)
Part-time
Unemployed
Retired
Other
National economy in the past year (ref. = stayed about the same)
Gotten much better
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Gotten better
Gotten worse
Gotten much worse
Not sure
Female
Birth year
Current/former labor union status (ref. = never a labor union
member)
Yes, I am currently a member of a labor union

-0.057
(0.14)
-0.078
(0.14)

0.0017
(0.12)
0.17
(0.16)

-0.21
(0.15)
-0.28
(0.16)

-0.061
(0.14)
-0.076
(0.14)

-0.0051
(0.11)
0.16
(0.16)

-0.21
(0.15)
-0.28
(0.16)

0.24*
(0.11)
0.12
(0.13)
0.11
(0.093)
-0.076
(0.082)

0.11
(0.10)
0.071
(0.11)
0.25*
(0.12)
0.044
(0.087)

0.38**
(0.13)
0.36**
(0.13)
0.21
(0.16)
0.061
(0.13)

0.24*
(0.11)
0.12
(0.13)
0.10
(0.093)
-0.080
(0.082)

0.11
(0.10)
0.062
(0.11)
0.26*
(0.11)
0.042
(0.087)

0.38**
(0.13)
0.37**
(0.13)
0.20
(0.16)
0.055
(0.13)

0.24
(0.13)
-0.15*
(0.070)
0.088
(0.097)
0.054
(0.15)
-0.093
(0.17)
-0.16*
(0.069)
0.0065*
(0.0032)

0.24
(0.13)

0.024
0.22
(0.16)
(0.21)
-0.39***
-0.13
(0.085)
(0.091)
0.13
0.16
(0.082)
(0.10)
0.27
-0.027
(0.14)
(0.18)
0.086
0.071
(0.16)
(0.17)
-0.23*** -0.29***
(0.065)
(0.074)
0.0037
0.00037
(0.0040) (0.0040)

0.31*
(0.12)

0.45**
(0.15)

0.24
(0.13)
-0.15*
(0.070)
0.087
(0.097)
0.057
(0.15)
-0.090
(0.17)
-0.16*
(0.069)
0.0065*
(0.0032)

0.24
(0.13)

0.026
0.21
(0.15)
(0.21)
-0.38***
-0.13
(0.085)
(0.092)
0.13
0.16
(0.082)
(0.11)
0.28
-0.0082
(0.14)
(0.17)
0.088
0.053
(0.16)
(0.17)
-0.23*** -0.29***
(0.065)
(0.075)
0.0039
0.00049
(0.0040) (0.0039)

0.31*
(0.12)

0.44**
(0.15)

I formerly was a member of a labor union
Child under 18 years
Marital status (ref. = married)
Separated/divorced
Single
Other
Length of residence in current home (ref. = less than 1 year)
1–2 years
3–4 years
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5 or more years
Current city residence length
Region (ref. = Northeast)
Midwest
South
Mountain
Pacific
Non-Black population growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
Non-Hispanic population growth ‘00 to ‘10–14

0.025
(0.073)
0.019
(0.078)

0.20*
(0.092)
0.11
(0.063)

0.052
(0.12)
0.25*
(0.11)

0.020
(0.073)
0.017
(0.078)

0.21*
(0.092)
0.11
(0.063)

0.062
(0.12)
0.24*
(0.11)

-0.16*
(0.076)
0.066
(0.089)
-0.14
(0.11)

-0.22*
(0.10)
-0.17*
(0.081)
-0.10
(0.14)

0.30
(0.20)
-0.079
(0.095)
-0.40**
(0.14)

-0.16*
(0.077)
0.068
(0.089)
-0.14
(0.11)

-0.21*
(0.100)
-0.17*
(0.081)
-0.11
(0.14)

0.28
(0.20)
-0.084
(0.097)
-0.40**
(0.14)

-0.18
-0.13
(0.11)
(0.15)
-0.37***
0.038
(0.11)
(0.15)
-0.19
0.17
(0.10)
(0.13)
0.0020 -0.0053*
(0.0022) (0.0024)

0.012
(0.13)
0.015
(0.15)
-0.18
(0.11)
0.00027
(0.0020)

0.019
(0.13)
0.015
(0.14)
-0.18
(0.11)
0.00025
(0.0020)
0.061
(0.12)
0.10
(0.12)
0.24
(0.15)
-0.041
(0.14)
-0.0011
(0.0033)

-0.26*
(0.12)
0.018
(0.13)
0.055
(0.16)
0.14
(0.14)

-0.00081

-0.29*
(0.14)
-0.086
(0.16)
-0.10
(0.19)
-0.19
(0.12)

0.098
(0.11)
0.096
(0.11)
0.24
(0.16)
-0.013
(0.13)
-0.00023
(0.0030)

-0.17
-0.13
(0.11)
(0.15)
-0.37***
0.046
(0.11)
(0.15)
-0.18
0.18
(0.10)
(0.13)
0.0021 -0.0058*
(0.0023) (0.0025)
-0.30*
(0.13)
-0.019
(0.13)
0.060
(0.16)
0.11
(0.13)

-0.00076

-0.28*
(0.13)
-0.013
(0.15)
-0.059
(0.19)
-0.25*
(0.12)

(0.0025)
Non-Asian population growth ‘00 to ‘10–14

(0.0026)

Constant

-11.3
(7.02)

-1.10
(8.60)

0.0070*
(0.0033)
-0.51
(8.85)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

4,600
0.093

5,078
0.093

1,620
0.146

-10.2
(6.97)

-0.93
(8.49)

0.0070*
(0.0032)
0.53
(8.77)

4,600
0.092

5,078
0.096

1,620
0.146

Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community Survey 2010≠2014, Election Atlas
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Table 3.3. Multinomial logistic regressions predicting agreement that racial problems are rare/isolated with county-level
demographic change
Percentage point
growth Black ‘00 to
‘10–14, Black
respondents

Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor
disagree
Somewhat agree
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Strongly agree

Top quartile
Hispanic growth ‘00
to ‘10–14, Hispanic
respondents

Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree

Base

-0.037
(0.021
)
0.011

0.037

-0.011

0.038

0.159**

(0.021
)
Base

(0.030)

(0.049)

0.048

Base

(0.037
)
0.001
(0.039
)
0.049

(0.030
)
-0.038
(0.037
)
0.159*
*
(0.049
)

(0.032
)
-0.001
(0.039
)
0.122*

Base

0.375*
(0.159
)

-0.048
(0.032)

0.122*
(0.051)
0.170**

(0.045
)
Base

(0.054)

0.170*
*
(0.054)

0.121*

Base

0.375*

0.194

0.343*

0.656**

(0.159
)
Base

(0.183)

(0.173
)
-0.032

(0.231)

(0.171
)

(0.24)

(0.051
)

-0.049
(0.045)

-0.181
(0.192)

0.121*
(0.055)

(0.055
)

0.281

Neither agree nor
disagree
Somewhat agree

Strongly agree

-0.194

0.181

(0.183
)
0.343*
(0.173
)
0.656*
*
(0.231
)

(0.192
)
0.032

Base

0.149

0.462
(0.261)

-0.149

(0.215
)
Base

(0.171
)
-0.281

(0.215)
-0.462

-0.314

(0.240
)

(0.261)

(0.225
)

Robust standard
errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
153

Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000,
American Community Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
Note: These models include the same control variables as those presented
in Table 3.2.

0.314
(0.225)
Base

Table 3.4. OLS regressions predicting various racism-related outcomes with county-level demographic change
Whites have advantages
Asian

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Black

Fear other races

Variables

Black

Percentage point growth Black ‘00 to
‘10–14

0.0081

-0.0075

0.0072

(0.012)

(0.0080)

(0.012)

Percentage point growth Hispanic ‘00 to
‘10–14

Hispanic

Angry about racism
Asian

Black

Hispanic

0.0089

-0.011

-0.014

(0.013)

(0.011)

(0.015)

Percentage point growth Asian ‘00 to
‘10–14

Asian

0.0089

-0.015

0.021

(0.017)

(0.012)

(0.018)

Top quartile percentage point growth
Black ‘00 to ‘10–14

Black

-0.092

-0.094

0.032

(0.074)

(0.054)

(0.092)

Top quartile percentage point growth
Hispanic ‘00 to ‘10–14

0.079
(0.066)

Top quartile percentage point growth
Asian ‘00 to ‘10–14
Constant

Hispanic

Hispanic

0.0077

-0.063

(0.049)

(0.066)

Asian

0.054

0.036

0.15

(0.11)

(0.081)

(0.095)

10.5*

-5.09

5.74

11.0*

-4.99

3.46

-0.17

-5.73

9.59

-0.26

-5.30

9.29

-3.38

-7.14

-3.14

-1.90

-7.50

-4.42

(5.06)

(9.37)

(6.93)

(4.99)

(9.25)

(7.13)

(4.50)

(6.50)

(6.56)

(4.48)

(6.47)

(6.45)

(6.58)

(7.50)

(8.25)

(6.73)

(7.46)

(8.22)

Observations

4,601

5,083

1,621

4,601

5,083

1,621

4,605

5,081

1,623

4,605

5,081

1,623

4,599

5,075

1,617

4,599

5,075

1,617

R-squared

0.057

0.153

0.202

0.057

0.154

0.197

0.047

0.090

0.106

0.050

0.089

0.105

0.040

0.076

0.095

0.039

0.075

0.097

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
Notes: These models include the same control variables as those presented in Table 3.2. Sample sizes within a respondent group across outcomes differ due to small amounts of missing data for the outcomes.

Table 3.5. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting agreement that racial problems are
rare/isolated
AIPW
IPWRA
Top quartile Black growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Black respondents
Coefficient (pct.)
-5.4%* -6.7%**
Robust standard error
0.042
0.040
Observations
3,726
3,726
Top quartile Hispanic growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Hispanic respondents

Top quartile Asian growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Asian respondents

Coefficient (pct.)
Robust standard error
Observations

-5.4%*
0.052
4,443

-6.1%**
0.048
4,443

Coefficient (pct.)
Robust standard error
Observations

2.9%
0.097
1,426

1.4%
0.088
1,426

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
Note: These models include the same control variables as those presented in Table 3.2 except
racial/ethnic group percentages are measured in 2000.
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Table 3.6. Average percentage point growth, treatment vs. control counties (inverse-probabilityweighted and limited to primary analysis samples only)
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Treatment
4.05
7.68
3.64
Control
-0.21
3.41
1.06
Difference
4.26
4.27
2.58
Observations
3,726
4,443
1,426
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
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Table 3.7. Average estimated descriptive statistics for “high-growth” counties (inverseprobability-weighted and limited to analysis sample)
Top quartile of growth ‘00 to ‘10–14
Black Hispanic Asian
Percent Non-Hispanic White ‘00 (county-level, Census)
65.8
55.4
57.5
Percent Bush vote ‘00 (county-level, Election Atlas)
46.7
46.0
39.8
Population density ‘00 (county-level, Census)
1,131.2 2,061.9 6,491.7
Percent with at least 4-year degree (individual-level, CCES)
31.8
37.6
74.9
Observations
3,726
4,443
1,426
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community
Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
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Table 3.8. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting agreement that racial problems are rare/isolated for various subsamples
Higher White ‘00
Top quartile Black
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Black respondents

Top quartile Hispanic
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Hispanic respondents

Lower White ‘00

4-year degree+

No 4-year degree

AIPW

IPWRA

AIPW

IPWRA

AIPW

IPWRA

AIPW

IPWRA

Coefficient (pct.)

4.6%

4.3%

-4.5%*

-5.0%*

-1.6%

-2.9%

-5.6%*

-7.0%**

Robust standard error

0.058

0.057

0.045

0.044

0.104

0.097

0.047

0.046

Observations

2,044

2,044

3,492

3,492

1,201

1,201

2,503

2,503

-11.4%*

-15.1%***

-6.4%**

-6.4%**

-3.9%

-6.0%

-6.7%**

Robust standard error

0.105

0.091

0.053

0.052

0.122

0.117

Observations

1,089

1,089

3,841

3,841

1,795

1,795

Coefficient (pct.)

Foreign-born

U.S.-born

AIPW

IPWRA

AIPW

IPWRA

-8.2%***

-12.0%*

-10.1%*

-6.2%*

-8.1%***

0.055

0.051

0.141

0.13

0.055

0.052

2,733

2,733

931

931

3,465

3,465
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*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
Note: These models include the same control variables as those presented in Table 3.2 except racial/ethnic group percentages are measured in 2000.

Table 3.9. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting various “racism-related” variables, controlling for all other racism-related variables
Racial problems
Whites have
rare/isolated
advantages
Angry about racism Fear other races
AIPW
IPWRA
AIPW
IPWRA
AIPW
IPWRA AIPW IPWRA
Top quartile Black
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Black respondents
Coefficient (pct.) -7.0%*** -7.4%*** -2.0%** -2.1%** -1.6%**
-1.1%
-1.1%
-3.1%
Robust standard
error
0.039
0.038
0.03
0.03
0.026
0.028
0.044
0.044
Observations
3,710
3,710
3,710
3,710
3,710
3,710
3,710
3,710
Top quartile Hispanic
growth ‘00 to ‘10–14,
Hispanic respondents
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Coefficient (pct.)
Robust standard
error
Observations
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

-3.9%*

-5.5%**

4.0%**

2.3%

-0.8%

-1.2%

-2.7%

-1.8%

0.047
4,422

0.044
4,422

0.045
4,422

0.042
4,422

0.033
4,422

0.032
4,422

0.047
4,422

0.045
4,422

Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
Note: These models include the same control variables as those presented in Table 3.2 except racial/ethnic group percentages are
measured in 2000 and controls for the other racism-related variables are added.

CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX TABLES
Table A3. Agreement on various racism-related questions by race/ethnicity (survey weighted)
Black
Hispanic
Asian

Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Observations

Racial problems rare/isolated
51.6%
34.2%
21.1%
27.0%
14.1%
17.6%
7.4%
14.8%
5.8%
6.5%
4,787
5,334

29.8%
33.1%
19.4%
12.3%
5.3%
1,687

Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Observations

Whites have advantages
2.7%
12.4%
2.0%
7.3%
11.3%
19.7%
27.2%
27.8%
56.8%
33.0%
4,787
5,340

5.8%
6.4%
16.6%
33.8%
37.4%
1,688

Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Observations

Angry about racism
1.1%
0.8%
7.0%
13.2%
77.8%
4,792

1.5%
2.5%
12.5%
18.4%
65.0%
5,337

0.8%
2.4%
12.7%
26.7%
57.5%
1,690

Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Observations

Fear other races
43.5%
18.4%
22.7%
9.9%
5.6%
4,786

36.4%
19.6%
25.1%
14.5%
4.5%
5,331

23.4%
26.1%
28.8%
16.4%
5.4%
1,684

Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016
Note: Sample sizes within a respondent group across outcomes differ due to small amounts of
missing data for the outcomes.
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Table B3. Correlations between various racism-related outcomes
Black respondents
Racial problems
Whites have
rare/isolated
advantages
Whites have
advantages
-0.289
Angry about
racism
-0.188
0.387
Fear other races
0.223
0.09

Racial problems
rare/isolated
Whites have
advantages
Angry about
racism
Fear other races

Hispanic respondents
Whites have
advantages

Angry about
racism

0.053

Angry about
racism

-0.268
-0.295
0.211

Racial problems
rare/isolated

0.362
0.125
Asian respondents
Whites have
advantages

Whites have
advantages
-0.365
Angry about
racism
-0.308
0.445
Fear other races
0.092
0.182
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016
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0.011

Angry about
racism

0.016

Table C3. Mean likelihood of selection into “high growth” for respondents in treatment and
control counties with and without inverse probability weights (IPW) applied, primary
analysis samples only
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Without IPW
Treatment
41.5
58
73.7
Control
30
39.4
38
Difference
11.5
18.6
35.7
With IPW
Treatment
Control
Difference
Observations

33.3
34.2
-0.9
3,726

45.4
52
-6.6
4,443

59.4
57.9
1.5
1,426

Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American
Community Survey 2010–2014, Election Atlas
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Table D3. Correlations between contextual and individual characteristics for Black and
Hispanic respondents
Black respondents
At least 4-year degree
Lives in higher-White county 2000
-0.008

Lives in higher-White county 2000

Black respondents born
before 1992
At least 4-year degree
-0.003
Hispanic respondents
At least 4-year
Foreign-born
degree
0.045
-0.022
0.043

At least 4-year degree
Lives in higher-White county 2000

Hispanic respondents born before 1992
At least 4-year
Foreign-born
degree
At least 4-year degree
0.037
Lives in higher-White county 2000
-0.038
0.052
Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000
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